Hostname: page-component-cb9f654ff-p5m67 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-09-03T14:17:43.020Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

MODAL MODELS FOR BRADWARDINE'S THEORY OF TRUTH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2008

GREG RESTALL
GREG RESTALL*
Affiliation:
The University of Melbourne
*
*PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE MELBOURNE, VICTORIA 3010, AUSTRALIA E-mail:restall@unimelb.edu.au
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Stephen Read (2002, 2006) has recently discussed Bradwardine's theory of truth and defended it as an appropriate way to treat paradoxes such as the liar. In this paper, I discuss Read's formalisation of Bradwardine's theory of truth and provide a class of models for this theory. The models facilitate comparison of Bradwardine's theory with contemporary theories of truth.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 1 , Special Issue 2: Mathematical Methods in Philosophy , August 2008 , pp. 225 - 240
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brandom, R. B. (1994). Making It Explicit. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Coffa, J. A. (1993). The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap. Wessels, L., editor. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Fine, K. (1988). Semantics for quantified relevance logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 17(1), 27–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldblatt, R., & Mares, E. D. (2006). An alternative semantics for quantified relevant logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 71(1), 163–187.Google Scholar
Grover, D. (1972). Propositional quantifiers. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1(2), 111–136.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grover, D. (1992). A Prosentential Theory of Truth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grover, D. L., Camp, J. L., & Belnap, N. D. (1975). A prosentential theory of truth. Philosophical Studies, 27(2), 73–125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Horwich, P. (1990). Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Leitgeb, H. (1999). Truth and the liar in De Morgan-valued models. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 40(4), 496–514.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leitgeb, H. (2005). What truth depends on. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 34(2), 155–192.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Priest, G. (1979). The logic of paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8(1), 219–241.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Read, S. (1988). Relevant Logic: A Philosophical Examination of Inference. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
Read, S. (2002). The liar paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine. Vivarium, 40(2), 189–218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Read, S. (2006). Symmetry and paradox. History and Philosophy of Logic, 27, 307–318.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Restall, G. (1993). Deviant logic and the paradoxes of self reference. Philosophical Studies, 70(3), 279–303.CrossRefGoogle Scholar