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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2009
It may be remembered (and I am especially induced to hope that it is so, now that the new volume of Transactions is in the hands of the members) that, on the last occasion at which I had the honour to address you, I mentioned, though I fear too cursorily, some of the necessary considerations due to an inquiry into the origin of monarchical, or, rather it should be termed, personal sovereignty. Speaking roughly, I stated that the origin of society, the origin of law, and the origin of religion, seemed to coalesce into the origin of government.
page 132 note * Vide Kemble's Anglo-Saxons, i. 327. The historian here states the necessity of such an investigation, though he doubts the possibility of a satisfactory result.
page 133 note * Science of Religion, lect. iii.
page 133 note † Vide, note on p. 138.
page 134 note * VideMill's Rep. Govt., pp. 26, 27. I need scarcely here allude to the magnificent opening address of our learned President of the Council.
page 135 note† Principles of Morality, book vi., cap. 6.
page 138 note * I may here note that the subject of the earliest source of law has been incidentally touched upon by other writers than Sir Henry Maine, though not with the direct application that that eminent jurist brings to bear. Austin himself, though the position I adopt is more historically a confirmation of his definition of law, says, that the natural order in which the law of any country arises, or is founded, seems to be, first, rules of positive morality (lect. xxxvii.); Montesquieu also says: “Dire qu'il n'y a rien de juste, ni d'injuste que ce qu'ordonnent ou defendent les lois positives, c'est dire qui avant qu'on eût tracé de cercle, tous les rayons n'éaient pas egaux” (“Esprit des Lois,” i., cap. i.).
page 140 note * See Principles ot Sociology, passim.
page 140 note † Mill's Rep. Govt., p. 37.
page 140 note ‡ Early Institutions, p. 400.
page 140 note § See particularly Freeman's History of Federal Government, vol. i., p. 125, cap. iv.
page 143 note * Austin, though he does not pretend to trace the historical origin of government, clearly perceives that custom and prejudice are among the causes of the origin of government. It is at the stage mentioned in the text that these two causes appear historically (Austin's Lectures, vi. I, p. 302, Campbell's edit.).
page 144 note * Westminster Review for 1842, on Science of History
page 144 note † Introductory Lectures to Modern History, pp. 92, 93.