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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Donald R. Gregory has recently argued that the monk Gaunilo's response to St Anselm's ontological argument succeeds in showing what is fundamentally wrong with any ontological argument, including modern modal versions. He holds that the Gaunilo strategy in fact demonstrates what it alleges, that reasoning which parallels the form and intent ofAnselm's reductio argument can ‘prove’ a priori the existence of quite unacceptable entities.
page 41 note 1 All page references in parentheses are to Gregory, Donald R., ‘On behalf of the second-rate philosopher: a defense of the Gaunilo strategy against the ontological argument’, History of Philosophy Quarterly 1, 1 (1984).Google Scholar
page 42 note 1 Someone might wish to distinguish between possible referents for the terms ‘perfect’ and ‘greatest possible’. I am only concerned with what properties would be required of Gaunilo-strategy entities by Anselm's concept of G. So I use the terms ‘perfect’ and ‘greatest possible’ interchangeably to describe Anselm's supreme individual.
page 45 note 1 At Theaetetus 208D, Socrates suggests that descriptions of individual sensible substances cannot be logically individuating. Aristotle makes a similar point at Metaphysics Z 15.
page 49 note 1 Using very reasonable logical principles, we can construct a deductively valid ontological argument whose cogency depends solely on whether its first premise is true, whether it is logically possible that necessarily an individual should possess the divine requisites. Where ‘M’ = ‘it is logically possible that’, ‘N’ = ‘it is logically necessary that’, ‘→’ stands for strict implication, and ‘S’ = ‘is a supremely perfect individual’, theargumentis: (1) M(Ǝx) (N(Sx)); (2) (Ǝx) (N(Sx)) → N((Ǝx)Sx); (3) (p→ q)Ǝ(Mp ƎMq); (1), (2) and (3) together imply (4) MN(Ǝx)Sx; by S5, reduction, (4) entails (5) N(Ǝx)Sx. I borrow this derivation from Cargile, James, ‘The Ontological Argument’, Philosophy, no. 50 (1975).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
page 49 note 2 I am indebted to James Cargile for reading through earlier drafts of this paper and for providing valuable ideas.