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National Treatment and WTO Dispute Settlement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2003

RAJESH PILLAI
RAJESH PILLAI
Affiliation:
Honourable Society of the Middle Temple, London
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Abstract

The tension between the WTO and its constituent States and the conflicting impulses of trade liberalization and domestic regulatory autonomy is well documented. This phenomenon is brought into stark relief by the perceived interference from WTO dispute settlement panels into fiscal and regulatory policy-making within States. It is clear that the GATT and GATS agreements do in fact mandate a high degree of policing by WTO panels in areas that were traditionally seen as the exclusive sovereign preserve of States.

Information

Type
Review Article
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , November 2002 , pp. 321 - 343
Copyright
© 2002 Rajesh Pillai

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Footnotes

Gaetan Verhoosel, Hart Publishing 2002.
This review developed out of a piece written for the Jean Monnet Seminar at New York University School of Law, May 2002. I wish to thank Professor Joseph H. H. Weiler, Robert Weekes and David Herlihy for their help in developing this piece. Any errors in this article are mine alone.