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Nāgārjuna's Approach to the Problem of the Existence of God

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

Hsueh-Li Cheng
Hsueh-Li Cheng
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Religious Studies, University of Hawaii at Hilo
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Extract

In this paper I will investigate Nāgārjuna's approach to the problem of the existence of God. Nāgārjuna lived in the second century A.D. and founded Mādhyamika Buddhism.1 He is considered to be one of the greatest thinkers of India2 and his philosophy, ‘the central philosophy of Buddhism’.3 Although there have been some systematic studies and presentations of Nāgārjuna's writings among Eastern and Western scholars during the past six or seven decades,4 many aspects of his teachings have not been adequately treated. One of these aspects is his examination of the concept of God or deity.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , June 1976 , pp. 207 - 216
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

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References

page 207 note 1 For the life of Nāgārjuna, see Walleser's, M.The Life of Nāgārjuna from Tibetan and Chinese Sources, Hirth Anniversary Volume, trans. by Probsthain, A. A., ed. Schindler, B. (London, 1922), pp. 421–55.Google Scholar

page 207 note 2 says, S. Radhakrishnan, ‘We have in Nāgārjuna one of the greatest thinkers of India, a far more vigorous sifting of the contents of experience than we found in either the subjectivists or the realists.’ Indian Philosophy, vol. 1 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1941), p. 644.Google Scholarsays, Y. Sogan, ‘The founder of the Mādhyamika School is the great Nāgārjuna, the most brilliant philosopher of India.’ Systems of Buddhistic Thought (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1912), p. 186.Google Scholar

page 207 note 3 Murti, T. R. V. says, ‘Considering the role and the importance of the Mādhyamika, I have ventured to appraise it as the Central Philosophy of Buddhism.’ The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. vii.Google Scholarsays, M. Hiriyanna, ‘In one sense it (the Mādhyamika) is the most important outcome of Buddha's teaching.‘ Outlines of Indian Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1932), p. 206.Google Scholar

page 207 note 4 Nāgārjuna's Kārikās first appeared in Western literature in Emile Burgess' Introduction à l'histoire du Buddhisme Indian (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1884).Google Scholar But Western scholars did not seriously study the Kārikās until La Vallée Poussin published the Sanskrit edition of Candrakirti's Prasannapadā in 1903.

page 207 note 5 T. R. V. Murti, Ibid. p. 226.

page 208 note 1 Murti, T. R. V., ‘Samvrti and Paramārtha in Mādhyamika and Advaita Vedānta’, in The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta, ed. by Sprung, Mervyn (Boston: D. Reidel, 1973), p. 13.Google Scholar

page 208 note 2 Mādhyamika Buddhism is known as San-lun-chung (Three Treatise School) in China. For this school is considered to be based on three texts: (a) the Middle Treatise (Chung-lun: Taishò no. 1564 in vol. 30), (b) the Twelve Gate Treatise (Shih-erh-men-lun: Taishò no. 1568 in vol. 30), and (c) the Hundred Treatise (Pai-lun: Taisho no. 1569 in vol. 30). The Twelve Gate Treatise was translated by Kumārajīva in A.D. 408–9 from the now lost Dvādasa-nikāya-śāstra. Both in verses and commentary were given by Nāgārjuna. It has no Tibetan translation nor does it exist in the Sanskrit original.

page 208 note 3 Soon after the death of the Buddha many of his followers began to think of him as more than a human being. Hīnayānists show a tendency to lift the Buddha, even during this early life, beyond the phenomenal into transcendental spheres. The Pali texts show that the historical Sākyamuni is not only above all ordinary mortals, but is the supreme deity (devātideva), who is omnipotent and omniscient. Mahāyānists such as Yogācāra and Tien-tai Buddhists think of the Buddha as supramundane and even transcendent. The Buddha is spoken of as having a threefold body (Trikāya): (1) Dharmakāya or Ideal body whose nature is wisdom and principle; (2) Sambhogakāya or Enjoyment or Reward by which appears only for the Bodhisattvas; and (3) Nirmānakāya or Transformation by which manifests itself for ordinary persons for their worship. These Trikāya are but three aspects of the one Buddha.

page 208 note 4 ‘Ìśvara is not only Śāstrayoni, but also the creator and sustainer of the intra-subjective (vyāvahārika) world common to all: the jīvas are the makers of the pratibhāsika world which is private and subjective. He is also the sustainer of the moral order.’ Murti, Ibid. p. 289n: see also Joshi, L. R., ‘A New Interpretation of Indian Atheism’, Philosophy East and West (July, 1966), p. 190.Google Scholar Not all Indian people hold this view of Ìśvara. For Advaita Vedāntism, Ìśvara is Māyā and only un-enlightened persons would regard Ìśvara as omnipotent and omniscient creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. See Chatterjee, S. C. and Datta, D. M., An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1939), pp. 58–9.Google Scholar

page 209 note 1 Nāgārjuna seems to think that theists might and would use God to explain the origin of the universe. He would like to show that it is untenable.

page 209 note 2 Nāgārjuna uses the tetralemma (catuskoti) to examine the issue. The so-called tetralemma is this: there are four possible alternative views about every aspect of reality: (1) affirmation, (2) negation, (3) both affirmation and negation, and (4) neither affirmation nor negation.

page 210 note 1 See the Twelve Gate Treatise, x.

page 210 note 2 Nāgārjuna's point is that we cannot intelligibly articulate conceptually the ordinary common sense notion of production or making. Whenever we try to use our language to describe the true nature of things, we would involve certain absurdity or contradiction. And whatever involves absurdity or contradiction cannot really depict reality. This and the following arguments assume that whatever cannot be explained rationally cannot be real.

page 211 note 1 Nāgārjuna says, ‘The effect which is already produced is not produced; that which is not yet produced is not produced. Without “that which is already produced” and “that which is not yet produced”, “that which is being produced” is not produced.’ Ibid. chapter xii: 1.

page 211 note 2 See Bertrand, Russell and Copleston, F. C., ‘The Existence of God – A Debate’ in A Modern Introduction to Philosophy, ed. by Paul, Edwards and Arthur, Pap (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 473–90.Google Scholar This debate was broadcast in 1948 on the Third Programme of the British Broadcasting Corporation.

page 211 note 3 David Hume seems to talk about this too in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Selby-Bigge, L. A. (2nd edition, 1902), pp. 147f.Google Scholar

page 212 note 1 Russell, Ibid. p. 479.

page 212 note 2 Ibid. p. 481.

page 212 note 3 See the Twelve Gate Treatise, x. Here Nāgārjuna comes closer to David Hume, who denies any rational basis for our belief in causal agency.

page 212 note 4 Ibid.

page 212 note 5 Ibid.

page 212 note 6 Ibid.

page 213 note 1 Ibid.

page 213 note 2 Ibid.

page 213 note 3 S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, Ibid. p. 235.

page 214 note 1 This would be the case, if the denial here means the denial of something real in the world.

page 215 note 1 Ayer, Alfred Jules, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 1946), p. 9.Google Scholar

page 215 note 2 Taishō, no. 1601 in vol. 32. This text was translated into Chinese by Vimoksasena (Pi-mu-chihhsien) and Gautama Prajna-ruci (Ch'u-tan-pan-jo-liu-chih) in A.D. 541 during the rule of the Eastern Wei.

page 216 note 1 Nāgārjuna, The Huei-cheng-lun, 23.

page 216 note 2 Nāgārjuna has done this in chapter xxii of the Middle Treatise.

page 216 note 3 Nāgārjuna emphasizes that the concept of the Tathāgata as the Absolute Being or a pantheistic God is incompatible with the doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda. According to the latter, ‘all things are dependent co-arising and hence are devoid of any self-existing reality. If anyone has an adequate understanding of this, he would have an adequate understanding of the Buddha’. The Middle Treatise, xxiv, 40.

page 216 note 4 Ibid. xxii: 15.