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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 February 2009
‘What sort of meaning does Christian discourse have?’ The question seems misleading, for within Christian discourse there are many different kinds of meaning—moral, historical, symbolic, exclamatory, etc. Modern philosophers recognise this, but they are mainly interested in the sort of meaning which is characteristic or distinctive of a realm of discourse, comparing and contrasting this with other uses of language. In this essay, we shall consider the varied analyses given by three contemporary philosophers. Each philosopher, in his analysis of Christian discourse, suggests a different nonreligious use of language as the illuminating logical model. Naturally, there is more in each book than the outline and application of the logical model, but I shall concentrate on this.
page 137 note 1 Foster, M. B., Mystery and Philosophy, S.C.M., London, 1957Google Scholar; Wilson, John, Language and Christian Belief, Macmillan, London, 1958Google Scholar; Smart, Niniah, Reasons and Faiths, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958.Google Scholar
page 138 note 1 ibid., p. 64.
page 138 note 2 Otto, R., The Idea of the Holy, translated by Harvey, J. W., 2nd edition, Geoffrey Cumberlcge, London, 1950.Google Scholar
page 138 note 3 Foster, op. cit., p. 49.
page 140 note 1 The word ‘indirect’ refers in part to the fact that a statement of the evidence is not the same in meaning as a statement of the status-claim. It is interesting to compare the relation of ‘characteristic’ to status with the relation of ‘feature’ to value (cf. part III). Note that ‘features’ are sometimes treated independently as if they were what the value-word means; e.g. when ‘X brings great unhappiness’ is viewed as a contradiction of ‘X is good’, rather than as adverse evidence. Similarly the ‘characteristics’ may sometimes be treated independently as if they were what the status-word means; e.g. when ‘Jones sins’ is viewed as a contradiction of ‘Jones is holy’, rather than as adverse evidence (a perennial theological categorymistake). Note however that value-judgments differ from status claims in a crucial way: the important contrast concerning the latter is between direct evidence and indirect evidence, whereas the former contrasts the expression of the speaker's response and the description of supporting evidence, which evidence is not significantly distinguished into ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’.
page 142 note 1 Wilson, op. cit., pp. 23–24.
page 143 note 1 Wilson, op. cit., pp. 30–31
page 143 note 2 cf. Smart's discussion, op. cit., chapter II.
page 144 note 1 e.g. immortality, the problem of evil, judgment, sacraments, etc.
page 144 note 2 e.g. in Ethics, by P. Nowell-Smith, Pelican, 1954; The Language of Moral, by Hare, R. M., Oxford, 1952Google Scholar; A Modem Introduction to Moral Philosophy by Montefiore, A., Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.Google Scholar
page 145 note 1 It is impossible to summarise Reasons and Faiths, which is a monumental work. It includes analyses of several great religious, fundamental religious concepts which he classifies as ‘numinous’, ‘mystical’ and ‘incarnational’, the role of morality, etc.
page 145 note 2 Largely, but not entirely, for Smart contrasts the incarnate deity with saint or prophet (who are analysed in terms of the numinous), in terms of the special status needed by a Saviour of the world. Smart's brief chapter on incarnation, incidentally, is an example of the amazing compression of his writing, for it also includes brilliant outlines of a doctrine of the atonement, a theory of ‘kenosis’, and the essential contrast between Christian incarnation and Hindu avatara.
page 145 note 3 Smart does not use the alternative form ‘implication that one has’ such-andsuch response.
page 145 note 4 Smart op., cit., p. 33.
page 145 note 5 cf. ibid., pp. 73–75.
page 146 note 1 Smart, op. cit., pp. 33–34.
page 146 note 2 ibid., p. 35.
page 147 note 1 Smart, op. cit., p. 5s.
page 147 note 2 ibid., p. 43.
page 147 note 3 ibid., p. 138; cf. p. 90.