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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2009
It is a curious fact that while the problem of free will has been long and widely discussed by both philosophers and theologians in the modern world, it has been largely in two separate compartments, the one set seldom conferring with the other, or even overhearing what the other has to say. Sometimes they seem almost to be talking of two different things.
page 115 note 1 Brunner, Emil, The Divine Imperative (Engl. tr.), p. 74Google Scholar. It is only fair to add that Brunner distinguishes between formal freedom, which every man possesses, and material freedom, which the enslaved will does not possess.
page 117 note 1 In an article in Mind, reprinted as an Appendix to the 6th edition of Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics.