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Political Fallout: The Failure of Emergency Management at Chernobyl'

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Edward Geist
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Abstract

Ever since the accident that destroyed unit 4 of the Chernobyl’ Nuclear Power Plant on April 26,1986, became public knowledge, the Soviet government's response to this catastrophe has been the subject of bewilderment and withering criticism. The exact sequence of events that unfolded in the days following the disaster and the forces that shaped it have, however, remained obscure. While the USSR's civil defense organization urged prompt and decisive measures to inform the population of the accident and move people out of harm's way, other Soviet institutions, such as the Communist Party and the KGB, feared the accident's threat to their legitimacy more than its implications for public health. Drawing on declassified archival documents from Ukrainian archives and memoir literature, I explore the political and institutional logic that prevented the USSR from acting appropriately to protect citizens from the consequences of the nuclear accident.

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Articles
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 74 , Issue 1 , Spring 2015 , pp. 104 - 126
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 2014

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References

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3. Since the early 1950s, some Americans had argued that the USSR possessed a vast, well-resourced civil defense organization that was far more capable than its American counterpart. This concern swelled into a major political controversy in the 1970s, when critics of detente such as Harvard historian Richard Pipes and Sovietologist Leon Gouré charged that Soviet civil defense proved that the Kremlin was a dangerous, expansionist power fully willing to resort to nuclear aggression if it appeared advantageous. See Pipes, Richard, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” Commentary 23, no. 7 (July 1977): 1–34;Google Scholar and Leon Gouré, War Survival in Soviet Strategy: Soviet CivilDefense (Coral Gables, 1976). Some western analysts concluded that the shortcomings of the USSR's disaster response at Chernobyl’ proved that the USSR's much-discussed civil defense investment was either useless or illusory. See, for example, Potter, William and Kerner, Lucy, “The Soviet Military's Performance at Chernobyl,” Soviet Studies 43, no. 6 (1991): 1039.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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21. In early 1983, the ministry noted the “problems of reliability and safety” at nuclear power plants but evaluated the attendant costs entirely in terms of the economic losses resulting from repair shutdowns, not possible accident hazards. As a solution, it suggested that all responsibility for operating the nuclear plants be transferred to it—with the exception of safety, which would remain under Soiuzatomenergo. “Vypiska iz protokola no. 2,” TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, sp. 2558, ark. 38–44 (report on shutdowns in Ukrainian nuclear energy sector, March 1983).

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23. Gnatiuk, “Neobkhodimosf MPVO-GO,” 19. According to Gnatiuk, the civil defense staff of the RSFSR carried out exercises at all nuclear power stations in Russia prior to the Chernobyl’ disaster.

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27. An employee of Chernobylinterinform told me this during a June 2010 visit to the Chernobyl’ Exclusion Zone. Access to the Jupiter plant is still restricted by the Ukrainian security services.

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29. I visited this shelter in June 2010 along with the shelter at ChNPP.

30. “Dovidka 3-ho Upravlinnia KDB URSR,” 1-5.

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33. Ibid., 119-21.

34. D'iachenko, , Opyt likvidatsii Chernobyl skoi katastrofy, 39–40.Google Scholar

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36. Ibid., 398.

37. Ibid., 399.

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39. Ibid., 3-5.

40. Ibid., 5-6.

41. “Tsentral'nyi Komitet Kompartii Ukrainy-Informatsiia,” TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, spr. 2997, ark. 2-3 (report to CP Ukraine Central Committee on events at ChNPP, April 1986).

42. Smirnova, Trevozhnye dni, 6.

43. As the functional ratemeters at the plant were sensitive only up to 1000 microroentgens an hour (0.001 R/hr), the KGB reports state that “at the immediate point of the accident, the radiation is up to 1000 microroentgen an hour.” In reality, this was a mere l/10,000th of the actual ambient radiation at the plant. Furthermore, they state that the maximum radiation in Pripiat’ was 14 microroentgens an hour on the morning of the 26th—when in fact there were places in the city where radiation levels were hundreds of times higher. “Povidomlennia UKDB URSR po m. Kyievu ta Kyivs'kii oblasti do KDB SRSR ta KDB SRSR pro vybukh 4-ho enerhobloka Chornobyl's'koyi AES. 26 kvitnia 1986r.,” DA SBU, f. 64 op. 1, spr. 34, ark. 2-3 (KGB report on conditions around ChNPP, April 26,1986); “Povidomlennia KDB URSR do KDB SRSR pro vybukh 4-ho enerhobloka Chornobyl's'koi AES. 26 kvitnia 1986r.,” DA SBU, f. 64, op. 1, spr. 33, ark. 2-4 (KGB report on conditions around ChNPP, April 26,1986).

44. “Informatsiine povidomlennia KDB URSR do TsK KPU pro vybukh 4-ho enerhobloka Chornobyl's'koyi AES. 28 kvitnia 1986r.,” DA SBU, f. 16, op. 11A (1988), spr. 34, ark. 52-56 (Ukrainian KGB report to CPSU Central Committee, April 28,1986).

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49. “Vypiska iz Norm radiatsionnoi bezopasnosti ‘NRB-76,'” TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 32, spr. 2337, ark. 2 (excerpts from NRB-76). The rem measurement is the product of the exposed dose in roentgens and a weighting factor accounting for the effectiveness of the type of radiation to cause biological damage.

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58. Ibid., 53. In December 1986, Pikalov received the USSR's highest military award, the Hero of the Soviet Union, for his service at Chernobyl'.

59. Ibid., 54.

60. Boris Ivanov, “Chernobyl',” Voennye znaniia 40, no. 3 (March 1988): 38. Many accounts of the Chernobyl’ disaster erroneously state that Shcherbina made the final decision to evacuate on the evening of April 26, which is reflective of the extraordinary confusion that reigned at the time.

61. Ibid.

62. Medvedev, The Truth about Chernobyl, 185–87.

63. Ivanov, “Chernobyl',” Voennyeznaniia, no. 3,39.

64. Medvedev, The Legacy of Chernobyl, 54.

65. “Nuclear Disaster: A Spreading Cloud and an Aid Appeal; U.P.I. Says Toll May Pass 2,000,” New York Times, April 30,1986, A10.

66. Reports prepared for the party attest to many Soviet citizens’ belief in accounts of the disaster like that circulated by UPI. See TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, spr. 2995, listy (11.) 4-6, 34–36.

67. Valentina Shevchenko, head of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR in 1986, insisted in a 2011 interview that the Kiev May Day parade went ahead at Moscow's insistence. Lina Kushnir, “Valentina Shevchenko: ‘Provesty demonstratsiiu 1 travnia 1986-ho nakazali z Moskvy,” Istorichna pravda, April 25,2011, at www.istpravda. com.ua/articles/2011/04/25/36971/ (last accessed November 10, 2014). Radiological conditions in Kiev began deteriorating sharply on April 30. See “Obstanovka i meropriiatia po likvidatsii posledstvii avarii na Chernobyl ‘skoi AES po sostoianiiu na 12 iiunia 1986 goda,” TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, spr. 2995,11.12-13 (report to Ukrainian CP Central Committee on Chernobyl’ liquidation effort, June 12,1986).

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69. Ivanov, , “Chernobyl',” Voennyeznaniia, no. 3,39.Google Scholar

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72. Ibid., 409.

73. Known as aptechki individualnye AI-2, these first-aid kits came in bright orange plastic cases and included seven different drugs, including potassium iodide, two antibiotics (tetracycline and sulfanamide), cystamine, nausea-prevention tablets, a single-use syringe of morphine, and tablets of “taren,” a form of the Soviet drug aprofen included to counteract organophosphate chemical weapons. The abuse potential of the latter two substances (aprofen can induce a hallucinogenic delirium) may have discouraged the Soviet government from issuing the complete kits to citizens following the Chernobyl' accident, and extant accounts suggest that civil defense distributed only the potassium iodide tablets. Atamaniuk, V. G., Shirshev, L. G., and Akimov, N. I., Grazhdanksia oborona (Moscow, 1986), 101–2.Google Scholar

74. Krutskikh, , Memuary, 410.Google Scholar

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76. Gorbachev touted the term heavily in his address to the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress, in February 1986, as a critical component of “socialist democratism.” Gorbachev, M. S., Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 3 (Moscow, 2008), 180–280.Google Scholar For an argument that the Chernobyl’ disaster hastened Gorbachev's reforms, see Baranovs'ka, N., “Chornobil's'ka trahediia iak argument perebudovi,” in Perebudova: Zadum i rezul'taty v Ukrainy do10-richchia protoloshennia kursu na reformy (Kiev, 1996), 38–45.Google Scholar

77. An ironic example of this appeared in a May 8,1986, circular for party propagandists stating explicitly that “the population is being promptly and fully informed about the ongoing work at the power plant and other measures.” The circular itself, however, instructs recipients to “destroy after reading.” “Ob avarii na Chernobyl ‘skoi AES i likvidatsii ee posledstvii,” TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, spr. 2957,11. 34-38 (circular on Chernobyl’ accident for party propagandists, May 8,1986).

78. On the May 6 news conference, see Taubman, Phillip, “At Moscow News Session: Brief and Not to Point,” New York Times, May 7, 1986, A19.Google Scholar For the text of Gorbachev's May 14 address, see “Vystuplenie M. S. Gorbacheva po sovetskomu televideniiu,” Pravda, May 15,1986,1. On Soviet citizens’ reactions to the address, see “Informatsiia ob otklikakh trudiashikhsia Ukrainskoi SSR po vystupleniiu General ‘nogo sekretaria TsK KPSS tovarishcha M. S. Gorbacheva po Tsentral'nomu televideniiu 14 maia 1986 goda,” TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 25, spr. 2979,11.8-12 (report on Ukrainian citizens’ reactions to M. S. Gorbachev's May 14,1986, televised address).

79. A 1989 book for propagandists about the disaster exemplifies the government's defensive position on this topic. It maintains that the radiological conditions in Pripiat' “did not objectively require evacuation” on April 26, and it ignores the fact that GO officers protested the delay. Vozniak, Ignatenko, Kovalenko, and Troitskii, Chernobyl', 121. For an overview of Soviet media accounts of the disaster in 1986-87, see Marples, David R., TheSocial Impact of the Chernobyl Disaster (New York, 1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

80. Valentina Shevchenko has made contradictory statements to this effect. See Kushnir, “Valentina Shevchenko.“

81. On the construction of the sarcophagus, see Baranovs'ka, Chornobyl's'ka trahediia, 207-39, and on state measures to provide housing and employment to evacuees, see ibid., 182-85.