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Republicanism Reconsidered: Some Thoughts on the Foundation and Preservation of the American Republic*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Jean Yarbrough
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Extract

Just when the equation of republican government with liberal representative democracy had finally taken hold in the academic community, a new group of scholars began to emphasize the differences between them. Drawing upon the writings of earlier republican theorists, they argued that republican government traditionally depended upon political participation and virtue to preserve freedom. In contrast, liberal democracy relied upon representation and self-interest, both of which undermined the civic spirit of the community.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , January 1979 , pp. 61 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1979

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References

1 The classic argument is Hartz, Louis, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955)Google Scholar. As a general index of this shift, the 1930 edition of the Encyclopedia of Social Scienceslists separate entries for “republic” and “democracy.” The 1968 edition of the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences makes no separate entry for “republic,” but refers the reader to “democracy.” The Dictionary of Social Science (1964) notes that “the distinction between a liberal democracy and a republic tended to become obsolete in the nineteenth century.”

2 Some of the most recent works which deal with this development in American political thought are Arendt, Hannah, On Revolution (London, 1963)Google Scholar; Diamond, Martin, “Politics and Ethics: The American Way” (Paper delivered at the 1976 American Political Science Association, Chicago)Google Scholar; Pocock, J.G.A., The Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, 1975)Google Scholar; and Wood, Gordon, The Creation of the American Republic: 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill, 1969)Google Scholar.

3 Although it is doubtful whether liberal democracy can be preserved without some concern for the character of the people, this issue is seldom raised in the debate over republicanism and liberal democracy. If it were, the distinction between the two forms would be even more subtle, for it seems that liberal democracy also depends upon some kind of virtue. As I try to suggest in this article, however, this virtue is of a different kind. It is concerned with personal moral and religious qualities and tends to play down the importance of an active civic virtue. In this connection, the recently published Moral Foundations of the American Republic, ed. Horwitz, Robert (Charlottesville, 1977) is especially illuminatingGoogle Scholar.

4 Here the above mentioned scholars divide. Wood and Diamond place the Founders in the liberal tradition, while Arendt and Pocock argue that they retained certain republican features. See Pocock, , Machiavellian Moment, esp. pp. 513 ffGoogle Scholar.

5 Wood, Creation, of the Republic; Diamond, , “Democracy and The Federalist: A Reconsideration of the Framers' Intent,” American Political Science Review, 53 (03, 1959), 52–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar. From a more limited perspective, see also Stourzh, Gerald, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970)Google Scholar.

6 Madison, James, Hamilton, Alexander, and Jay, John, The Federalist, ed. Cooke, Jacob E. (Middletown, Wesleyan University Press, 1961), No. 10, p. 62Google Scholar; No. 14, p. 84; No. 39, p. 251.

7 For a full discussion of these and other definitions, see Stourzh, , Hamilton, pp. 38–75Google Scholar.

8 Two notable exceptions are Anastoplo, George, The Constitutionalist (Dallas, 1971) and from a different perspectiveGoogle Scholar, Eidelberg, Paul, A Discourse on Statesmanship: The Design and Transformation of the American Polity (Urbana, 1974)Google Scholar. Also, Pocock, Machiavellian Moment.

9 Fink, Zera, The Classical Republicans: An Essay in the Recovery of a Pattern of Thought (Evanston, Ill., 1945)Google Scholar.

10 Pocock, , Machiavellian Moment, pp. 506 ffGoogle Scholar.

11 In this respect, my classification more closely resembles that of Gerald Stourzh. Stourzh distinguishes between classical and modern political philosophy; he then divides the moderns into two stages. The first ranges “from Machiavelli's Discourses to the early books of Montesquieu's magnum opus, to Mably, and to Rousseau …” (Hamilton, p. 72). This corresponds to the neoclassical republican tradition I shall later discuss. The second stage includes those philosophers from Hobbes to Hume who “asserted the primacy of the private passions for individual self-preservation, self-enrichment, and selfaggrandizement” (ibid., p. 73). My quarrel with Stourzh is that he believes the American “republic” is grounded on the second stage of modern political philosophy.

12 For a discussion of whom the revolutionary generation read, see Colbourn, H. Trevor, The Lamp of Experience: Whig History and the Intellectual Origins of the American Revolution (New York, 1965)Google Scholar.

13 See especially, Aristotle, , Politics, trans. Barker, Ernest (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 1280 b 8Google Scholar; Plutarch, , Lives, trans. Dryden, John, 3 vols. New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1921), “Life of Lycurgus,” vol. I, p. 90Google Scholar.

14 Plutarch, , “Comparison of Nuraa with Lycurgus,” in Lives, 1: 118–119Google Scholar.

15 The notion of a separation of powers need not mean that each social class or political branch shares power equally. Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, and Plutarch all praise constitutions in which the aristocratic or oligarchic element predominates. This suggests that the preservation of these regimes depended more upon the virtue of its leading citizens than on a mechanical balance of power.

16 Plutarch, , “Life of Lycurgus,” I: 63Google Scholar. Rome was the one great exception to this principle, having evolved its republican institutions out of monarchy. It was, however, for this reason that Machiavelli claimed in the Discourses that Rome could never attain more than a second degree of happiness. Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince and the Discourses, ed. Lerner, Max (New York: Modern Library, 1940) bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 116; bk. 1, chap. 14, p. 139Google Scholar; Aristotle Politics 1253a.

17 Cited in Stourzh, , Hamilton, p. 173Google Scholar. John Adams also believed the Romans were too militaristic. John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, Dec. 21, 1819, in The Adams-Jefferson Letters, ed. Cappon, Lester J. (New York, 1971), p. 237Google Scholar. (Hereafter cited as Letters.)

18 In Farrand, Max, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, rev. ed., 4 vols. (New Haven, 1937), 1: 401–403Google Scholar.

19 Thomas Jefferson to Monsieur Coray, October 31, 1823, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Memorial Edition, eds. Lipscomb, Andrew A. and Bergh, Albert Ellery, 20 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1905), XV: 481–482Google Scholar.

20 For a discussion of this tradition, see Pocock, and Fink, , as well as Robbins, Caroline, The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman: Studies in the Transmission, Development and Circumstances of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies (Cambridge, 1959)Google Scholar.

21 Strauss, Leo, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Seattle, 1958)Google Scholar.

22 Pocock, , Machiavellian Moment, esp. pp. 167, 177, 472Google Scholar; Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, chap. 1.

23 Harrington, James, Oceana in Ideal Commonwealths, ed. Morley, Henry (New York, 1901), pp. 183–416, esp. 183–212Google Scholar. Pocock, , Machiavellian Moment, pp. 389–395Google Scholar.

24 In The English Libertarian Heritage: From the Writings of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon in the Independent Whig and Cato's Letters, ed. Jacobson, David L. (Indianapolis, 1965)Google Scholar. Although Gordon and Trenchard did not advocate the elimination of monarchical institutions and, thus, were not republicans in the strict sense, they were influential in the development of American republican thought.

25 Machiavelli, Discourses, bk. I, chap. 27. Also, see Stourzh, , Hamilton, pp. 64–67Google Scholar.

26 “Cato”, in Jacobson, English Libertarian Heritage, esp. nos. 35 and 63.

27 Wood, , Creation of the Republic, esp. pp. 606–615Google Scholar; Diamond, “Democracy and The Federalist”. In his later essays, Diamond qualified his argument, but he limited his discussion to a consideration of moral virtue and did not consider civic virtue. See especially “Politics and Ethics”.

28 Eliot, Jonathon, ed., Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 5 vols. (Philadelphia, 1901), III: 536–537Google Scholar. See also the discussion by Jaffa, Harry in Crisis of the House Divided (Seattle, 1959), pp. 204–205Google Scholar.

29 Federalist, No. 55, p. 378; No. 57, p. 384; also The Writings of James Madison, ed. Hunt, Gaillard, 9 vols. (New York, 1906), VI: 96–99Google Scholar; 340. Consider also Madison's discussions of education in Padover, Saul K., The Forging of American Federalism (New York, 1953), esp. pp. 313–317Google Scholar. Also, the discussion of Madison's political thought in Eidelberg, , Discourse on Statesmanship, pp. 216–40Google Scholar.

30 Although this argument may seem excessively Machiavellian, there is one fundamental difference. Machiavelli is not concerned with how men are, only with how they appear. The Framers' discussion of institutional arrangements suggests that they believed that concern for how we appear influences what we are and what we can become.

31 Adair, Douglass, “Fame and the Founding Fathers”, in Fame and the Founding Fathers: Essays by Douglass Adair, ed. Colbourn, H. Trevor (New York, 1974), pp. 2–26, esp. pp. 11–12Google Scholar.

32 See Stourzh, , Hamilton, p. 125 ffGoogle Scholar; for Madison's views, see above note 26.

33 For a discussion of the recent literature, see Pateman, Carole, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge, 1970), chap. 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

34 Arendt, , On Revolution, pp. 206 ffGoogle Scholar.

35 Federalist, No. 38, p. 238.

36 Adair, , “Fame”, esp. p. 13Google Scholar.

37 “North American No. 1”, in The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the Political Thought of James Madison, ed. Meyers, Marvin (Indianapolis, 1973), pp. 34–43, esp. p. 35Google Scholar.

38 In his superb essay on fame, Adair has also argued that Madison was concerned with fame. He gives as evidence Madison's discussion of the ancient lawgivers in Federalist, No. 38 and his monumental effort to record faithfully the debates at the Federal Convention. In my opinion, however, the “North American Letter No. I” is more to the point. A case might also be made for Federalist, No. 14, which in rhetorical style closely resembles the North American, written four years earlier. See also Eidelberg's, discussion, Discourse on Statesmanship, pp. 256 ffGoogle Scholar.

39 To be sure, the classical political philosophers also recognized the limits of fame and of the political realm in general.

40 Perhaps the best formulation of this position occurs in Common Sense, where Thomas Paine cites that “wise observer on governments Dragonetti. ‘The science … of the politician consists in fixing the true point of happiness and freedom. Those men would deserve the gratitude of ages, who should discover a mode of government that contained the greatest sum of individual happiness, with the least national expense’” (in The Essential Thomas Paine, ed. Hook, Sidney [New York, 1969], p. 48)Google Scholar.

41 For an illuminating discussion of the role of the lawgiver in antiquity, and the differences between Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Rousseau on this point, see Masters, Roger, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton, 1968), pp. 354–369Google Scholar.

42 Machiavelli, , Discourses, bk. 1, chap 2, pp. 110–11Google Scholar; Harrington, , Oceana, p. 232Google Scholar; Adams, John, A Defense of the American Constitutions in Political Writings: Representative Selections, ed. Peek, George A. Jr, (Indianapolis, 1954), p. 121Google Scholar. (Hereafter cited at Political Writings.) The failure of the Founders to resolve the problem of slavery exemplifies what can happen when essential freedoms are not fixed all at once. A good case can be made that the Civil War fundamentally transformed the federal republic and was, in effect, a second founding.

43 Federalist, No. 38, p. 240. Here I believe Stourzh (Hamilton, p. 176ff.) draws too sharp a line between Hamilton and Madison, and at Madison's expense. I am not persuaded that Hamilton's study of the ancient lawgivers is to be taken literally as a prescription for the American founding. Hamilton seems to have accepted the liberal view of human nature (upon which the natural rights of men rest) as well as the liberal principles of political obligation. If then Hamilton is not so much an “ancient”, Madison is not so much a liberal (ibid., pp. 59–60). Both men draw upon ancient and modern principles; the difference seems to be more a question of a democratic vs. aristocratic interpretation of these principles.

44 Stourzh (Hamilton, p. 119) has argued that although Madison subscribed to Hume's argument that it was easier to maintain a large republic against instability, he neglected Hume's argument that it was more difficult to found a large republic. Federalist, No. 37, suggests that Madison was indeed aware of the dangers. It seems more to the point to argue that Madison believed the Americans had avoided these dangers (No. 37 was written after the Constitutional Convention), rather than that he neglected them.

45 Locke, John, The Second Treatise of Government (Indianapolis, 1952)Google Scholar.

46 Iredell, James, in Eliot, Debates, IV: 9–11Google Scholar.

47 Federalist, No. 40. For a discussion of this point see Arendt, , On Revolution, pp. 176–216Google Scholar.

48 For an excellent survey of this development, see Wood, , Creation of the Republic, pp. 308ffGoogle Scholar.

49 Adams, , in Political Writings, p. 117Google Scholar. Cf. Rousseau, , Social Contract, bk. 2, chap. 7Google Scholar, where Rousseau advises the legislator to persuade the people that the laws have come from the gods. Also, Machiavelli, Discourses, bk. 5, chap. 11, which Rousseau cites.

50 Adams, , in Political Writings, p. 117Google Scholar.

51 If space allowed, it would be helpful to consider, in addition to the universal principles of liberty, equality, and consent, the historical and physical conditions of the founding, e.g., the colonial experience, the impact of the War of Independence, the agrarian economy of the eighteenth century, and the way these conditions affected the preservation of a distinctive republican character and way of life.

52 Aristotle Politics 1319b.

53 Adair, “‘That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science’: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist”, reprinted in Fame, pp. 93–106.

54 Hamilton, in Farrand, , Records Federal Convention, I: 147Google Scholar; also Aristotle, Politics 1308aGoogle Scholar; Hume, David, “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth”, in Political Essays, ed. Hendel, Charles W. (Indianapolis, 1953), p. 157Google Scholar.

55 Hamilton immediately introduces this theme in. Federalist, No. 1.

56 Adams to Jefferson, 15 November 1813, p. 400; 16 July 1814, pp. 435–436; 21 December 1819, p. 551, in Letters.

57 See the brilliant analysis of Lincoln's “Perpetuation of our Political Institutions Speech”, in Jaffa, , House Divided, pp. 183–232Google Scholar.

58 Also, Adair, “Fame”.

59 Pocock, , Machiavellian Moment, esp. pp. 507 ffGoogle Scholar.

60 Madison seems to have recognized the danger of largeness. In 1791, he wrote “… the more extensive a country, the more insignificant is each individual in his own eyes. This may be unfavorable to liberty”. Cited in Padover, p. 294. He did not foresee any difficulty with the principle of representation.

61 de Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America, ed. Bradley, Phillips, 2 vols. (New York, 1966), 11: 320–321Google Scholar.

62 Arendt, , On Revolution, p. 283Google Scholar; Morgenthau, Hans, The Purpose of American Politics (New York, 1960), pp. 203–208Google Scholar.

63 Tocqueville, 1:93.

64 Jefferson, , Notes on Virginia, Query XVII, in Political Writings: Representative Selections, ed. Dumbauld, Edward (Indianapolis, 1955), p. 38Google Scholar.

65 The same can be said of the political thought of the anti-federalists. Supporters and opponents of the Constitution divided over the size and kind of representation appropriate to republican government. As a general rule, the anti-federalists did not champion the cause of participation.

66 Federalist, No. 10; also Wood, , Creation of the Republic, pp. 319–328Google Scholar.

67 Although not all participation promotes civic virtue, participation is nevertheless necessary for civic virtue.

68 Thus, by 1784 even Samuel Adams had come to believe that “popular Committees and County Conventions were not only useless but dangerous”, cited in Wood, , Creation of the Republic, p. 327Google Scholar.

69 Arendt, , On Revolution, pp. 234–42Google Scholar.

70 McWilliams, Wilson Carey, The Idea of Fraternity in America (Berkeley, 1973), p. 193Google Scholar. Although I do not share Professor McWilliams's longing for fraternity, and prefer instead the concern with citizenship, he is entirely correct when he suggests that the “great Beast” may have been made too tame.

71 Jefferson to Colonel Smith, 13 Nov. 1787, in The Life and Selected Writings of Jefferson, ed. Koch, Adrienne and Peden, William (New York, 1944), p. 436Google Scholar. (Hereafter cited as Selected Writings.) With the passage of the Alien and Sedition acts, the theme of lethargy became important to James Madison, though he never championed the wards as a means of combatting this problem.

72 See in particular, Jefferson to Madison, 30 January 1787, p. 413; Jefferson, to Kercheval, Samuel, 12 07 1816, pp. 673ffGoogle Scholar, in Selected Writings. Also, Arendt, , On Revolution, pp. 234–42Google Scholar.

73 For example, Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval 5 September 1816; Jefferson to Joseph Cabell, 2 February 1816; Jefferson to Joseph Cartwright, 5 June 1824; Jefferson, to Taylor, John, 28 05 1816, in Political Writings, pp. 98–101; 51–53Google Scholar.

74 Jefferson, to Cartwright, John, 5 06 1824, in Political Writings, p. 100Google Scholar.

75 Jefferson, to Taylor, John, 28 05 1816, in Selected Writings, p. 670Google Scholar.

76 Jefferson, to Cabell, Joseph C., 2 02 1816, in Selected Writings, p. 661Google Scholar.

77 Jefferson, to Adams, John, 28 10 1813, in Selected Writings, pp. 633–634Google Scholar.

78 Jefferson, to Adams, John, 28 10 1813, in Political Writings (full text not given in Selected Writings, n. 27), pp. 100–101Google Scholar.

79 Ibid., p. 100.

80 See especially, Mansfield, Harvey C. Jr, “Thomas Jefferson”, in American Political Thought, ed. Frisch, Morton and Stevens, Richard (New York, 1971), pp. 23–50Google Scholar.

81 Adair, , “Fame and the Founding Fathers”, in Fame, pp. 19–21Google Scholar. Also consider The Literary Bible of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Chinard, Gilbert (Baltimore, 1928)Google Scholar. It includes extensive quotations from Euripides, Homer, Vergil, Ovid, Pope, and Shakespeare. Lehman, Karl, Thomas Jefferson: American Humanist (New York, 1947), p. 117Google Scholar, has also noted Jefferson's lack of enthusiasm for the political heroes portrayed in Plutarch's Lives.

82 In Political Writings, p. 32.

83 Jefferson, to Kercheval, Samuel, 12 07 1810, in Selected Writings, p. 674Google Scholar.

84 Unlike contemporary advocates of participation, Jefferson did not believe that participation by itself was sufficient. He always insisted that it be accompanied by education. For Jefferson, “the continuance of republican government” hung on “these two hooks”. Jefferson, to Cabell, Joseph C., 31 01 1814, in Political Writings, p. 97Google Scholar.

85 Walzer, Michael, “Civility and Civic Virtue in Contemporary America”, Social Research, 41 (Winter 1974), 593–611Google Scholar.

86 Especially Federalist, No. 49, pp. 340–341.

87 Stern, Peter, “Thomas Jefferson and the Problem of Preserving Republican Spirit” (Paper delivered at the Conference for the Study of Political Thought, Loyola University of Chicago, 04 1976)Google Scholar.

The author wishes to thank Professors Peter Stern and William Baumgarth for their critical comments on a n earlier draft of this article.