Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
Agnostics often hold that, since there is not a clear preponderance of evidence either in favour of theistic belief or against it, their position of suspended belief is more rational than either theism or atheism. I would like to examine an objection raised recently by Clement Dore against the agnostic's reasoning on this matter.
page 627 note 1 ‘Agnosticism’, Religious Studies, 18 (1983), 503–7.Google Scholar
page 627 note 2 In ‘The Will to Believe’ and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897; rpt. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).Google Scholar His other general defence of this doctrine is to be found in ‘The sentiment of rationality’ in the same volume.
page 629 note 1 Both also in ‘The Will to Believe’ and Other Essays.