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International criminal procedure and its participants: an examination of the interaction of judges, prosecutor and defence at the Yugoslav Tribunal1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Christoph J. M. Safferling
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Extract

More than ten years have passed since the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on 25 May 1993. What was perceived then as being quite a scandalous step has come to seem somewhat normal both for international and criminal lawyers. The creation of the International Tribunal was a surprising move mainly for three reasons. First, from a public international law point of view, the UN Charter does not explicitly authorise anything like a ‘judicial intervention’ as a possible means to react to an international conflict and establish peace and security. Second, given that international criminal law at that time was hardly codified, the legality of prosecutions was questioned in view of the principle nullum crimen sine lege. Third, the procedural system of an international criminal prosecution was unclear.

The shock concerning the first problem was reduced by the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) shortly thereafter, and was later overcome by institutionalising ‘judicial intervention’ by Article 13(b) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The second problem was solved by the first judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY itself.

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Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law , Volume 5 , December 2002 , pp. 219 - 252
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Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Instituut and the Authors 2002

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References

3. The full name is International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, founded by UN Security Council Resolution 827, 25 May 1993.

4. The term was coined by Roggemann, H., Der International Strafgerichtshof (Berlin, Spitz Verlag 1994) p. 8Google Scholar.

5. See Frowein, J. and Kirsch, Ph., in Simma, B. et al. , eds., The Charter of the United Nations — A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) 2nd edn.Google Scholar Introduction to Chapter VII, MN 33 and Art. 41 MN 6 and 19, ‘atypical measures’.

6. This argument is still being brought forward by the defence, e.g., Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanović et al., 1T-01-47-PT, 12 November 2002, where the Trial Chamber II ruled that the concept of command responsibility was applicable to internal armed conflicts even before 1991.

7. Ad hoc institutions are frequently used in international law. In the field of international commercial relations, for example, ad hoc arbitration tribunals are an everyday phenomenon. Whereas arbitrators can be left with a relatively wide margin concerning the procedure they wish to adopt, a criminal trial requires strict adherence to quite a number of safeguards.

8. The full name is International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, founded by UN Security Council Resolution 955, 8 November 1994. As to the acceptance of this power of the SC see A. Paulus, ‘Art. 29 MN 55–86’, in Simma, op. cit. n. 5.

9. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted on 17 July 1998, UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/TNF/3 of 17 August 1999 (with corrections).

10. The problem was addressed and routinely solved by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in its first decision, Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94–1-AR72, 2 October 1995. See Greenwood, C., ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Tadić Case’, 7 EJIL (1996) p. 265CrossRefGoogle Scholar; the very critical Alvarez, J.E., ‘Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadić Case’, 7 EJIL (1996) p. 245CrossRefGoogle Scholar; von Heinegg, H., ‘Die Errichtung des Jugoslawien-Strafgerichtshofes durch Resolution 827 (1993)’, in Fischer, H. and Lüder, S.R., eds, Völkerrechtliche Verbrechen vor dem Jugoslawientribunal, nationalen Gerichten und dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof (Berlin, Spitz 1999) p. 63Google Scholar; polemic Bohnert, J., ‘Kant in Jugoslawien’, in Duttge, G., ed., Gedächtnisschrift für E. Schlüchter (Cologne, Heymanns 2002) p. 763Google Scholar.

11. The principle of ‘equality of arms’ is also contained in the human right to a fair trial, see e.g., ECourtHR Bulut v. Austria, Rep. 1996–11, para. 48; Ankerl v. Switzerland, Rep. 1996-V, para. 38; see also Esser, R., Auf dem Weg zu einem europäischen Strafverfahrensrecht (Berlin, De Gruyter 2002) pp. 407 et seqCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 1966 p. 171Google Scholar; see Safferling, C., Towards an International Criminal Procedure (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003) pp. 331, 334Google Scholar.

13. A third Trial Chamber was enacted by the amendment of Art. 11(a) Statute ICTY by Security Council Resolution 1166 of 13 May 1998.

14. Amendment of Article 13ter Statute ICTY by Security Council Resolution 1329 of 30 November 2000; see the 8th Annual Report of the ICTY, UN Doc. A/56/352 – S/2001/865, paras. 10–17.

15. See Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., IT-96–21-A, 20 February 2001, App. Ch., para. 35.

16. The option to issue Practice Directions was introduced at the 13th Plenary Session on 25 July 1997. The various Presidents have since then made some use of this provision and drafted eight directions in this regard; to be found amongst other legal documents at: <http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm<.

17. Practice Direction on the Length of Briefs and Motions, IT/184/Rev. 1, 5 March 2002.

18. IT/137, 9 July 1998 <http://www.un.org/icty/basic/detention/IT137.htm>.

19. The enforcement system of the ICTY is shown in action by MacLean, J., ‘The Enforcement of the Sentence in the Tadić Case’, in Fischer, H., Kreß, C. and Lüder, S.R., eds, International and National Prosecution of Crimes Under International Law (Berlin, Spitz 2001) p. 727Google Scholar; see also Tolbert, D., ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and the enforcement of sentences’, 11 Leiden JIL (1998) p. 655CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

20. I have tried to lay down some principles myself in Safferling, op. cit. n. 12, pp. 351–59; see for a detailed analysis of the law at the ICTY and the ICC, Sluiter, G. and Kreß, K. in Cassese, A., Gaeta, P. and Jones, J.R.W.D., eds, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) pp. 1757–1821Google Scholar; lately Lambert-Ardelgwad, E., ‘Droit penal international — L'emprisonnement des personnes condamnées par les jurisdictions pénales internationales’, RSC (2003) p. 162Google Scholar.

21. For a comparative analysis of international prosecutors, see Bergsmo, M., Cissé, C. and Staker, C., ‘The Prosecutor of International Tribunals: The Case of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, and the ICC Compared’, in Arbour, L., Eser, A., Ambos, K. and Sanders, A., eds, The Prosecutor of a Permanent International Criminal Court (Freiburg, Edition Iuscrim 2000)Google Scholar.

22. See also 8th Annual Report ICTY, supra n. 14, paras. 186–194.

23. In detail, Safferling, op. cit. n. 12, pp. 64–79.

24. Prosecutor v. Kupreskić et al., IT-95–16, 21 September 1998.

25. 5th Annual Report ICTY, UN Doc. A/53/219 — S/1998/737, para. 133.

26. Cf., 9th Annual Report ICTY, UN Doc. A/57/379 — S/2002/985, para. 238.

27. See concerning the decision on assignment of Counsel: Prosecutor v. Btagojević, IT-02–60-PT, 9 December 2002, T. Ch. II; more restrictively Prosecutor v. Knezević, IT-95–4-PT, IT-95–8/1-PT, 6 September 2002, T. Ch. III.

28. Cf., 9th Annual Report ICTY, supra n. 26, para. 299.

29. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS (1950) p. 221; as amended by 11th protocol ETS No. 155.

30. In Germany it is the presiding judge that chooses the counsel; see para. 142 (1) German Code of Criminal Procedure.

31. As to the human right to an independent and impartial court or tribunal see Safferling, op. cit. n. 12, pp. 90–97.

32. DeCubber v. Belgium, 26 October 1984, Series A No. 86, para. 26.

33. The German system has frequently been suspected of producing a ‘Schulterschlusseffekt’ (to stand shoulder for shoulder) of the Prosecutor and the Judges; see Schünemann, B., ‘Der Richter im Strafverfahren als manipulierter Dritter? Zur empirischen Bestätigung von Perseveranz- und Schulterschlusseffekt’, 20 Strafverteidiger (2000) p. 159Google Scholar.

34. See Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanović and Kubura, IT-01–47, 26 March 2002, T. Ch. II; Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95–17/1-A, 21 July 2000, App. Ch., Declaration Judge Shahabuddeen paras. 13, 14.

35. 6th Annual Report ICTY, UN Doc. A/54/187 — S/1999/846, para. 158.

36. This is a human rights requirement, cf., Safferling, op. cit. n. 12, pp. 106–107. At the ICC this requirement was incorporated in Art. 55 (2)(c) of the Statute.

37. Cf., as to the ICTR, Wladimiroff, M., ‘The Assignment of Counsel before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, 12 Leiden JIL (1999) p. 957CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

38. Directive No. 1/94, IT/73/REV. 9, as amended 12 July 2002.

39. In detail see Rules 44 and 45(B) and Art. 14 Directive of Assignment of Defence Counsel.

40. Information is accessible at <http://www.adcicty.com/home.htm>.

41. Membership with the ADC-ICTY has several levels; only full-members can exercise voting rights and be eligible themselves (see Art. 6 ADC-ICTY Constitution for the executive Committee; Art. 12 for the right to vote and Art. 14 for the Disciplinary Council).

42. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanović, Alagić and Kubura, supra n. 32.

43. For the German system, cf., Safferling, op. cit. n. 12, at pp. 65 et seq.

44. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanović, Alagić and Kubura, supra n. 32.

45. Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel Appearing before the International Tribunal (as amended on 12 July 2002) (IT/125 REV. 1).

46. Art. 19(A) Directive of Assignment of Defence Counsel. The decision is reviewable by the President, Art. 19(F) Directive of Assignment of Defence Counsel.

47. Art. 19(C) Directive of Assignment of Defence Counsel.

48. Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94–1-A-R77, ‘Judgement on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin’, 31 January 2000; and Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94–1-A-R77, ‘Appeal Judgement on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin’, 27 February 2001.

49. Arts. 37–50 of the Code of Professional Conduct For Counsel.

50. According to Art. 14 of the Constitution of the ADC-ICTY.

51. A short description of the development is provided by Mundis, D. in ‘From “Common Law” Towards “Civil Law”: The Evolution of the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, 14 Leiden JIL (2001) pp. 367 at 370–374CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52. Cf., Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, IT-98–34-T, 27 February 2002, T. Ch. I., where the Prosecutor relied in her motion of January 2002 on a Rule that had been modified in December 2000.

53. S. De Gurmendi Fernandez and H. Friman seem to see this as rather normal in the international context. ‘The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court’, 3 YIHL (2000) pp. 157 at 158Google Scholar

54. IT/125 REV. 1.

55. Rules governing the Detention of Persons Awaiting Trial or Appeal Before the Tribunal or Otherwise Detained on the Authority of the Tribunal (‘Rules of Detention’) IT/38/REV.8, last amended 29 November 1999.

56. Gurmendi Fernandez and Friman, loc. cit. n. 53, pp. 157 at 164 et seq.

57. Tochilovsky, V., ‘Rules of Procedure for the International Criminal Court: Problems to Address in Light of the Experience of the ad hoc Tribunals’, in 46 NILR (1999) p. 343CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mundis, loc. cit. n. 51, pp. 367 at 368.

58. V. Tochilovsky, ‘Legal Systems and Cultures in the International Criminal Court’, in Fischer et al., eds., op. cit. n. 19, pp. 627 at 632; Mundis, loc. cit. n. 51, pp. 367 at 370 et seq.

59. The first criminal, Duško Tadić, was extradited 24 April 1995; the trial started 7 May 1996; the final conviction was on 26 January 2000. It is important to note that as regards the lengths of proceedings one must count from the charge to the end of the appeals proceedings; see Human Rights Committee General Comment 13 (Art. 14) para. 10. According to the ECourtHR even constitutional complaints are to be taken into account; see Gast and Popp v. Germany, Appl. No. 29357/95, 25 Feburary 2000, Rep. 2000–11, para. 64. Tochilovsky, loc. cit. n. 58, pp. 627 at 632 is misleading as he counts only the first instance trial.

60. Cf., Zappalà, S., Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003) pp. 114–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

61. Cf., Harris, D.J., O'Boyle, M. and Warbrick, C., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (London, Butterworths 1995) pp. 228 et seqGoogle Scholar, who demonstrate that most of the convictions by the ECourtHR concerning the ‘reasonable time’ requirement of Art. 6(1) ECHR originate in civil law jurisdiction.

62. Mundis, loc. cit. n. 51, pp. 367 at 369. A comparative study of the role of the judges in England and Germany is given by Schulte-Nover, S., Strafrichter in Deutschland und England (Frankfurt, Lang 2003)Google Scholar.

63. In favour of a right to a reasoned judgment as a human right, Harris etal., op. cit. n. 61, pp. 215 et seq.

64. This is rightly stressed by Tochilovsky, loc. cit. n. 58, pp. 627 at 636.

65. For an analysis of the position of the victim at the ICTY and the ICC, see Safferling, C., ‘Das Opfer völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen’, 115 Zeitschrift für die gesamten Strafrechtswissenschaften (2003), 352Google Scholar; see also De Gurmendi Fernandez and Friman, loc. cit. n. 53, pp. 157 at 181–192 and B. Timm, ‘The Legal Position of Victims in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, in Fischer et al., op. cit. n. 19, p. 289.

66. Cf., C. Jorda and J. de Hemptinne, ‘The Status and the Role of the Victim’, in Cassese et al., op. cit. n. 20, p. 1387; Timm, ibid., p. 289.

67. A rather bitter, disillusioned view of the work of the ICTY from a Croatian viewpoint is presented by Separović, Z.P., ‘UN-Tribunal: Justice for the Victims?’, in Kirchhoff, G.F. and Friday, P.C., eds., Victimology at the Transition From the 20th to the 21st Century (Aachen, Shaker 2000) p. 325Google Scholar.

68. The predecessors of the ICTY, namely the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals, have relied mostly on documents and have heard but a few witnesses. It has been suggested that the more high-ranking the accused the less need there is for witnesses; cf., Kreβ, ‘Witnesses in Proceedings Before the ICC’, in Fischer et al., op. cit. n. 19, pp. 309 at 313, fn. 9. The trial of Slobodan Milošević, IT-02–54, does not seem to corroborate this assumption. In the first phase of the trial before Trial Chamber III concerning only Kosovo, the Prosecutor called some 124 witnesses to present his case; see <http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh90.htm>.

69. The victimological work in international criminal law has just started. The first attempt in this direction was the meeting of international experts at the International Workshop on ‘War — Victimization — Security: The Case of the Former Yugoslavia’. For a report, see Ewald, U. and von Oppeln, C., ‘War — Victimization — Security: The Case of the Former Yugoslavia’, 10 Eur. J Crime, Crim. L & Crim. Jus. (2002) p. 39CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

70. For an analysis of the situation in Germany, see Weigend, Th., Deliktsopfer und Strafverfahren (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 1989)Google Scholar.

71. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94–1-T, 10 August 1995, T. Ch. II., para. 23.

72. V. Morris and M. Scharf, An Insider's Guide to the ICTY (Irvington-on-Hudson NY, Transnational 1995) p. 536.

73. Donat-Cattin, D., ‘Art. 68, no. 2’, in Triffterer, O., ed., A Commentary to the Rome Statute of the ICC (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1999)Google Scholar.

74. The ECourtHR has accepted this reading of Art. 8 ECHR in its decision, Doorson v. The Netherlands, 26 March 1996, Reports 1996–II, para. 70.

75. Cf., Kreβ, loc. cit. n. 68, pp. 309 at 311.

76. The Victims and Witnesses Section is supported through donation of national states. It has been able to open a field office in Sarajevo to enhance the contact between the ICTY and the victims. In 2002 the Section consisted of 35 staff members; see 9th Annual Report of the ICTY, UN Doc A/57/ 379 — S/2002/85, 4 September 2002, paras. 267–270.

77. A similar institution is foreseen at the ICC by virtue of Art. 43(6) ICC Statute.

78. Trial Chamber II has therefore summoned a journalist to give live evidence on one of his articles, see Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talić, IT-99–36-T, 7 June 2002, T. Ch. II.

79. The model practiced in Germany at the Regional Court (Landgericht) Mainz, , 49 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1996) p. 208Google Scholar, critically reviewed by Dahs, H., ‘Die gespaltener Hauptverhandlung’, 49 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (1996) p. 178Google Scholar, would probably be incompatible with the adversarial structure of the ICTY. The Judge interviewed the child witnesses in a different room. While this interrogation was transferred to the courtroom where Prosecutor, defence counsel and accused could watch, they were not in a position to take part in the questioning itself.

80. Cf., Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94–1-T, 25 June 1996, T. Ch. I.

81. First in Rule 90(A) and now in Rule 71 bis, which is systematically the correct placement, next to the Depositions in Rule 71.

82. The different models are described by Keiser, C., Das Kindeswohl im Strafverfahren (Frankfurt, Lang 1998) pp. 352–367Google Scholar. Interrogations by video have also been discussed by the US Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig 497 U.S. 836 (1990); a violation of the rights of the accused could not be found.

83. The practice deals mostly with child victims of sexual abuse.

84. Cf., Streng, F., ‘Überfordem Sexualstraftaten das Strafrechtssystem?’, in Schulz, J. and Vormbaum, Th., eds., Festschrift für Günter Bemmann (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1997) pp. 443 at 448Google Scholar.

85. The first was entered in the Tadić case on 18 May 1995.

86. Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra n. 71.

87. As to the functioning of Rule 96 see Sellers, P.V., ‘Rule 89 (C) and (D): At Odds or Overlapping with Rule 96 and Rule 95?’, in May, R. et al. , eds., Essays on ICTY Procedure and Evidence in honour of Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 2001) pp. 275 at 279–288Google Scholar.

88. Cf., Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., IT-96–21-T, 5 June 1997, T. Ch. I. paras. 43–48.

89. Jones, R.W.D., The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (Ardsley NY, Transnational 2000) 2nd edn., p. 429Google Scholar.

90. Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra n. 71, para. 46.

91. Safferling, C.J.M., ‘Das Opfer völkerrechtlicher Verbrechen’, 115 Zeitschrift für die gesamten Strafrechtswissenschaften (2003) pp. 352–384Google Scholar; see also A. Orie, ‘Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal Proceedings’, in Cassese et al., op. cit. n. 20, pp. 1439 at 1472.

92. The comparable set of Rules at the ICC (Rules 63 (III), 70–72) is a little more restrictive than Rule 96 at the ICTY; D. K. Piragoff has tried to show, however, that they only differ in structure, in ‘Procedural Justice Related to Crimes of Sexual Violence’, in Fischer et al., op. cit. n. 19, pp. 385 at 389.

93. A possible infringement of the right to a public trial (Art. 14 (1)(2) ICCPR, Art. 6(1)(1) ECHR) is justified by explicit exceptions in the human rights treaties; cf., Safferling, op. cit. n. 12, at pp. 230–237.

94. The wording of Rule 75 (B) was modified at the 5th Plenary Session in January 1995. The term ex parte hearing was substituted by the term in camera in order to make clear that only the public is excluded from the trial. The accused and his defence counsel are certainly present; cf., Jones, op. cit. n. 89, at p. 384.

95. In the decision Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra n. 71, T. Ch. II, Judge Stephen delivered a separate opinion in which he ruled out the possibility that witness protection could necessitate anonymity during trial. The rights of the accused must prevail; see Kreβ, loc. cit. n. 68, pp. 309 at 373–374. Trial Chamber I agreed with Judge Stephen in Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, Decision on the application of the prosecutor dated 17 October 1996 requesting protective measures for victims and witnesses, 5 November 1996, in principle, but then accepted the checking list put forward by the majority; see Jones, op. cit. n. 89, pp. 386 et seq.

96. Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra n. 71; these criteria have been accepted by Prosecutor v. Blaškić, ibid. Legal scholars have argued extensively about this issue, cf., Leigh, M., ‘The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses against Accused’, 90 AJIL (1996) p. 216CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chinkin, C., ‘Due Process and Witness Anonymity’, 91 AJIL (1997) p. 74CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Leigh, M., ‘Witness Anonymity is Inconsistent with Due Process’, 91 AJIL (1997) p. 80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

97. See e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talić, Decision on Motion by Prosecution for Protective Measures, IT-99–36-PT, 3 July 2000, T. Ch. II, para. 8.

98. Ibid., para. 11; Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95–17/1, 11 June 1998, paras. 7, 8.

99. Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talić, supra n. 95, T. Ch. II.

100. Cf., Bossuyt, M. J., Guide to the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dordrecht, Nijhoff 1987) p. 284Google Scholar; Fawcett, J.E.S., The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1987) 2nd edn., p. 161Google Scholar.

101. See for example, Ambos, K. and Steiner, H., ‘Vom Sinn des Strafens auf innerstaatlicher und supranationaler Ebene’, Juristische Schulung (2001) p. 9Google Scholar; Safferling, C., ‘The Justification of Punishment in International Criminal Law’, 4 Austrian Rev. Int. & Eur. L (1999) p. 124Google Scholar; Möller, Ch., Völkerstrafrecht und International Strafgerichtshof — kriminologische, straftheoretische und rechtspolitische Aspekte (Münster, Lit 2003) pp. 416 et seqGoogle Scholar.

102. See ECourtHR, Doorson v. The Netherlands, supra n. 74; also Visser v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 26668/95, 4 April 2002, paras. 48–52.

103. There is no explicit time limit in the RPE; however, disclosure must take place before commencement of trial and not before the witness gives evidence, see Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talić, supra n. 78, para. 38, accepting 30 days as being sufficient for the proper preparation for the accused.

104. R.W.D. Jones, ‘Protection of Victims and Witnesses’, in Cassese et al., op. cit. n. 20, pp. 1355 at 1363.

105. See Zappalà, op. cit. n. 60, p. 132.

106. Jones, loc. cit. n. 104, pp. 1355 at 1366.

107. Cf., Kreβ, loc. cit. n. 68, pp. 309 at 346–348.

108. See e.g., Art. 332 French CPP and § 238 German CPP.

109. In the first ICTY case in this regard, the dead witness was a defence witness who had been interviewed under oath by the Prosecutor, see Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95–14-T, 29 April 1998, T. Ch. I.

110. Cf., e.g., Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, IT-98–34-T, 14 November 2001, T. Ch. I.

111. Cf., Prosecutor v. Kordiၴ and Cerkez, IT-95–14/2-AR73.5, 21 July 2000, A. Ch.

112. Ibid., and Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, supra n. 52.

113. See 8th Annual Report of the ICTY, UN Doc. A/56/352 — S/2001/865 para. 51.

114. Cf, Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, supra n. 52.

115. The procedural requirements are further elaborated in the Practice Direction on Procedure for Implementation of Rule 92bis(B) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (the Presiding Officer), 20 July 2001, IT/192.

116. Cf., Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, supra n. 50; likewise Prosecutor v. Galić, IT-98–29-T, 2 August 2002, T. Ch. I. This reading of the norm was accepted by the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Galić, IT-98–29-AR73.2, 7 June 2002, App. Ch.; Zappalà, op. cit. n. 60, p. 138, welcomes this restriction.

117. Prosecutor v. Galić, ibid., paras. 24, 25.

118. Prosecutor v. Naletilić and Martinović, supra n. 52.

119. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, IT-02–54-T, 21 March 2002, T. Ch. III.

120. The Appeals Chamber follows this interpretation; Prosecutor v. Galić, supra n. 116.

121. The Appeals Chamber set up a list of acts and conduct accordingly, see Prosecutor v. Galić, ibid., paras. 9, 10.

122. Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, supra n. 119.

123. Prosecutor v. Galić, supra n. 116, para. 15.

124. E.g., if the accused fears that the investigator who took the deposition influenced the witness, Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talić, IT-99–36-PT, 18 January 2002, T. Ch. 2.

125. Prosecutor v. Galić, supra n. 116, paras. 11–15, 19. The requirements of command responsibility have been discussed for the first time in international criminal law since the Nuremberg trials in Prosecutor v. Delalić, Mucić, Delić, Landžo, IT-96–21-T, 16 November 1998, T. Ch. II.; for a detailed analysis see K. Ambos, Der Allgemeine Teil des Völkerstrafrechts (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 2002) pp. 284–292.

126. See for example, ECourtHR, Isgrò v. Italy, Series A 194-A para. 34, dealing with an earlier witness who had vanished.

127. See for example, ECourtHR, Unterpertinger v. Austria, Series A 110, para. 33; the Austrian Court based the conviction on a statement made to the police during investigation by the then-wife of the accused, who did not testify at trial; also Saïdi v. France, Series A 261-C para. 44, where a drug dealer was convicted only because he was identified by several persons whom he never had the chance of confronting during trial. More recently Doorson v. The Netherlands, supra n. 74, para. 76, also a drug dealer case. For a discussion of the Strasbourg case law from a German lawyer's perspective see Beulke, , ‘Konfrontation und Strafprozessreform’, in Hanack, E.-W., Hilger, H., Mehle, V. and Widmaier, G., eds., Festschrift für Peter Riess (Berlin, De Gruyter 2002) p. 3Google Scholar.

128. See for further discussion of this Safferling, op. cit. n. 12, pp. 283 et seq.

129. Orie, loc. cit. n. 91, pp. 1439 at 1485.

130. See Bryan, I. and Rowe, P., ‘The Role of Evidence in War Crimes Trials: The Common Law and the Yugoslav Tribunal’, 2 YIHL (1999) p. 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar; G. Boas, ‘Admissibility of Evidence under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY: Development of the “Flexibility Principle”’, in May et al., op. cit. n. 87, pp. 263 at 271.

131. Zappalà, op. cit. n. 60, pp. 133–135, with reference to the ICTY case-law concerning hearsay. See also A. Rodrigues and C. Tournaye, ‘Hearsay Evidence’, in May et al., op. cit. n. 87, p. 291.

132. Tochilovsky, loc. cit. n. 58, pp. 627 at 640.

133. Cf., Orie, loc. cit. n. 91, pp. 1439 at 1449.

134. At the ICC: Art. 54 (l)(a) Statute.

135. The provision was even more restrictive before and modified to enhance the rights of the accused at the 5th Plenary Session; 2nd Annual Report of the ICTY, UN Doc. A/50/365 — S/1955/ 728, para. 25.

136. Tochilvsky opines that this is the reason why the defence counsel is often reluctant to request disclosure according to Rule 66(B); see loc. cit. n. 58, pp. 627 at 641.

137. See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95–14, 27 January 1997, T. Ch. 1., paras. 35–38.

138. Rule 66 (C) was inserted at the 5th Plenary Session; 2nd Annual Report of the ICTY, UN Doc. A/50/365 — S/1955/728, para. 22; until November 1999 Rule 66 (B) referred to (C) expressly; see Jones, op. cit. n. 89, at p. 336; As the rule reads now, systematically para. (C) operates as an exception to paras. (A) and (B).

139. See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95–14/2-AR73.6, 18 September 2000, App. Ch.

140. Trial Chamber II accepted in Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95–17/1-T, T. Ch. II, 16 July 1998, the importance of evidence that affects the credibility of the witness for the defence under Rule 68; reported in Prosecutor v. Furundžija, n-95–17/1-T,T. Ch. II, 10 December 1998, paras 18–22.

141. See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-85-14-T, 27 January 1997, T. Ch. I.

142. See Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talić, IT-99–36-T, 23 May 2002, T. Ch. II.

143. Cf., Jones, op. cit. n. 89, p. 350.

144. See Mundis, loc. cit. n. 51, at pp. 378 at 380.

145. Similarly the jurisdiction of the German Bundesgerichtshof as concerns the principle of ‘equality of arms’, see e.g., 36 BGHSt p. 305.

146. Cf., Mundis, loc. cit. n. 51, p. 378; Mundis stresses that according to the existing law at the ICTY the Prosecutor is not obliged to point exculpatory evidence out to the Judges. However, the more the ICTY procedure moves towards civil law practice the more the Prosecutor must fulfil her role in a purely objective manner.

147. For a detailed comparison see Safferling, op. cit n. 12, pp. 64 et seq.

148. ICTY, Decision on Communication between the Parties and their Witnesses, Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Kupreškić, Kupreškić, Josipović, Papić and Šantić, IT-95–16-T, T. Ch. I, 21 September 1998.

149. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talić, IT-99–36-T, 23 May 2002, T. Ch. II.

150. See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95–14-T, 22 April 1999, T. Ch. I; relied on by Trial Chamber 2 in: Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talić, supra n. 140.

151. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95–14-A, 26 September2000, App. Ch.

152. Ibid., para. 42.

153. See Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, IT-99–36-T, 30 October 2002, para. 26.

154. States are obliged to cooperate according to Art. 29 ICTY Statute and the Chapter VII character of the Statute. In this regard, the ICTY is in a better situation than the ICC will be, where cooperation mostly depends on ‘horizontal’, inter-state relationships; see for a comprehensive analysis B. Swart, ‘International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance’, in Cassese et al., op. cit. n. 20, pp. 1589 at 1590–1598.

155. See Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talić, supra n. 149.

156. Prosecutor v. Galic, IT-98–29-AR73.2, 7 June 2002, App. Ch., para. 31.

157. See Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talić, IT-99–36-PT, 15 February 2002, T. Ch. II.

158. See Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talić, ibid., and Prosecutor v. Statić, IT-97–24-PT, 25 February 2002, single judge (Schomburg), for the defence.

159. Prosecutor v. Stakić, ibid.

160. Rule 95 was amended several times; see Jones, op. cit. n. 89, pp. 427–428.

161. 2nd Annual Report of the ICTY, UN Doc. A/50/365 — S/1955/728, para. 26, fn. 9.

162. The exclusionary Rule is to be found in Art. 69(7) ICC Statute.

163. With regard to the ICC, see Lagodny, O., ‘Legitimität und Bedeutung des Ständigen Internationalen Strafgerichtshofes’, 113 ZStW (2001) pp. 800 at 823CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

164. Safferling, op. cit n. 12, pp. 294–295.

165. See also Bassiouni, M.C. and Manikas, P., The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (New York, Transnational 1996) p. 952Google Scholar.

166. Safferling, op. cit. n. 12, p. 137.

167. Cf., S. Zappalà, ‘Rights of Persons during an Investigation’, in Cassese et al., op. cit. n. 20, p. 1185

168. Cf., Art. 9(1)(2) ICCPR.

169. Prosecutor v. Jokić, IT-01–42-PT, 20 February 2002, para. 18 and Prosecutor v. Ademi, IT-01–42-PT, 20 February 2002, T. Ch. I, para. 19.

170. See Prosecutor v. Blaškić, IT-95–14-T, 20 December 1996, T. Ch. I.

171. Amendment of Rule 65 at the 21 st Plenary Session of 15–17 November 1999, when the words ‘exceptional circumstances’ were deleted (IT/161); see also Zappalà, op. cit. n. 59, p. 95.

172. Prosecutor v. Djukić, IT-96–20-T, 24 April 1996, T. Ch. 1, General Djukić died before the trial commenced; cf., de Waart, P., ‘From “Kidnapped” Witness to Released Accused “for Humanitarian Reasons”: The Case of the Late General Djordje Djukić’, 9 Leiden JIL (1996) p. 543CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Prosecutor v. Simić, IT-95–9, 26 March 1998, T. Ch. I.

173. As to the case-law of the ICTY in this regard, see De Frank, , ‘ICTY Provisional Release: current Practice, a Dissenting Voice, and the Case for a Rule Change’, 80 Texas LR (2002) pp. 1429 at 1451–1452Google Scholar.

174. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik et al., IT-00-39&40, 8 October 2001, T. Ch. III, para. 12. This was a 2:1 decision. Judge Robinson (Jamaica) vehemently dissented, voting in favour of a human rights based approach. An analysis of this dissent is given by De Frank, ibid., p. 1429.

175. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanović, Alagić, Kubura, IT-01–47-PT, 19 December 2001, T. Ch. II, para. 7.

176. Prosecutor v. Jokić, para. 18 and Prosecutor v. Ademi, para. 19, both supra n. 169.

177. Prosecutor v. Jokic, ibid., and Prosecutor v. Ademi, ibid. The burden of proof is exactly the problematic consequence of the rule-exception mechanism; this is overlooked by T. Ch. I and De Frank, loc. cit. n. 175, pp. 1429 at 1450–1451.

178. Epstein, L. and Walker, Th. G., Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and Justice (Washington D.C., CQ Press 1992) pp. 412Google Scholar; Corre, N., Bail in Criminal Proceedings (London, Fourmat Publishing 1990) p. 4Google Scholar.

179. See e.g., Meyer-Goßner, L., Strafprozessordnung (Munich, CH. Beck 2003) 46th edn., para. 112, Nos. 8–11Google Scholar.

180. I have tried to show that the special nature of international criminal law does not alter the legal arguments for or against pre-trial detention, Safferling, op. cit. n. 12, pp. 142–147.

181. A strong petitum for a renaissance of the principle of liberty in criminal policy has recently been issued by Albrecht, P.-A., Die vergessene Freiheit (Berlin, BWV 2003)Google Scholar.

182. Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (London, Duckworth 1987)Google ScholarPubMed.

183. A conclusive argument has been brought forward by Reinisch, A., ‘Das Jugoslawien Tribunal der Vereinten Nationen und die Verfahrensgarantien des II. VN-Menschenrechtspaktes’, 47 Austrian Journal of Public and International Law (1995) pp. 173–213Google Scholar.

184. Tadić and Erdemović as rather small fish have been tried by the ICTY while Djajić (see Safferling, C., ‘Public Prosecutor v. Djajić’, 92 AJIL (1998) at p. 528CrossRefGoogle Scholar) and Jorgić have been tried by German courts; the latter has been convicted for genocide: 45 BGHSt 64, 19 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (1999) p. 396Google Scholar; the decision was upheld by the Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfG EuGRZ 2001, 76; a critical analysis is given by Hoß, C. and Miller, R.A., ‘German Federal Constitutional Court and Bosnian War Crimes’, 44 GYIL (2001) p. 576Google Scholar.

185. This against De Frank, loc. cit. n. 173, pp. 1429 at 1452–1453 and at 1460–1461. He opines that it would be ‘grossly inappropriate’ to equate domestic jurisdiction and the ICTY. The opposite is true. As concerns the applicability of the fair trial requirements there is no difference. An international prosecution cannot be a bit unfair just because it deals with war criminals.

186. ECourtHR Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, 26 July 2001, Appl. No. 33977/96.

187. Ibid. para. 84 with further references to the Courts case law; cf., also Meyer-Ladewig, J., Hk-EMRK (Baden-Baden, Nomos 2003), Art. 5, No. 36Google Scholar.

188. Ibid. para. 84.

189. Ibid. para. 85.

190. Prosecutor v. Ademi, supra n. 169, paras. 18–22.

191. In this sense also Kreβ, loc. cit. n. 68, pp. 309 at 369.

192. Cf., Safferling, C., ‘Die EMRK und das Völkerstrafrecht’, in Renzikowski, J., ed., Die EMRK im Zivil-, Straf- und Öffentlichen Recht — Grundlagen einer Europäischen Rechtskultur (Zürich, Schulthess 2003) forthcomingGoogle Scholar.

193. A deliberation of Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanović, Alagić, Kubura, supra n. 175, is missing, although both Chambers rely on the same decision of the ECourtHR.

194. As concerns burden of proof, De Frank seems to agree, loc. cit. n. 173, pp. 1429 at 1457–1458.

195. ECHR Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, 26 July 2001, No. 33977/96, para. 84; Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, Series A No. 207, paras. 35–53; Clooth v. Belgium, 12 December 1991, Series A No. 225, para. 44; Muller v. France, 17 March 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997–11, paras. 35–45; Jecius v. Lithuania, 31 July 2000, No. 34578/97, paras. 93–94, ECHR 2000–IX.

196. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanović, Alagić, Kubura, supra n. 175.

197. Prosecutor v. Ademi, supra n. 169, para. 22

198. Meyer-Ladewig, op. cit. n. 187.

199. This seems to be common ground. Cf., Prosecutor v. Ademi, supra n. 169, para. 21.

200. This is an important argument for the judges to interpret Rule 65 restrictively. See Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talić, IT-99–36-PT, 25 July 2000, T. Ch. II, para. 18.

201. The necessity to question the accused before deciding has been established by the Appeals Chamber, see Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., IT-99–37-AR65, 30 October 2002, App. Ch.

202. On a sealed indictment the suspect can obviously not appear at the ICTY voluntarily; see Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talić, supra n. 200; Prosecutor v. Krajisnik and Plavsic, IT-00–39&40-PT, 8 October 2001, T. Ch. III.

203. Prosecutor v. Sainović and Ojdanić, IT-99–37-PT, 26 June 2002, T. Ch. 3.

204. Prosecutor v. Ademi, supra n. 169, para. 27.

205. Ibid.

206. Ibid., para. 33.

207. See EcourtHR Funke v. France, Series A No. 256-A; Saunders v. United Kingdom, Rep. 1996–VI, 2064; Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 EHRR (1996) 29Google Scholar.

208. Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., supra n. 201. This is also what the ECourtHR says in Neumeister v. Austria Series A No. 8, para. 10. p. 39, De Frank, loc. cit. n. 173, pp. 1429 at 1453 fn. 88 apparently misunderstood this judgment.

209. Cf., Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talić, supra n. 200, para. 20.

210. Prosecutor v. Ademi, supra n. 169, para. 22.

211. This problem is found missing in the proposal made by De Frank, loc. cit. n. 173, pp. 1429 at 1456.

212. Cf., Schlunk, A., in Triffterer, O., eds., Commentary on the Rome Statute (Baden-Baden, Nomos 1999) Art. 58 No. 13Google Scholar.

213. Prosecutor v. Blagojević and Obrenović et al., IT-02–60-AR65, 3 October 2002, App. Ch. The test could be found in the so-called de facto regime which is an accepted notion in public international law; see Verdross, A. and Simma, B., Universelles Völkerrecht (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 1984) 3rd edn., para. 961CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

214. Prosecutor v. Mrksić, IT-95–13/1-AR65, 8 October 2002, App. Ch. In several cases, however, the Prosecutor intents to defeat the safeguards of the resident state by naming general lack of cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor; cf, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ademi, supra n. 169, para. 35; Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talić, supra n. 200, para. 15.

215. Cf., e.g., Art. 57(2) of the First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions; also Oeter, D., in Fleck, D., ed., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000)Google Scholar para. 456 with further references as to the historic development and the customary law status of the principle of proportionality.

216. Ibid.

217. Cf, Bundesverfasssungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court), 15 December 1965, in 19 BVerfGE (1966) pp. 342 at 348–351Google Scholar.

218. Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanović, Alagić, Kubura, supra n. 175, para. 7.

219. Prosecutor v. Ademi, supra n. 169, para. 22.

220. Cf., also Meyer-Ladewig, supra n. 187.

221. Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talić, supra n. 200, para. 27.

222. Safferling, op. cit. n. 12, p. 75.

223. Prosecutor v. Ademi, supra n. 169, para. 11, concerning the interpretation of the amended Rule 65 (provisional release), see above 3.3.

224. Cf., Safferling, ‘Audiatur et altera pars — die prozessuale Waffengleichheit als Prozessprinzip?’, 12 Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (2003) (forthcoming)Google Scholar.

225. Cf., Elberling, B., ‘Rechtsprechung des Jugoslawien-Tribunals im Jahr 2002’, 45 GYIL (2002) pp. 483 at 486–488Google Scholar.

226. See ICTY 9th Annual Report, UN Doc. A/57/379 — S/2002/985, para. 207.