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Institution Building in Bolshevik Russia: The Case of “State Kontrol'”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Thomas Remington
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Extract

One of the dilemmas of revolutionary regimes is the difficulty they experience in creating new structures of rule out of resources inherited from the ancien regime. In Russia, the Bolsheviks came to power dedicated to building a socialist society and creating new institutions whose forms were predicated on an unfolding theory of how the transition to socialism would occur. Such a method of shaping institutions was deductive and synoptic, standing in sharp contrast to the evolutionary adaptation of old institutions to new functions. One may wonder how free revolutionary regimes in fact are to construct institutions a novo. The early Bolshevik attempt to establish “control” structures, that is, institutions and procedures for the external auditing and monitoring of economic and other public organizations, is a case in point. Of interest are the extent to which the Bolsheviks were successful in creating effective control bodies and the reasons behind their success or failure.

Type
Discussion
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 41 , Issue 1 , Spring 1982 , pp. 91 - 103
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1982

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References

I wish to express my appreciation to William Burgess, Larry Holmes, William Rosenberg, Richard Stites, and the editor and referees of Slavic Review for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also grateful to the Russian and East European Center of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for making it possible through the Summer Research Laboratory to work at the Slavic Library, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

1. Although this theme is familiar in political theory, there is little empirical research bearing on it. Hannah Arendt defines revolution in terms of this experience of being free of the past and able to create new institutions ( Hannah, Arendt, On Revolution [New York: Viking Press, 1965], p. 27Google Scholar).

2. The first approach corresponds to Charles E. Lindblom's construct “Model One” as a guiding vision of social organization in which problems are solved through analysis rather than trial and error (see Lindblom, Charles E., Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems [New York: Basic Books, 1977Google Scholar], chap. 19). The evolutionary approach is often associated with Edmund Burke, who warned against replacing institutions “in favor of a geometrical and arithmetical constitution … without having models and patterns of approved utility” to follow ( Edmund, Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. Conor Cruise O'Brien [Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969], pp. 144, 152Google Scholar).

3. The ambiguities of the concept of control are discussed by William Rosenberg, “Workers and Workers’ Control in the Russian Revolution,” History Workshop, 1978, no. 5, p. 89. Also see Adams, Jan S., Citizen Inspectors in the Soviet Union: The People's Control Committee (New York: Praeger, 1977, pp. 3–4 Google Scholar. More abstractly, Gerard Bergeron has identified a range of six possible degrees of control (domination, direction, limitation, surveillance, verification, and consultation) in a useful discussion of the differences between the European and English usages of the term (see Gérard Bergeron, Fonctionnement de I'État, 2nd ed. [Paris: Librairie Armond Colin, 1965], pp. 41–52 Google Scholar). Although in Bolshevik Russia the exact sense of the term became indistinct, its core meaning expressed monitoring rather than executive authority.

4. V. A. Sakovich, Gosudarstvennyi kontrol’ v Rossii: ego istoriia i sovremennoe ustroistvo v sviazi s izlozheniem smetnoi sistemy, kassovago poriadka i ustroistva gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti, 2 vols. Vol. 1, 2nd rev. ed. (St. Petersburg, 1898); vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1897).

5. Cf. Paul H. Avrich, “The Russian Revolution and the Factory Committees” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1961); idem, “The Bolshevik Revolution and Workers’ Control in Russian Industry,” Slavic Review, 22, no. 1 (March 1963): 47-63; Robert James Devlin, Jr., “Petrograd Workers and Workers’ Factory Committees in 1917: An Aspect of the Social History of the Russian Revolution” (Ph.D. diss., SUNY at Binghamton, 1976); A., Pankratova, Fabzavkomy iprofsoiuzy v revoliutsii 1917 g. (Moscow and Leningrad, 1927Google Scholar); idem, Fabzavkomy Rossii v bor'be za sotsialisticheskuiu fabriku (Moscow, 1923); Kaplan, Frederick I., Bolshevik Ideology and the Ethics of Soviet Labour, 1917-1920: The Formative Years (London: Peter Owen, 1969Google Scholar); Maurice, Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers’ Control, 1917-1921: The State and Counter-Revolution (London: Solidarity, 1970Google Scholar); and Goodey, C, “Factory Committees and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat (1918),” Critique, 1974, no. 3Google Scholar.

6. Novyi luch, December 6, 1917. This is a Menshevik newspaper available in the Nikolaevskii collection of Menshevik documents at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

7. Thomas F. Remington, “Democracy and Development in Bolshevik Socialism, 1917-1921” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1978), p. 37.

8. See the statement by delegate Maksimov at the First All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions in Pervyi vserossiiskii s “ezdprofessional'nykh soiuzov, 7-14 ianvaria 1918 g. Stenograficheskii otchet. (Moscow, 1918), pp. 84-85.

9. The phrase in the original is “na sotsial'nykh nachalakh.” The full text is reproduced in I. A. Gladkov, ed., Natsionalizatsiia promyshlennosti v SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Moscow, 1954), pp. 77-82.

10. Sed'maia (aprel'skaia) vserossiiskaia konferentsiia RSDRP (bol'shevikov): Protokoly, 24-29 aprelia 1917 g. (Moscow, 1958), pp. 68-69.

11. V. I. Lenin, Polnoesobraniesochinenii, 5th ed., 55 vols, (hereafter cited as PSS) (Moscow, 1958-65), 35: 57, 200; 36: 75, 130, 175.

12. Lenin laid out his views on the simplification of the administrative functions in the modern capitalist state and particularly the ease with which workers can assume those functions by means of “accounting and control” in his article, “Uderzhat li bol'sheviki gosudarstvennuiu vlast’ ? ” written on October 1, 1917 (see Lenin, PSS, 34: 287-339). In the article he states: “Statewide bookkeeping, statewide accounting of production and distribution of products is, so to speak, something like the skeleton of socialist society” (ibid., p. 307)

13. Tretii vserossiiskii s “ezd sovetov rabochikh, soldatskikh, i kresfianskikh deputatov (St. Petersburg, 1918), pp. 29-30.

14. Protokoly chetvertoi konferentsii fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov i professional'nykh soiuzov g. Moskvy (Moscow, 1919), pp. 19-20.

15. Lenin's conception of the relationship of control organs to the government is suggested by the point in his draft nationalization decree of December 1917 that would require workers’ control organs to report weekly to the Supreme Economic Council on their success in raising labor productivity and discipline (Lenin, PSS, 35: 174-76).

16. Prokopovich, S. N., The Economic Condition of Soviet Russia (London: P. S. King and Son, Ltd., 1924), p. 5Google Scholar.

17. The decree indicates that organs of control would have oversight power over production, the right to fix output and cost norms, and access to all books, but the specific powers in relation to management were not enumerated. Moreover, as Solomon Schwarz pointed out, the decree states that a ruling on the question of the relationship of workers’ control to the organs regulating the economy statewide would be issued, but none ever was (Sfolomon] Shvarts, “Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety i profsoiuzy v pervye gody revoliutsii” [manuscript in the possession of the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, n.p., n.d., p. 27]).

18. Zhuravlev, V. V., Dekrety sovetskoi vlasti 1917-1920 gg. kak istoricheskii istochnik (Moscow, 1979), p. 43 Google Scholar.

19. Obrazovanie i razvitie organov sotsialisticheskogo kontrolia v SSSR (1917-1975): Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Moscow, 1975); Narodnoe khoziaistvo: Organ vysshego soveta narodnogo khoziaistva, 1918, no. 11, pp. 23-25; Voskresenskaia, N. A., V. I. Lenin — Organizator sotsialisticheskogo kontrolia (Moscow, 1970), p. 72 Google Scholar.

20. P. N. Amosov et al., comp., Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i fabzavkomy: Materialy po istorii fabrichno-zavodskikh komitetov, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1927), 2: 170 Google Scholar.

21. Ibid., pp. 184-85.

22. Ankudinova, L. E., Natsionalizatsiia promyshlennosti v SSSR (1917-1920 gg.) (Leningrad, 1963), p. 38 Google Scholar and Trukan, G. A., Rabochii Mass v bor'be za pobedu i uprochenie sovetskoi vlasti (Moscow, 1975), p. 226 Google Scholar.

23. Novyiput', 1919, no. 3, p. 26.

24. N. P. Silant'ev, Rabochii kontrol’ isovnarkhozy (Moscow, 1957), pp. 98–99 Google Scholar; Gorodetskii, E. N., Rozhdenie sovetskogo gosudarstva, 1917-1918 gg. (Moscow, 1965), p. 240 Google Scholar

25. V. Z. Drobizhev, “K istorii organov rabochego upravleniia na promyshlennykh predpriiatiiakh v 1917-18 gg.,” Istoriia SSSR, 1957, no. 3, pp. 45-47. Another study showed that over half the members of governmental administrative boards in industry were former members of factory committees and control commissions (see A. B. Medvedev, “Razrabotka V. I. Leninym printsipov organizatsii upravleniia promyshlennosti v pervyi period sovetskoi vlasti [oktiabr’ 1917-iiun' 1918 gg.]” in O deiatel'nosti V. I. Lenina v 1917-1922 gody: Sbornikstatei [Moscow, 1958], p. 93).

26. Drobizhev, “K istorii,” pp. 45-47. A letter written by the presidium of the Textile-Workers' Trade Union to its factory committees and control commissions in mid-summer 1918 cautions the committees against taking over operational power within the factories in the wake of the sweeping nationalization decree of July. It instructed them that while committees were to retain all their former rights, they could not interfere in the decisions of the management board and stipulated that one-third of the management boards must consist of technical specialists (see Chugaev, D. A., ed., Rabochii klass sovetskoi Rossii v pervyi god diktatury proletariata: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov [Moscow, 1964], pp. 120–Google Scholar).

27. The trade unions in the Urals, where Moscow's influence was weaker, succeeded in demanding that state control organs work through the trade union control organs to oversee factory production as early as October 1918 ( Chugaev, , Rabochii klass, p. 131 Google Scholar).

28. I. D., Martysevich and V. P., Portnov, Sotsialisticheskii kontrol’ v RSFSR i zakonnost' (1917-1934 gg.) (Moscow, 1979), p. 53 Google Scholar; Voskresenskaia, , V. I. Lenin, p. 97 Google Scholar.

29. Voskresenskaia, , V. I. Lenin, p. 99 Google Scholar.

30. This was not lost on the attentive Stalin, who, speaking at a session of the Central Executive Committee on April 9, 1919, observed that the State Control Commissariat was the only Soviet agency not yet subjected to a thorough purge (chistka i lomka) ( Stalin, I. V., Sochineniia, 13 vols. [Moscow, 1947], 4: 251Google Scholar).

31. The journal is quoted in Dorokhova, G. A., Raboche-krest'ianskaia inspektsiia v 1920- 1923 gg. (Moscow, 1959), p. 10 Google Scholar.

32. Portnov, Martysevich and, Sotsialisticheskii kontrol', pp. 55–57Google Scholar; Voskresenskaia, , V. I. Lenin, p. 113 Google Scholar; Biulleten’ izvestii gosudarstvennogo kontrolia, 1918, no. 1, pp. 10-14 and no. 2, p. 11. The editor of this last publication was anonymous as, indeed, was most of the activity of the commissariat. An Old Bolshevik named E. E. Essen was made deputy commissar in November 1917, and another Old Bolshevik, K. I. Lander, became commissar in May 1918. In March 1919 Stalin became commissar, and V. A. Avanesov became his deputy. In contrast to the many Soviet institutions in which power and policy were highly personalistic, the State Control Commissariat seems to have disguised its political ambitions under a faceless proceduralism.

33. Chugunov, A. I., Organy sotsialisticheskogo kontrolia RSFSR 1923-1934 gg. (Moscow, 1972), pp. 23–24 Google Scholar.

34. Biulleten’ izvestii gosudarstvennogo kontrolia, 1918, no. 5, p. 3.

35. Ibid., no. 4, j>. 11.

36. Voskresenskaia, , V. I. Lenin, p. 114 Google Scholar.

37. N. Glebov, “Rabochii kontrol',” Professional'nyi vestnik, 1919, no. 1, p. 10. In addition to the enterprise cells for control overseen by the trade unions, there was evidently a new organizational form for trade union-based control in 1918, called “workers’ inspectorates.” These bodies originated with committees formed in factories under trade union sponsorship during the summer and fall of 1918, principally to look after health and safety conditions. They also developed a system of district offices and inspectors in early December 1918 (see Vestnik narodnogo komissariata truda, 1918, no. 5-6, p. 5 and 1919, no. 1-2, pp. 70-74). Other inspectorates were formed by workers who had gained experience during a tour of duty with the State Control Commissariat ( Voskresenskaia, , V. J. Lenin, p. 141 Google Scholar). The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Trade Union Council also formed special inspectorates to safeguard food transports (Voskresenskaia, V. /. Lenin, p. 142 and K. V. Gusev, Kratkii ocherk istorii organov partiino-gosudarstvennogo kontrolia v SSSR [Moscow, 1965], p. 11). By and large, these inspectorates seem to have formed part of the trade union rather than the State Control Commissariat bureaucracy.

38. Ekonomicheskaia zhizri, 1919, no. 13, p. 2; Izvestiia, December 4, 1918, p. 3; Izvestiia, December 6, 1918, p. 4. Although I have not discussed the role of the Supreme Economic Council (VSNKh) in the control field, it too claimed jurisdiction over control as part of its general regulatory mission. The VSNKh hoped to integrate factory-level control bodies into its regional economic councils and to form a control department at the national level. Such a department was formed in June 1918, and the VSNKh became a regular participant in interbureaucratic discussions over the organization of control (Novyiput', 1918, no. 2 [July], pp. 44-45; Gladkov, I. A., ed., Natsionalizatsiia promyshlennosti, pp. 124-25Google Scholar; Biulleten’ izvestii gosudarstvennogo kontrolia, 1918, no. 11, pp. 9-10).

39. Dorokhova, , Raboche-krest'ianskaia inspektsiia, pp. 13–14Google Scholar.

40. Stalin, , Sochineniia, 4: 217, 251Google Scholar; Dorokhova, , Raboche-krest'ianskaia inspektsiia, pp. 14–15Google Scholar; Ikonnikov, S. N., Organizatsiia i deiatel'nost’ RKI v 1920-1925 gg. (Moscow, 1960), pp. 16–17 Google Scholar.

41. Vos'moi s “ezd RKP(b) mart 1919 goda: Protokoly (Moscow, 1959), p. 428 and Obrazovanie, pp. 70-72. The paucity of statements by Stalin pertaining to the work of the State Control Commissariat in his collected works and the lack of references to any actions taken by him in either Soviet or Western documentary or secondary literature, combined with what is known of his extensive efforts in the military-political and nationalities areas, strongly suggest that he headed this commissariat in name only. Operational power almost certainly belonged instead to his deputy V. A. Avanesov.

42. Ikonnikov, , Organizatsiia i deiatel'nost', p. 19 Google Scholar.

43. Dorokhova, Raboche-krest'ianskaia inspektsiia, p.

44. Ikonnikov, , Organizatsiia i deiatel'nost', p. 72 Google Scholar.

45. Ibid. See also Gusev, , Kratkii ocherk, p. 19 Google Scholar.

46. Voskresenskaia, , V. I. Lenin, p. 128 Google Scholar and Chugunov, , Organy sotsialisticheskogo kontrolia, p. 26 Google Scholar.

47. Sapronov, T, “Kontrol’ kak nadstroika nad Sovetami ili organ Sovetov?” Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo, 1919, no. 6, pp. 3–5Google Scholar.

48. Dorokhova, , Raboche-krest'ianskaia inspektsiia, pp. 24–30Google Scholar; Obrazovanie, pp. 579-80; Ikonnikov, , Organizatsiia i deiatel'nost', pp. 21–22Google Scholar.

49. Lenin, PSS, 40: 64.

50. Dorokhova, , Raboche-krest'ianskaia inspektsiia, pp. 31–32Google Scholar.

51. Bor'ian, B., “Rabochii kontrol’ (1917-1921),” Vestnik truda, 1921, no. 10-11, p. 33 Google Scholar.

52. Dorokhova, , Raboche-krest'ianskaia inspektsiia, p. 75 Google Scholar

53. Bor'ian, “Rabochii kontrol',” pp. 36-37; Chugunov, Organy sotsialisticheskogo kontrolia, p. 21.

54. Ikonnikov, , Organizatsiia i deiatel'nost', p. 71 Google Scholar.

55. Lenin, PSS, 42: 34.

56. V. V. Kuibyshev, quoted in Gusev, , Kratkii ocherk, pp. 18–19Google Scholar.

57. Dorokhova, , Raboche-krest'ianskaia inspektsiia, p. 75 Google Scholar. Of course the shortage of competent personnel was a severe problem among all Soviet organs of this period.

58. Dorokhova, , Raboche-krest'ianskaia inspektsiia, p. 59 Google Scholar; Portnov, Martysevich and, Sotsialisticheskii kontrol', pp. 59–74Google Scholar; Ikonnikov, , Organizatsiia i deiatel'nost', pp. 47–54Google Scholar.

59. Martysevich and Vorlnoyrffffnttsucheskii kontrol', pp. 77-78.

60. Dorokhova, , Raboche-krest'ianskaia inspektsiia, p. 68 Google Scholar; Portnov, Martysevich and, Sotsialisticheskii kontrol', pp. 85–86Google Scholar.

61. These recommendations were futile because of the insuperable addiction of the government to the black market for basic supplies and services and because some of the most productive economic units under the conditions of the time were those of the smallest scale, in which overhead costs were minimal. These points are elaborated in Remington, “Democracy and Development,” chap. 6.

62. Bukharin, N. I., Programma Kommunistov (bol'shevikov) (Moscow, 1918), p. 35 Google Scholar

63. In more theoretical terms, the process at work is that of the instrumentalization of ends of the movement, expressed behaviorally as a deradicalization or embourgeoisement of its members and institutionally as the bureaucratization of the system (see Apter, David E., Choice and the Politics of Allocation [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971]Google Scholar).

64. Lenin, PSS, 37: 422.

65. The proliferation of redundant bureaucracies as an outcome of the center's efforts to enforce compliance is a phenomenon that Anthony Downs calls the “law of control duplication” (see Anthony, Downs, Inside Bureaucracy [Boston: Little-Brown & Co., 1966], p. 148Google Scholar).

66. Ikonnikov, , Organizatsiia i deiatel'nost', p. 32 Google Scholar.