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State Legislative Influence over Agency Rulemaking: The Utility of Ex Ante Review

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Brian J. Gerber ,
Cherie Maestas  and
Nelson C. Dometrius
Brian J. Gerber
Affiliation:
Texas Tech University
Cherie Maestas
Affiliation:
Florida State University
Nelson C. Dometrius
Affiliation:
Texas Tech University
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Abstract

Scholars have argued that legislatures can use administrative procedures to constrain bureaucratic discretion and maintain policy control when delegating authority. One such mechanism is the formal authority to review agency rule proposals. We find that legislatures with stronger formal authority to review rules ex ante are viewed by agency heads as more influential in their rulemaking decisions, but this power is mitigated when such review is checked by the governor. Our analysis demonstrates the impact of institutional arrangements on general state legislative influence over policy implementation. Understanding this element of legislative control over state bureaucracies helps explain variations in state-level policymaking.

The General Assembly finds that it must provide a procedure for oversight and review of regulations adopted pursuant to [the] delegation of legislative power to curtail excessive regulation and to establish a system of accountability so that the bureaucracy must justify its use of the regulatory authority before imposing hidden costs upon the economy of Pennsylvania.

Regulatory Review Act of 1982

Pennsylvania General Assembly

Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 5 , Issue 1 , Spring 2005 , pp. 24 - 46
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association, 2005

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