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Time and Degrees of Existence: A Theory of ‘Degree Presentism’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2010

Extract

It seems intuitively obvious that what I am doing right now is more real than what I did just one second ago, and it seems intuitively obvious that what I did just one second ago is more real than what I did forty years ago. And yet, remarkably, every philosopher of time today, except for the author, denies this obvious fact about reality. What went wrong? How could philosophers get so far away from what is the most experientially evident fact about reality?

Type
Papers
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2002

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