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After the Punctuation: Competition, Uncertainty, and Convergent State Policy Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Thomas T. Holyoke  and
Heath Brown
Thomas T. Holyoke*
Affiliation:
California State University, Fresno, CA, USA
Heath Brown
Affiliation:
City University of New York, John Jay College, NY, USA
*
Thomas T. Holyoke, Department of Political Science, California State University, Fresno, 2225 East San Ramon, M/S MF19, Fresno, CA 93740-8029, USA. Email: tholyoke@csufresno.edu
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Abstract

What happens after longstanding policies are overthrown in fierce political battles, events scholars refer to as punctuated equilibrium? Do these new policies remain static and unchanging until the next big punctuation, or do they continue to change in explainable and predictable ways? In this article, we develop a model of postpunctuation policy change grounded in theories of boundedly rational decision-making by policymakers. Uncertain about how well the new policy will perform, policymakers learn to rely on competing interest groups for information or, under certain circumstances, look to other political jurisdictions for cues on how their policies ought to be further refined. We test our predictions by studying changes in state charter school laws from 1996 to 2014. We find evidence of policy change, and even convergence, across states suggesting that policies after punctuation do change in ways explained as reactions to political pressures in an environment fraught with uncertainty.

Keywords

interest groupspolicy diffusioncharter schoolspolicy changestate politics
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 2019 , pp. 3 - 28
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2018

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