I am grateful to Robert Rotberg for his review of Until We Have Won Our Liberty: South Africa After Apartheid. Both of our books examine what came after white rule in Southern Africa and seek broader lessons for politics. We both celebrate many post-apartheid triumphs as well as travails, including low economic growth, unemployment, crime, and poor education. And yet Rotberg’s review highlights our very different theoretical and empirical perspectives concerning how to describe governance and development outcomes, and the relative influence of institutions versus individuals.
For example, Rotberg chooses to see South Africa from the vantage of Botswana. He says that Botswana’s economic performance and bureaucratic professionalism is a model of what South Africa could have been. I see only limited value in that comparison: Botswana is a country of less than three million people (South Africa is almost 60 million), almost entirely homogeneous, with no modern history of conflict, and faced nothing akin to apartheid government or a violent reconfiguration of the state.
Relative to scores of other African and upper-middle income countries, on a variety of dimensions, I find that South Africa is more frequently a leader than a laggard. Moreover, a different neighbor—Zimbabwe—provides a more illuminating comparison. Zimbabwe was once beset with its own version of white settler rule, which also ended as a product of political struggle. In the 1990s, many white South Africans predicted that with Black government, their country would “go the way of Zimbabwe,” in terms of kleptocracy, tyrannical rule, cessation of the rule of law, and currency collapse. While acknowledging substantial corruption in and out of South African government, in no ways has it become Zimbabwe.
Rotberg points out that I refer to Chad and the Central African Republic but does not explain that I do so only to highlight that those are truly failed states, and to correct what I view as misleading rhetoric when so many use this label for South Africa. Whatever its problems, to date, South Africa has maintained a relatively stable currency, a national system for social grants, a dense network of excellent roads and airports, strong tax collection, and world class universities. Many governance failures, yes; but a failed state it is not.
In his review, Rotberg emphasizes his preferred focus on leadership. I agree that the virtues and vices of those in leadership positions are consequential. But I remain skeptical of the analytic value of Rotberg’s lens. If we only know “good leadership” through evidence of successful outcomes, then the argument is tautological.
In fact, I am more impressed by how existing structures constrain what is possible for chief executives. In my review of Rotberg’s book and in my own book, I describe how ex ante assessments of leadership potential offer little predictive value concerning outcomes.
To answer Rotberg’s question of why citizens express mostly frustration while I highlight a more balanced picture, I offer a series of hypotheses in Chapter three. First, democratic practice tends to focus on critiques, not celebrations. Second, I discuss a pervasive human tendency towards negativity bias. Finally, I do not expect ordinary citizens to discuss politics in terms of the long durée in the face of their own quotidian wants and needs.
I do not argue that all is well in South Africa, but rather that between 1994 and 2019, democratic practice advanced what I call dignified development—a mix of material and human capital gains, alongside more respectful treatment. Nonetheless, recent trends are worrying, and some of my own optimism has dimmed since I submitted my manuscript for publication. Democracy is fragile and sustained shortfalls in power generation, alongside unstable local-level coalitions contribute to a sense of hopelessness for the future. Growing conflict and frustration could unearth the messy-but-peaceful democratic institutions developed over the past three decades.
The upcoming 2024 national and provincial elections provide another opportunity for South African citizens to use their hard-fought rights and responsibilities to demand better government performance and accountability. They will offer more food for thought concerning both the value and durability of democracy.
