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International courts and global democratic values: Participation, accountability, and justification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2016

Jonathan W. Kuyper  and
Theresa Squatrito
Jonathan W. Kuyper*
Affiliation:
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department of Political Sciences, Stockholm University
Theresa Squatrito*
Affiliation:
Postdoctoral Research Fellow, PluriCourts, University of Oslo
*
*Correspondence to: Jonathan W. Kuyper, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Universeitwagen 10 F, Plan 5, Stockholm, Sweden 106 91. Author’s email: jonathan.kuyper@statsvet.su.se
** Correspondence to: Theresa Squatrito, P. O. Box 6706, St Olavs plass 5, 0130 Oslo, Norway. Author’s email: theresa.squatrito@jus.uio.no
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Abstract

In a post-Cold War era characterised by globalisation and deep interdependence, the actions of national governments increasingly have an effect beyond their own territorial borders. Moreover, key agents of global governance – international organisations and their bureaucracies, non-state actors and private agents – exercise pervasive forms of authority. Due to these shifts, it is widely noted that world politics suffers from a democratic deficit. This article contributes to work on global democracy by looking at the role of international courts. Building upon an original dataset covering the 24 international courts in existence since the end of the Second World War, we argue that international courts are able to advance democratic values and shape democratic practices beyond the state. They can do so by fostering equal participation, accountability, and public justification that link individuals directly with sites of transnational authority. We contend that the ability of international courts to promote these values is conditioned by institutional design choices concerning access rules, review powers, and provisions regarding judicial reason-giving. We canvass these design features of different international courts and assess the promises and pitfalls for global democratisation. We conclude by linking our analysis of international courts and global democratisation with debates about the legitimation and politicisation of global governance at large.

Keywords

Global DemocratisationInternational CourtsParticipationAccountabilityJustification
Type
Articles
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 43 , Issue 1 , January 2017 , pp. 152 - 176
Copyright
© British International Studies Association 2016 

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23 We use the term ‘global democracy’ to refer to proposals or blueprints, and ‘global democratisation’ to signify the ongoing attainment of democratic values.

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44 These six courts were the Andean Tribunal of Justice, the Benelux Court of Justice, the European Court of Justice (now the Court of Justice of the European Union), the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

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59 Previous data on access to ICs do not cover all four types. When speaking of international criminal tribunals one might also victim access, such as offering testimony. We do not include this in the coding because it does not have a direct equivalent in the non-criminal tribunals.

60 The connections between public justification and public participation rights are expanded upon below. Observer status, though, is a good example of how different democratic values intersect in supportive ways.

61 Proceedings of the World Trade Organization Appellate Body (WTO AB) can be open to the public upon agreement of the disputing parties. Otherwise, proceedings are closed to the public. Mackenzie, Ruth, Romano, Cesare, Sands, Philippe, and Shany, Yuval, The Manual on International Courts and Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 88–89 Google Scholar.

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77 Ibid., p. 286. A prominent example of a case where an IC exercises international constitutional review is the Kadi case decided by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission (2008) ECR I–6351.

78 Ibid., p. 295.

79 See Appendix for more information.

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83 Dingwerth, ‘Global democracy and the democratic minimum’.

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91 Instead we offered separate rationale for adopting these values, derived from democratic theory and recent work on global democracy.

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93 Valentini, ’No global demos’.

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