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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 January 2009
In this paper I defend a version of consequentialism that is neither of the act nor the rule variety. I argue that most, if not all, acceptable moral rules are formulations of intricate and interrelated practices that serve to promote harmonious co-existence between human beings; that these formulations – moral rules – are shorthand abbreviations of the lengthy formulations which would be required to actually describe the extremely complicated set of prescriptions and prohibitions which comprise our ethical practices; that we are culturally, perhaps even naturally, disposed to justify our actions in consequentialist fashion; that these underlying moral practices or ‘folk’ ethics provide the foundation for all forms of consequentialism; and finally, that the folk ethical practices practice consequentialism incorporates are empirically verified.
1 I am not claiming that the folk ethic is innately derived. Folk ethics is not for this reason to be confused with or tied to the kind of folk psychology defended by Fodor and his followers. I claim only that we are naturally disposed in this direction in so far as we are capable of learning from experience, and are disposed to train our children to behave in ways that have benefited or profited us. Whether or not the folk ethic is innate in the Fodor sense is a stew I shall leave unstirred.
2 Judaism incorporated and sanctified it, and enforced it by the threat of God's anger. Christianity circumvented and diminished the importance of this ethic by replacing the folk ethic's agenda of harmonious co-existence among humans on this earth with its own otherworldly goals. Political movements with Machiavellian orientations pay lip service to this ethic, but act in egoistic and non-altruistic fashion to promote their own agendas.
3 Schopenhauer, A., The Meaning of Life: Questions, Answers, and Analysis, ed. Sanders, Steven and Cheney, David, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1980, p. 27Google Scholar.
4 Existentialists like Sartre claim that nothing is objectively right or wrong. Our choices alone determine what is right, and so we cannot choose wrongly. According to Sartre: ‘To choose to be this or that is to affirm at the same time the value of what we choose, because we can never choose evil. We always choose the good, and nothing can be good for us without being good for all.’ Existentialism and Human Emotions, tr. by Frechtman, Bernard, New York, 1957, p. 17Google Scholar. PC can agree with Sartre that we are living in a universe neither governed by a theistic God nor by a priori truths of reason, but it disagrees with his contention regarding our freedom to choose our morality. PC maintains that we are not free to choose our own ethics; rather we are free to discover them by inductive means by determining which practices have the best result.
5 In this paper, I provide only a condensed version of PC. I am working on a book that will include an extended version of PC, entitled On Consequentialist Ethics, to be published by Wadsworth early in 2002. I have also made limited use of some of the ideas underlying PC in my critique of Bertrand Russell's ethics in my book on his philosophy: Odell, S. Jack, On Russell, Belmont, California, 2000Google Scholar.
6 Mill, J. S., Utilitarianism, New York, 1957, p. 25Google Scholar.
7 Rawls's distinction between practice rules and summary rules is relevant here, although his terminology might be misleading. The rules of the folk morality are in his terminology summary rules, but what they summarize are social practices and not games. They are not practice rules even though they summarize practices. See Rawls, John, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’, Philosophical Review, lxiv (1955)Google Scholar.
8 Frankena, William, Ethics, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 2nd edn., 1993, pp. 61–78Google Scholar.
9 Holmes, Robert, Basic Moral Philosophy, Belmont, California, 1993, pp. 79 fGoogle Scholar.
10 Russell, Bertrand, ‘The Elements of Ethics’, in Philosophical Essays, rev. edn., London, 1966, p. 13Google Scholar.
11 Odell, , On Russell, p. 77Google Scholar.
12 Smart, J. J. C. and Williams, Bernard, Utilitarianism For and Against, Cambridge, 1973CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
13 Even Peter Railton, who has some sympathy with rule consequentialism, rejects it in favour of an act variety. See his ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, xiii (1984)Google Scholar.
14 Smart and Williams, p. 10.
15 Unlike Smart, Williams objects to both act and rule utilitarianism on the ground that neither form can be reconciled with the concept of integrity. See Smart and Williams, pp. 97–116. Elsewhere, he elaborated and further defended this form of objection by distinguishing between integrity and moral self-indulgence. See Williams, Bernard, ‘Utilitarianism and Self-indulgence’, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 50 fGoogle Scholar. It is not clear to me just what Williams means by ‘integrity’, but if by ‘integrity’ one means strict adherence to a code of conduct most fanatics, even. Nazis, have integrity in this sense. This sort of integrity is morally neutral. Moral integrity can, however, be understood as devotion to a code unified around and grounded upon communal practices that are expected on empirical grounds to provide harmonious co-existence among humans. If it is understood in this way, the question of whether or not a person's integrity or devotion to principles (virtues) enters into the assessment of his conduct as moral or ethical depends upon whether or not his principles can be justified. And the question as to which principles are justifiable is the question that PC answers empirically. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Scheffler, Samuel, The Rejection of Consequentialism, Oxford, rev. edn., 1994, pp. 41–70CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
16 Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, 1984Google Scholar. I am, it should be noted, looking at this issue from what might be construed as its ‘upside’ or self-aggrandizing implications. Parfit is concerned with its self-defeating implications.
17 Odell, , On Russell, p. 76Google Scholar.
18 See Brandt, Richard, ‘Toward a Credible Utilitarianism’, in Morality and the Language of Conduct, ed. Neri-Castaneda, Hector and Nakhnikian, George, Detroit, 1963, esp. 119–23Google Scholar. See also Brandt, Richard, ‘Fairness to Indirect Optimific Theories in Ethics’, Ethics, xcviii (1988)Google Scholar.
19 See Hare, R. M., Moral Thinking, Oxford, 1981CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Hare's two-level approach to moral thinking is a refined version of this type of view.
20 For more of the details regarding the ins and outs of the controversy regarding act versus rule utilitarianism, see Hooker, Brad, ‘Rule Consequentialism, Incoherence, Fairness’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, xcv (1995)Google Scholar; Hooker, Brad, ‘Ross-style Pluralism versus Rule Consequentialism’, Mind, CV (1996)Google Scholar; and Johnson, Conrad, Moral Legislation, Cambridge, 1990Google Scholar.
21 These standards are relative. What one person would deem to be well below his acceptable standards for continued existence might not be so regarded by a different person.
22 This scene does not occur in Cooper's 1826 novel but essentially the same point is made when Hawkeye, out of pity, shoots an enemy warrior to prevent his painful death. See Cooper, James Fenimore, The Last of the Mohicans, Albany, New York, 1983, p. 75Google Scholar.
23 This is not to say that active euthanasia for such persons is something to be taken lightly, or that there would not have to be strenuous safeguards to see that nothing further could be done to enhance the quality of life for these individuals. Nor does it mean that any physicians would have to participate in such a practice. Ways could be devised for the patient to utilize computers that would be programmed to administer lethal amounts of morphine when the patient is, by her or his own assessment, living well below her or his minimal standards. The most important consideration is that a policy permitting active euthanasia for those persons who desire it because they are living far below their minimal standards for continued existence could well have desirable consequences, consequences that would probably not be overshadowed either by surviving relatives having serious qualms or by our having to confront commonplace abuses of the policy.
24 Austin, J. L., ‘A Plea for Excuses’, Philosophical Papers, ed. Urmson, J. O. and Warnock, G. J., London, 1961, pp. 123–52Google Scholar.
25 Burke, Edmund, quoted from Sabine, George, A History of Political Theory, New York, 1937, p. 609Google Scholar. Sabine is quoting from Bonn's 1861 edition of Burke's Reform of Representation in the House of Commons, 1792, Works (vol. VI)Google Scholar.
26 I want to thank Michael Slote for reading and commenting on several versions of this paper. His comments were invaluable. I want to thank Barbara Bradford for her many constructive editorial suggestions, and for her advice regarding its contents. I also want to thank Moreland Perkins for his numerous helpful and instructive comments regarding an earlier draft.