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Energy Transition in the European Union and its Member States: Interpreting Federal Competence Allocation in the Light of the Paris Agreement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2021

Michael Fehling
Michael Fehling*
Affiliation:
Bucerius Law School, Hamburg (Germany). Email: michael.fehling@law-school.de.
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Abstract

Energy transition in the European Union (EU) and its Member States involves questions of federalism, which are subject to various perspectives. The distribution of powers cannot be properly understood using classical legal methodology alone because Articles 192 to 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) contain too many ambiguous political compromises. On the one hand, Article 192(1) TFEU (on the environment) and Article 194(1) and (2)(1) TFEU (on energy) enable EU legislation on energy transition through the ordinary legislative procedure, including majority voting in the European Parliament and the Council. On the other hand, there are significant textual limits for EU action in neighbouring provisions with a ‘sovereignty exception’ for the Member States in both Article 192(2) and Article 194(2)(2) TFEU. This article argues that, in the light of the Paris Agreement, the allocation of competences between the EU and its Member States should, in case of doubt, be understood in such a way that effective climate protection becomes possible. Because under Article 191(1) TFEU the EU is to promote measures at the international level to combat climate change, such an international law-friendly interpretation is part of a legitimate teleological approach. Economic theories of federalism and innovation research in the social sciences help us to understand which aspects of economic or innovation theory can promote effectiveness in this respect. It is necessary to interpret the distribution of competences in a dynamic way, thereby slightly shifting the limits of interpretation.

Keywords

Energy transitionDistribution of powersLegal methodologyParis AgreementCompetition/cooperative federalismPre-emption
Type
Symposium Article
Information
Transnational Environmental Law , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , July 2021 , pp. 339 - 363
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press.

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Footnotes

This contribution is part of a collection of articles growing out of the workshop ‘The Law of Energy Transition in Federal Systems’, held by the University of Tübingen, Faculty of Law, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of Law, in Tübingen (Germany), 27 June 2019.

References

1 This categorization leaves aside the highly debated questions of the legal character of the EU and the distribution of sovereignty; cf. von Bogdandy, A., ‘Neither an International Organization Nor a Nation State: The EU as a Supranational Federation’, in Jones, E., Menon, A. & Weatherill, S. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 761–75Google Scholar.

2 See, e.g., G. de Búrca, ‘Limiting EU Powers’ (2005) 1(1) European Constitutional Law Review, pp. 92–8, at 93–5; Wendel, M., ‘Mutual Trust, Essence and Federalism: Between Consolidating and Fragmenting the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice after LM’ (2019) 15(1) European Constitutional Law Review, pp. 17–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 35; Oeter, S., ‘Föderalismus und Demokratie’, in von Bogdandy, A. & Bast, J. (eds), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, 2nd edn (Springer, 2009), pp. 73–120CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 74–5.

3 Paris (France), 22 Apr. 2016, in force 4 Nov. 2016, available at: http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf.

4 See, e.g., Davies, G., ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the Shadow of Purposive Competence’ (2015) 21(1) European Law Journal, pp. 2–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Oberg, J., ‘The Rise of the Procedural Paradigm: Judicial Review of EU Legislation in Vertical Competence Disputes‘ (2017) 13(2) European Constitutional Law Review, pp. 248–80, at 252–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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9 For details see Haltern, n. 7 above, paras 774–94.

10 Lisbon (Portugal), 13 Dec. 2007, in force 1 Dec. 2009, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT.

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18 The new Art. 194 TFEU was intended to bundle the legislative acts related to energy which had been grounded on different competences before, most importantly, Arts 114 and 192 TFEU; see Kahl, W., ‘Die Kompetenzen der EU in der Energiepolitik nach Lissabon’ (2009) 44(5) Europarecht, pp. 601–22, at 608CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kreuter-Kirchhof, C., ‘Ist die Zukunft des Energierechts europäisch?’, in Rosin, P. & Uhle, A. (eds), Recht und Energie. Liber Amicorum für Ulrich Büdenbender zum 70. Geburtstag (De Gruyter, 2018), pp. 129–53, at 142Google Scholar.

19 C-490/10, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2012:525, para. 67.

20 Joined Cases C-164/97 and C-165/97, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:1999:99, para. 12.

21 See, e.g., C-281/01, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2002:761, para. 33; C-301/06, Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2009:68, para. 60.

22 Haltern, n. 7 above, paras 823–4 (pointing to the fact that institutional considerations of the actors in the legislative procedure might also play a prominent role in deciding upon the ‘right’ clause).

23 Directive (EU) 2018/410 amending Directive 2003/87/EC to Enhance Cost-effective Emission Reductions and Low-Carbon Investments, and Decision (EU) 2015/1814 [2018] OJ L 76/3.

24 Directive (EU) 2018/2002 amending Directive 2012/27/EU on Energy Efficiency [2018] OJ L 328/210 and the Renewable Energy Directive (n. 30 below) are all based on Art. 194(2) TFEU.

25 Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 715/2009, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU, Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 [2018] OJ L328/1.

26 C-490/10, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2012:525, para. 46.

27 C-5/16, Republic of Poland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2018:483, para. 46.

28 Ibid., para. 61.

29 This (not very ambitious) target is based on a political compromise; see C. Kreuter-Kirchhof, ‘Emissionshandel und Erneuerbare Energien Richtlinie’ (2019) (7–8) Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht, pp. 396–404, at 400–1.

30 Directive (EU) 2018/2001 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources (Recast) [2018] OJ L 328/82 (Renewable Energy Directive).

31 Council of the EU, ‘Brussels European Council, 29/30 October 2009, Presidency Conclusions’, 1 Dec. 2009, 15265/09, Institutional issue 7.

32 Cf. Klinski, S., ‘Instrumente eines Kohleausstiegs im Lichte des EU-Rechts’ (2017) 6 Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, pp. 203–11, at 206–7Google Scholar; Kahl, W., ‘Alte und neue Kompetenzprobleme im EG-Umweltrecht: Die geplante Richtlinie zur Förderung Erneuerbarer Energien’ (2009) 28(5) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, pp. 265–70, at 269Google Scholar.

33 C-5/16, Poland, n. 27 above, paras 43–4.

34 Ibid., para. 41.

35 Kreuter-Kirchhof, C., ‘Der künftige Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien in der EU’ (2017) 28(21) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 829–35, at 830Google Scholar (arguing that already a reduction of GHG emissions by 80% (as put forward by the European Council, C-5/16, Poland, n. 27 above) would invoke the sovereignty clause).

36 Directive 2010/75/EU on Industrial Emissions (Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control) [2010] OJ L 334/17.

37 C-218/85, Cerafel v. Le campion, ECLI:EU:C:1986:440, para. 13.

38 N. 8 above.

39 Craig & de Búrca, n. 11 above, p. 84; Haltern, n. 7 above, paras 784–5.

40 For a short comparison with German Constitutional Law (Art. 72(2) Grundgesetz) see Bauerschmidt, J., ‘Die Sperrwirkung im Europarecht’ (2014) 49(3) Europarecht, pp. 277–98, at 286–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

41 Auber, E., ‘États-Unis versus Union européenne: Observations comparatives sur la répartition des competénces’ (2008) 517 Revue du Marché Commun de l'Union Européenne, pp. 221–6, at 221Google Scholar; Cross, E., ‘Pre-emption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community: A Framework for Analysis’ (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review, pp. 447–72, at 455Google Scholar; K. Lenaerts, Le juge et la Constitution aux États-Unis d'Amérique et dans l'ordre juridique européeen (Émile Bruylant, 1988), pp. 645–7.

42 For an overview see Schütze, R., ‘Supremacy Without Preemption? The Very Slowly Emergent Doctrine of Community Preemption’ (2006) 43(4) Common Market Law Review, pp. 1023–48Google Scholar; for a detailed discussion of these categories in US law see Merriam, J., ‘Preemption as a Consistency Doctrine’ (2017) 25(3) William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal, pp. 981–1045Google Scholar; slightly different categorization by Cross, n. 41 above, pp. 455–66; for a detailed discussion of these categories in US law see Tribe, L., American Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 2000), pp. 1172–79Google Scholar.

43 Bundesverwaltungsgericht [Federal Administrative Court] 14 Sept. 2017, Case 4 CN 6.16, Amtliche Sammlung [official documentation], Vol. 159, pp. 356–66.

44 This line of argumentation is put forward in more detail by Ziehm, C., ‘Klimaschutz im Mehrebenensystem: Kyoto, Paris, europäischer Emissionshandel und nationale CO2-Grenzwerte’ (2018) 29(6) Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht, pp. 339–46, at 344–5Google Scholar; less clear, Klinski, n. 32 above, p. 208; Scott, J., ‘Multi-Level Governance of Climate Change’ (2011) 5(1) Carbon & Climate Law Review, pp. 25–33, at 27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45 Ziehm, n. 44 above, p. 343.

46 The concept of the reform is described by Kreuter-Kirchhof, C., ‘Klimaschutz durch Emissionshandel? Die jüngste Reform des europäischen Emissionshandelssystems’ (2017) 28(11) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 412–8Google Scholar.

47 Klinski, n. 32 above, pp. 208–9.

48 Highlighted by Ziehm, n. 44 above, p. 345.

49 For more details of the UK Carbon Price Floor and whether it might serve as a role model see D. Newberry, D. Reiner & R. Ritz, ‘When is a Carbon Prize Floor Desirable?’, Cambridge Working Paper on Economics 1833, 15 June 2018, available at: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/277385.

50 Spieth, W.F., ‘Europarechtliche Unzulässigkeit des “nationalen Klimabeitrags” für die Braunkohleverstromung’ (2015) 34(17) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, pp. 1173–7, at 1174Google Scholar; Rodi, M., ‘Kohleausstieg: Bewertung der Instrumentendebatte aus juristischer und ökonomischer Sicht’ (2017) 6(6) Zeitschrift für das gesamte Recht der Energiewirtschaft, pp. 195–203, at 201Google Scholar.

51 Kreuter-Kirchhof, n. 29 above, p. 399.

52 Except for some remarks regarding the support schemes for renewables (Art. 4): Kreuter-Kirchhof, n. 29 above, pp. 402–3.

53 For this difference between supremacy and pre-emption see, in general, Weiler, J., ‘The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism’ (1981) 1 Yearbook of European Law, pp. 267–306, at 277CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Bauerschmidt, n. 40 above, pp. 280–1.

54 Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy 2014–2020 (2014/C 200/01) [2014] OJ C 200/1.

55 This happened in the German Renewable Energy Sources Act of 2014 (Erneuerbare Energien-Gesetz (EEG 2012)) and was extended in the EEG 2018.

56 Art. 106 (2) TFEU states that ‘undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them’.

57 C-405/16 P, Federal Republic of Germany v. European Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2019:268, paras 70–85. With this landmark decision the ECJ reaffirmed its own ruling in C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, ECLI:EU:C:2001:160 (PreussenElektra), paras 59–60, although in the former Stromeinspeisungsgesetz [German Electricity Feed Act] there was considerably less state influence on the financial flows than in the EEG 2012. For a detailed analysis of the relevant case law see Overkamp, P. & Brinkschmidt, J., ‘Der Beihilfenbegriff im Wandel: Die Entscheidung des EuGH zum EEG 2012 als Wendepunkt der “Beihilfenpolitik”’ (2019) 23(21) Die öffentliche Verwaltung, pp. 868–75Google Scholar.

58 Ludwigs, M., ‘Die Förderung erneuerbarer Energien vor dem EuGH: Luxenburg locuta, causa non finita!’ (2019) 38(13) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, pp. 909–14, at 913–4Google Scholar; Scholtka, B., ‘Remarks on ECJ C-405/16’ (2019) 30(10) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 425–6, at 426Google Scholar.

59 For the following line of argumentation see Overkamp & Brinkschmidt, n. 57 above, p. 869; Knauff, M., ‘Beihilferechtliche Steuerung der Energiepolitik? Der Einfluss der EU-Kommission auf die Energiepolitik der Mitgliedstaaten’, in Gundel, J. & Lange, K.W. (eds), Energieversorgung zwischen Energiewende und Energieunion (Mohr Siebeck, 2017), pp. 55–75Google Scholar, at 67–74; regarding PreussenElektra (n. 57 above): M. Bronckers & R. van der Vlies, ‘The European Court's Preussen Elektra Judgment: Tensions between EU Principles and National Renewable Energy Initiatives’ (2001) 22(10) European Competition Law Review, pp. 458–68, at 464.

60 See Overkamp & Brinkschmidt, n. 57 above, p. 874; M. Kahles & J. Nysten, ‘Alles auf Anfang? Die fehlende Beihilfeneigenschaft des EEG’ (2019) 8(5) Zeitschrift für das gesamte Recht der Energiewirtschaft, pp.147–52, at 150–2; Ludwigs, n. 58 above, pp. 912–3.

61 Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No. 663/2009 and (EC) No. 715/2009, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU, Council Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No. 525/2013 [2018] OJ L 328/1.

62 There are only European-wide goals, no binding national targets in the Regulation because of the sovereignty clauses in Arts 192(2)(1)(c) and 194(2)(2) TFEU; see S. Schlacke & M. Knodt, ‘Das Governance-System für die Europäische Energieunion und für den Klimaschutz’ (2019) 30(7–8) Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht, pp. 404–12, at 406.

63 See Saurer, J., ‘Klimaschutz global, europäisch national: Was ist rechtlich verbindlich?’ (2017) 36(21) Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, pp. 1574–9, at 1575Google Scholar.

64 Cf. Saurer, J., ‘Strukturen gerichtlicher Kontrolle im Klimaschutzrecht: Eine rechtsvergleichende Analyse’ (2018) 29(12) Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht, pp. 679–86, at 683Google Scholar.

65 D. Bodansky, ‘The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope’ (2016) 110(2) American Journal of International Law, pp. 288–319, at 289.

66 For some detail see Ediboglu, E., ‘The Paris Agreement: Effectiveness Analysis of the New UN Climate Change Regime’ (2017) 17 University College Dublin Law Review, pp. 164–201, at 179Google Scholar.

67 For a detailed analysis see, e.g., M.-C. Cordonier Segger, ‘Advancing the Paris Agreement on Climate Change for Sustainable Development’ (2016) 5(2) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, pp. 202–37, at 209–12. Cf. (bottom-up substance combined with a top-down process) D. Bodansky, J. Brunnée & L. Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 214–5.

68 L. Bergkamp, ‘The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: A Risk Regulation Perspective’ (2016) 7(1) European Journal of Risk Regulation, pp. 35–41, at 36.

69 For ratification at EU-level see Council Decision (EU) 2016/1841 on the Conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [2016] OJ L 282/1; before that (signature) Council Decision (EU) 2016/590 on the Signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Paris Agreement adopted under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [2016] OJ L 103/1; ratification in Germany, BGBl [official journal] II 2016, p. 1082.

70 E.g., Opinion of the Court, Competence of the Community to Conclude International Agreements concerning Services and the Protection of Intellectual Property: Article 228 (6) of the EC Treaty, Opinion 1/94, Opinion of the Court, ECLI:EU:C:1994:384, p. 5284.

71 See, in general and with more details, Craig & de Búrca, n. 6 above, pp. 81–3.

72 Cordonier Segger, n. 67 above, p. 218.

73 New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf.

74 Kyoto (Japan), 11 Dec. 1997, in force 16 Feb. 2005, available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.

75 See further Bodansky, Brunnée & Rajamani, n. 67 above, pp. 118–20, 130–58.

76 Kreuter-Kirchhof, n. 18 above, pp. 148–9; Kreuter-Kirchhof, n. 29 above, p. 401.

77 Aarhus (Denmark), 25 June 1998, in force 30 Oct. 2001, available at: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytext.html. The Aarhus Convention is also a mixed agreement; see ratification at EU-level, Directive 2001/42/EC on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Plans and Programmes on the Environment [2001] OJ L 197/0030; Directive 2003/4/EC on Public Access to Environmental Information and Repealing Directive 90/313/EEC [2003] OJ L 41/0026; Directive 2003/35/EC providing for Public Participation in respect of the Drawing Up of Certain Plans and Programmes relating to the Environment and Amending with regard to Public Participation and Access to Justice Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC [2003], OJ L 156/17; ratification at German level, BGBl [official journal] II 2016, p. 1251.

78 See Recitals 4–10 of Directive 2003/35/EC, ibid.; Recitals 19–21 of Directive 2011/92/EU on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment [2011] OJ L 26/1 (later replaced by Directive 2014/52/EU Amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment [2014] OJ L 124/1).

79 Pointing in this direction, albeit not clear, C. Eckes, ‘Environmental Policy “Outside-In”: How the EU's Engagement with International Environmental Law Curtails National Autonomy’ (2012) 13(11) German Law Journal, pp. 1151–75, at 1156, 1172.

80 In the context of the Kadi cases highlighted by C. Ohler, ‘Gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Rechtsschutz gegen personengerichtete Sanktionen des UN-Sicherheitsrats’ (2008) 19(20) Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 630–3, at 632.

81 Cf. H.P. Aust, ’Eine völkerrechtsfreundliche Union? Grund und Grenze der Öffnung des Unionsrechts zum Völkerrecht’ (2017) 1 Europarecht, pp. 106–21, at 109–11. This explains why the ECJ emphasized the autonomy of EU law when reviewing sanctions of the UN Security Council in the Kadi case law. See Joint Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461 (Kadi I), paras 291–308; Joint Cases C-584/10 P et al., European Commission and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518 (Kadi II), paras 104–6, 130–3. For further discussion of this point see G. de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after Kadi’ (2010) 51(1) Harvard International Law Journal, pp. 1–49, at 40–2; M. Wimmer, ‘Inward- and Outward-Looking Rationales behind Kadi II’ (2014) 21(4) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, pp. 676–703, at 698–9; S. Neudorfer, ‘Antiterrormaßnahmen der Vereinten Nationan und Grundrechtsschutz in der Union’ (2009) 69 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, pp. 979–1006, at 992–3. Admittedly, the constellation in Kadi was more about the scope of commitment to UN law than about international friendly interpretation of the EU treaties.

82 The living-instrument doctrine is discussed primarily in relation to the Strasbourg court but formulates a legal reasoning widely shared in continental law; see T. von Danwitz, ‘The Rule of Law in the Recent Jurisprudence of the ECJ’ (2014) 37(5) Fordham International Law Journal, pp. 1312–46, at 1346.

83 See, e.g., M.P. Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism’ (2007) 1(2) European Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 1–21; G. Itzcovich, ‘The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of Justice’ (2009) 10(5) German Law Journal, pp. 537–60; for a detailed methodological discussion of the effet utile case law of the ECJ see F. Müller & R. Christensen, Juristische Methodik, Vol. II: Europarecht (Duncker & Humblot, 2012), pp. 357–60.

84 L. Kestemont, Handbook on Legal Methodology: From Objective to Method (Intersentia, 2018), p. 29; for a short summary see K.F. Röhl & H.C. Röhl, Allgemeine Rechtslehre, 3rd edn (Heymanns, 2008), pp. 630–1; cf. K. Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 20th edn (C.F. Müller, 1999), para. 57 (‘Teleologische Interpretation ist kaum mehr als ein Blankett, weil mit der Regel, daß nach dem Sinn eines Rechtssatzes zu fragen ist, nichts für die entscheidende Frage gewonnen ist, wie dieser Sinn zu ermitteln sei’).

85 R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 242–3, 284–5; for Germany see R. Stettner, Grundfragen einer Kompetenzlehre (Duncker & Humblot, 1983), pp. 306–7; P. Lerche, Aktuelle föderalistische Verfassungsfragen (Bayerische Staatskanzlei, 1968), pp. 32, 50.

86 From a comparative perspective see M. Fehling, ‘Mechanismen der Kompetenzverteilung in föderalen Systemen im Vergleich’, in J. Aulehner et al. (eds), Föderalismus – Auflösung oder Zukunft der Staatlichkeit (Boorberg, 1997), pp. 31–55, at 42–5, 47.

87 This was argued strongly in relation to administrative law in K. Gärditz, ‘Die “Neue Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft”: Neuer Wein in alten Schläuchen?’, in M. Burgi (ed.), Zur Lage der Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft, Die Verwaltung, Beiheft 12 (Duncker & Humblot, 2017), pp. 105–45, at 133–41. Traditionally, the ‘Pure Theory of Law’ (H. Kelsen) stressed the autonomy of the legal order; relying extensively on a ‘pure legal method’ today, e.g., A. Funke, ‘Perspektiven subjektiv-rechtlicher Analyse im öffentlichen Recht’ (2015) 70 Juristenzeitung, pp. 369–80, at 374–6.

88 See, most famously, O.W. Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review, pp. 457–74, at 469; for an interdisciplinary approach in environmental law see, e.g., D. Owen & C. Noblet, ‘Interdisciplinary Research and Environmental Law’ (2014) 41(4) Ecology Law Quarterly, pp. 887–938.

89 Cf., with focus on administrative law, J. Chevallier, ‘Doctrine ou science?’ (2001) 7 L'Actualité Juridique: Droit Administratif, pp. 603–7, at 603–4.

90 See, e.g., H.C. Röhl, ‘Öffnung der öffentlich-rechtlichen Methode durch Internationalität und Interdisziplinarität: Erscheinungsformen, Chancen, Grenzen’ (2015) 74 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, pp. 7–32, at 28–32; A. von Arnauld, ‘Die Wissenschaft vom öffentlichen Recht nach einer Öffnung für sozialwissenschaftliche Theorie’, in A. Funke & J. Lüdemann (eds), Öffentliches Recht und Wissenschaftstheorie (Mohr Siebeck, 2009), pp. 65–117, at 82–6; from a methodological point of view cf., e.g., S. Taekema & B. van Klink, ‘On the Border: Limits and Possibilities of Interdisciplinary Research’, in B. van Klink & S. Taekema (eds), Law and Method (Mohr Siebeck, 2011), pp. 7–32, at 14–27.

91 On the background to the German discussion about a ‘New Administrative Law Science’ this is pointed out in more detail by M. Fehling, ‘Die neue Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft: Problem oder Lösung. Innovation durch Kanonisierung?’, in Burgi, n. 87 above, pp. 65–103, at 79–87; A. Voßkuhle, ‘Neue Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft’, in W. Hoffmann-Riem, E. Schmidt-Aßmann & A. Voßkuhle (eds), Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts, Vol. 1, 2nd edn (C.H. Beck, 2012), § 1 para. 39.

92 For a general discussion see, e.g., C. Volden, ‘The Politics of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the Bottom in Welfare Benefits?’ (2002) 46(2) American Journal of Political Science, pp. 352–63; V. Mehde, Wettbewerb zwischen Staaten (Nomos, 2005).

93 Cf., from a slightly different perspective, Schütze, n. 85 above; W. Kerber, ‘Applying Evolutionary Economics to Public Policy: The Example of Competitive Federalism in the EU’, in K. Dopfer (ed.),Economics, Evolution and the State (Edward Elgar, 2005), pp. 296–324.

94 On the positive impacts of intergovernmental competition see T.R. Dye, American Federalism: Competition among Governments (Lexington, 1990), pp. 177–89.

95 For details see, Schlacke & Knodt, n. 62 above, p. 406.

96 Specifications in Art. 4(3)(19) of the Paris Agreement; for further details see Bodansky, Brunnée & Rajamani, n. 67 above, pp. 219–26.

97 Dating back at least to Tiebout, C., ‘A Pure Economic Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1956) 64(5) The Journal of Political Economy, pp. 416–24CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for refinements see, e.g., T. Bewley, ‘A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Expenditures’ (1981) 49(3) Econometrica, pp. 713–40; detailed overview on different concepts of competition between regulatory systems by Brettschneider, J., Das Herkunftslandprinzip und mögliche Alternativen aus ökonomischer Sicht (Dunker & Humblot, 2015), pp. 161–263CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

98 See A.O. Hirschmann, Exit, Voice, and Loyality (Harvard University Press, 1970); overview by Peters, A., ‘Wettbewerb von Rechtsordnungen’ (2010) 69 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, pp. 7–53, at 17–9Google Scholar.

99 Cf., e.g., R.J. Revesz, ‘Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation’ (1992) 67(6) New York University Law Review, pp. 1210–54.

100 See, e.g., Swire, P.P., ‘The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law‘ (1996) 14(2) Yale Law & Policy Review, pp. 68–110Google Scholar; Engels, K.H., ‘State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?’ (1997) 48(2) Hastings Law Journal, pp. 271–376Google Scholar.

101 Revesz, n. 99 above, pp. 1217–8.

102 Swire, n. 100 above, pp. 99–100.

103 European Commission, ‘State Aid SA.38632 (2014/N) – Germany EEG 2014: Reform of the Renewable Energy Law’, 23 July 2014, C(2014) 5081 final, in particular recitals (292)–(328). However, because of the substantial extension of these privileges, some exemptions and reductions might threaten to come into conflict with EU state aid law in the future. Reductions of the EEG surcharge have not been subject to the decision of the ECJ (Federal Republic of Germany v. European Commission, n. 57 above), which only covered the feed-in-tariffs.

104 This line of argumentation has been developed by D. Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy (Harvard University Press, 1995); cf. furthermore Millimet, P. Fredriksson & D., ‘Is There a “California Effect” in US Environmental Policymaking?’ (2002) 32(6) Regional Science and Urban Economics, pp. 723–64Google Scholar.

105 As the counter principle of the country of origin principle, the country of destination principle determines that the regulation of the country that receives goods and services applies.

106 Some short remarks by Craig & de Búrca, n. 11 above, p. 608; for a detailed analysis of different areas of European law see Brettschneider, n. 97 above, pp. 330–562.

107 Vogel, n. 104 above, pp. 20–2; Swire, n. 100 above, pp. 83–5; cf. Stewart, R., ‘International Trade and Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experience’ (1992) 49(4) Washington & Lee Law Review, pp. 1329–71, at 1333–45Google Scholar.

108 See Saurer, n. 13 above, p. 425.

109 So, most clearly, Brettschneider, n. 97 above, pp. 719–20; Peters, n. 98 above, pp. 32–5.

110 So, in general (not dealing with the problems of climate change) Swire, n. 100 above, p. 108; cf. Brettschneider, n. 97 above, pp. 709–10.

111 Dating back at least to J. Schumpeter, Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (Duncker & Humblot, 1912) (Harvard Economic Studies 46, 1934): trilogy of invention, innovation, and diffusion; drawing on Schumpeter's categorization for legal research on innovation: Hoffmann-Riem, W., ‘Risiko- und Innovationsrecht im Verbund’ (2005) 38 Die Verwaltung, pp. 145–76, at 155Google Scholar.

112 Most importantly, Hoffmann-Riem, W., Innovation und Recht: Recht und Innovation (Mohr Siebeck, 2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

113 Rodi, M., ‘Innovationsförderung durch ökonomische Instrumente der Umweltpolitik’, in Eifert, M. & Hoffmann-Riem, W. (eds), Innovation und Recht: Innovationsfördernde Regulierung (Duncker & Humblot, 2009 ), pp. 147–69, at 153Google Scholar.

114 For this concept, in general, see, e.g., D.C. North: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 92–104; Mahoney, J., ‘Path Dependence in Historical Sociology’ (2000) 29(4) Theory and Society, pp. 507–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for the energy transition compare the short remark by Oberthür, S., ‘Hard or Soft Governance? The EU's Climate and Energy Policy Framework for 2030’ (2019) 7(1) Politics and Governance, pp. 17–27, at 25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; in the context of innovation see P. Aghion et al., ‘Path-Dependence, Innovation and the Economics of Climate Change’, Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy & Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 24 Nov. 2014, available at: https://www.lse.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/publication/path-dependence-innovation-and-the-economics-of-climate-change.

115 For the energy mix see Saurer, n. 13 above, pp. 423–4.

116 Cf., pointing to research and development policies in the different states, Westphal, D. Buschke & K., ‘A Challenge to Governance in the EU: Decarbonization and Energy Security’ (2019) 8(3/4) European Energy Journal, pp. 53–64, at 60Google Scholar.

117 For some short remarks see C. Franzius, ‘Regulierung und Innovation im Mehrebenensystem’, in T. Müller (ed.), Erneuerbare Energien in Europa (Nomos, 2015), pp. 41–85, at 85; Hoffmann-Riem, n. 112 above, p. 268; for the US energy market compare Lyons, D., ‘Protecting States in the New World of Energy Federalism’ (2018) 67(5) Emory Law Journal, pp. 921–73, at 960–1Google Scholar.

118 See Morelle, R. Leal-Areas & A., ‘The Resilience of the Paris Agreement: Negotiating and Implementing the Climate Regime’ (2018) 31(1) Georgetown Environmental Law Review, pp. 1–64, at 22–3Google Scholar, Cordonier Segger, n. 67 above, p. 218.

119 According to Art. 13(1) Paris Agreement the transparency framework ‘builds upon collective experience’.

120 Similarly, comparing the reporting and implementing obligations of the Paris Agreement and the Governance Directive, see Oberthür, n. 114 above, p. 24.

121 After a detailed overview of the enforcement mechanism also sceptical: Schlacke & Knodt, n. 62 above, pp. 407–8.

122 Fehling, n. 86 above, pp. 50–5; cf. Stettner, n. 85 above, pp. 142–4, 409–12.