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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Are mystical states essentially ‘everywhere the same’? Though this question is notoriously obscure and difficult to answer, many contemporary writers on mysticism seem to favour an affirmative response to it, for a variety of reasons. First of all, some are impressed by the undeniable similarity in the testimony of mystics from widely divergent backgrounds and cultures; like most readers of mystical literature, they are deeply struck by the degree of apparent consensus between Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist contemplatives, for example. Secondly, there is a commendable desire in recent times to adopt a more positive and open-minded approach to other religions, and to acknowledge the value of their spiritual traditions; consequently, Christian authors today tend to focus on the common elements in Christian and non-Christian spiritualities, downplaying any differences. In the third place, those who wish to defend the cognitive value of mystical experiences on the basis of the ‘universal agreement’ of mystics will naturally maintain that there is a fundamental unanimity behind their different reports.
page 417 note 1 The Upanishads: Breath of the Eternal, trans. Swami Prabhavananda, and Manchester, Frederick (New York: New American Library, Mentor Book, 1957), p. 51Google Scholar; quoted in Stace, Walter T., Mysticism and Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1960), p. 88.Google Scholar
page 418 note 1 A less systematic defence of the same views can also be found in Stace, Walter T., The Teachings of the Mystics (New York: New American Library, Mentor Book, 1960)Google Scholar. In this paper, however, all quotations from Stace are taken from his Mysticism and Philosophy, on the pages indicated.
page 418 note 2 All quotations from Teresa are taken from the first two volumes of The Collected Works of St Teresa of Avila, trans. by Kavanaugh, Kieran, O.C.D. and Otilio Rodriguez, O.C.D., 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1976–1977)Google Scholar. Because St Teresa's writings are available in many editions, I will generally use a double system of reference, indicating the title, chapter, and paragraph number of the original, as well as the volume and page number in the edition I am using. Similarly, all quotations from John of the Cross are taken from The Collected Works of St John of the Cross, trans. by Kavanaugh, Kieran, O.C.D. and Otilio Rodriguez, O.C.D., 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1979)Google Scholar. For references to John, I will give the title of the treatise (either in full or in brief), and the redaction used (either A or B for the Spiritual Canticle and Living Flame of Love); the number of the book (in the case of the Ascent) is indicated by large roman numerals, while arabic numerals refer to the chapter or stanza and lower-case roman numerals give the paragraph number. Thus, ‘Ascent II. 12. iii’ directs the reader to the second book of The Ascent of Mount Carmel, chapter twelve, paragraph three.
page 419 note 1 Moore, Peter G., ‘Recent Studies of Mysticism: A Critical Survey’, Religion III (Autumn 1973), 150Google Scholar; Katz, Steven T., ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’, in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, ed. Katz, Steven T. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 30Google Scholar. See also Peter Moore, G., ‘Mystical Experience, Mystical Doctrine, Mystical Technique’, in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, pp. 108–12.Google Scholar
page 421 note 1 It is not clear what Stace might say about the further hypothetical case in which witness C, who has the same experience and background information as B, sincerely testifies that he ‘saw one individual carrying something and approaching another individual’. Would this be a high-level or low-level interpretation? Any any rate, C, who knows that the individuals were Smith and Jones and that the object was a Luger, is clearly giving less information about the ‘felt character’ of his experience than he could have. I mention this example only in order to raise the possibility, which Stace never seriously considers, that the relatively indeterminate reports of his favourite Eastern mystics could perhaps be omitting some of the phenomenal features of the actual experience.
page 421 note 2 Of course, the mystic may have difficulty explaining to the non-mystic exactly what phenomenal characteristics of his state make it seem to be an experience of something holy rather than demonic, personal rather than impersonal, loving rather than malevolent, and so on. But that hardly proves that a description in these terms is unwarranted, any more than a witness's testimony is discredited because he cannot say precisely which features of his experience inclined him to say, for example, that a suspect's behaviour seemed natural and friendly rather than formal or cleverly feigned.
page 421 note 3 Wainwright, William J., ‘Interpretation, Description, and Mystical Consciousness’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion XLV, supplement (09 1977), pp. 1004CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Wainwright is actually criticizing Ninian Smart's claim that ‘phenomenologically, mysticism is everywhere the same’, and that theistic accounts of mystical states are ‘highly ramified’ and should therefore be considered interpretations rather than descriptions. Smart originally defended this position in ‘Interpretation and Mystical Experience’, Religious Studies I (October 1965), 75–87, an abbreviated version of which was later published under the title ‘Mystical Experience’, in Art, Mind and Religion: Proceedings of the 1965 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, ed. Capitan, W. H. and Merrill, D. D. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 133–43Google Scholar. Nelson Pike offers similar criticisms of Smart's thesis in his ‘Comments’ on the latter paper, in the same volume, pp. 144–50.
page 424 note 1 It is also worth noting that even if Stace succeeded in proving that mystical experiences are ‘everywhere the same’, this would not by itself show that they are all states of ‘pure consciousness without content’. Theoretically one could just as easily turn his whole line of reasoning on its head, by using theistic accounts as the touchstone, and arguing that since John, Teresa, Eckhart, and Ruysbroeck all speak of ‘union with God’, and since the Mandukya Upanishad is ‘clearly’ referring to the same kind of experience, the states treated in the Upanishads must also be phenomenally theistic, even though, for various cultural and historical reasons, they are not described in such terms.
page 424 note 2 Teresa of Avila, The Book of Her Life, ch. 20, par. IGoogle Scholar, in Collected Works of St Teresa I. 129. Teresa's views on this kind of ‘union’ had undergone significant development by the time she wrote the Interior Castle, where she associates it with the fifth of the seven progressively more exalted spiritual ‘dwelling places’. All of this is explained in detail in Dicken, E. W. Trueman, The Crucible of Love: A Study of the Mysticism of St Teresa of Jesus and St John of the Cross (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1983), pp. 407–29.Google Scholar
page 425 note 1 Teresa of Avila, The Book of Her Life, ch. 23, par. 2Google Scholar, in Collected Works of St Teresa 1. 152. For a recent philosophical discussion of Teresa's concerns about demonic deception see Mavrodes, George, ‘Real v. Deceptive Mystical Experiences’, in Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, pp. 235–58.Google Scholar
page 425 note 2 Unimpressive as it may at first appear, this particular example is in fact especially telling because, for once, Stace seems to come down on the side of the orthodox interpretation; according to his characterization of introvertive mystical states, they always involve an experience of the ultimate unity as ‘timeless’, ‘changeless’, ‘eternal’ and so on. In this case John's assertion that God seems to ‘move’ within cannot be attributed to the influence of orthodoxy, since John explicitly points out that the experience is different from what traditional doctrine would lead one to expect.
page 425 note 3 Thomas, George F., Philosophy and Religious Belief (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), p. 102.Google Scholar
page 427 note 1 John, of the Cross, Ascent II. 26. iiiGoogle Scholar; see also Ascent II. 26. iv; Spiritual Canticle B 14 and 15. xii–xv; 37. ii, vii; Luring Flame B 3. ii–xvii. The other attributes John mentions include wisdom, mercy, and charity, all of which suggest a personal and loving tone to the experiences.