The article aims to provide a comprehensive theoretical and practical analysis of the issues in the legal regulation of corruption prevention, study the state of the fight against corruption and the legalization of proceeds of corruption-related crimes under martial law, determine new corruption risks during a war, and suggest recommendations for their minimization. The authors of this article established the main problems that cause the emergence and spread of corruption in society and ways to overcome this phenomenon. The study’s results established that independent anti-corruption agencies and authorized law enforcement agencies have continued preventive and law enforcement activities even under war conditions, their purpose being to ensure the normal State functioning, the country’s defence capacity, and society’s security. In law-making and law enforcement activities, this research work can help to improve international relations between Ukraine and foreign countries in the context of the development of bilateral relations regarding the provision of assistance to Ukraine for post-war recovery, the attraction of investment, the fight against corruption, and possible accession to the European Union.

This original analysis of the World Values Survey waves of 2007, 2012 and 2018 reveals important relationships among political trust and satisfaction, happiness, views of corruption, local elections and activism from the last half of the Hu Jintao administration through the first five years of Xi Jinping's rule. These data shed new light on the deeper dynamics underlying the high and growing levels of trust in government documented in other studies. Among this report's more novel findings, we find increased trust in government coincides with decreased local electoral participation, suggesting that participation in local elections is not key to perceptions of regime legitimacy. Views of corruption and a sense of personal efficacy through non-institutionalized forms of political participation such as peaceful demonstrations appear more relevant. Thus, constraints on people's ability to engage in peaceful demonstrations are likely to negatively impact views of regime legitimacy. In addition, the report uncovers demographic variations in these dynamics, indicating that regime legitimacy is more precarious among citizens at the bottom of the socioeconomic hierarchy and among younger Chinese. Overall, these findings complicate existing explanations of regime legitimacy centring on economic performance, nationalism, responsiveness/adaptiveness and efforts to combat corruption.

Traditionally, women have been perceived as the fairer sex with a moral compass and with less inclination towards gaining wealth and taking risks. Past research has posited that women consider crime due to need. Recently one piece of research has considered greed due to the development and empowerment of women, the opportunities and power accorded to them in line with governance frameworks, policies and regulations that cover crimes, penalties and punishments, and cultural and social norms. Social perspectives influence the moral values passed down within social and family units. A pilot survey of female participants exposed to investigation and law and from two age groups of 18–39 years and 40–61 years reflected a significant change in culture and values. The older group was critical of corrupt behaviour and that the choices were the “right thing to do”. The younger participants were selective in their choices, choosing to deny or be silent if there was insufficient evidence and protection or where there was the involvement of someone dear. This reflects the power of knowledge, empowerment and education. The author discusses case studies of women exposed to crime, including organized crime, via their family or social networks to assess abuse of power and trust.

This study analyses the intricate relationship between sanction-based accountability and bureaucratic shirking. Drawing on an original survey conducted among Chinese civil servants, it addresses the question of whether sanction-based accountability can effectively regulate the conduct of public officials and provide a cure for bureaucratic shirking. The study identifies the characteristics of shirking behaviour in the Chinese bureaucracy and distinguishes three major patterns: evading responsibility, shifting responsibility and reframing responsibility. The findings indicate that sanction-based accountability may contain some obvious and notorious slacking types of behaviour, such as stalling and inaction, but government officials may distort or reframe their responsibilities to cope with accountability pressure. Empirical evidence suggests that owing to some “strategic” adjustments in bureaucratic behaviour, flagrant shirking is replaced by more subtle ways of blame avoidance, such as playing it safe or fabricating performance information. Sanction-based accountability therefore does not offer a panacea for bureaucratic shirking.

Corruption is an age-old issue. Although various mitigation measures have been developed over time, it persistently exists and transforms with the dynamic business environment. The development of corruption is linked to the skills of criminals to cover their tracks. Control mechanisms and other lines of defense are insignificant when persons of power override, bully or collaborate to carry out corruption. Since humans are perceived to be rational, educating individuals on the evils of corruption with its apparent negative connotations would have been a logical approach to disrupting corruption. However, the growing trend of corruption reflects otherwise. Human behavior is subjective and based on a person–situation complexity, relationships and associations around human life. This pilot study assesses the decisions of individuals based on various corruption scenarios, using 20 questions modeled around Corruption Dimensions and Prisoner’s Dilemma. Of the respondents, 92% had formal exposure to anti-corruption-related studies. Most respondents responded negatively to corruption-related scenarios in the Corruption Dimensions, with noted bias in their criticism when it involved a politician as compared with a businessman. Similarly, the Prisoner’s Dilemma questions also reflected selective reasoning when comparing those with personal relationships as compared with acquaintances. The strength of the evidence, the independence of the judiciary, the ability to escape, the reluctance to self-incriminate and the personal benefits affect the judgment of the respondents. However, in situations involving environmental issues, respondents selected to confess regardless of the situation stating that it was the right thing to do. Education creates awareness on individual rights, options and, to a certain extent, the moral and legal obligations. However, the subjectivity of the person’s associations and lifelong experience also plays a major role in the decision-making process.

This article analyzes the relationship between corruption offenses and money laundering with reference to the Spanish Penal Code. These two criminal categories lack a certain definition, as there is no such univocal concept of “political corruption” and “money laundering.” The reasons for the denaturation of these criminal figures will be addressed. Then, the paper will expose how these criminal figures relate to each other. We argue that a real concurrence between both figures is possible, although it may lead, in certain cases, to double incrimination and its consequent punitive excess. Therefore, we will propose some criteria for a restrictive interpretation of “money laundering” to avoid confusion with other legal figures such as “confiscation.” The paper will end with reference to the Spanish Criminal Code’s regulation on “confiscation” and a brief review of the main critics.

This article presents a qualitative empirical study of the impact of corruption and anti-corruption on the efficiency of China's bureaucratic system in developing a local economy. Drawing on 40 in-depth interviews and 98 days of participant observation, it first investigates the significance of extravagant position-related consumption in building personalized bureaucratic ties (patronage networks) and mobilizing resources for local economic development. It then examines the causal link between President Xi's campaign against corruption and extravagance and the rise of bureaucratic slack in local governments. The anti-extravagance campaign reduces the level of corruption in local government but it discourages local officials, who are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid risk and ensure political survival, from using banquets and gift-giving to build patronage networks, attract investment and mobilize development resources. The article concludes that corruption may contribute positively to the efficiency of a fragmented Chinese bureaucracy in fostering development at the local level, while the anti-corruption campaign compels local cadres to develop a new coping strategy – bureaucratic slack – for implementing policies and developing local economies.

This article addresses corruption as a negative practice displaying the ‘darker side’ of social capital in Chinese guanxi and Russian blat/svyazi networks. It presents a conceptual framework integrating several research streams to establish a conceptual linkage between social network characteristics and three forms of corruption between business persons and public officials: cronyism, bribery, and extortion. We argue that the forms of corruption in a society are determined by the nature of social network ties and their underlying morality, with particularistic and general trust being key factors. Our framework depicts networks as three concentric circles representing three types of corruption resulting from their corresponding types of reciprocity: open, closed, and negative. We then apply the framework to the practice of guanxi in China and blat/svyazi in Russia. We propose that different network characteristics and different forms of corruption may help explain what we label the ‘China-Russia paradox’ of why corruption and high economic growth have co-existed in China, at least in the short term, but less so in Russia. We conclude with ethical and legal implications for doing business in those two transforming economies and offer suggestions for future research.

This article presents a large-scale, systematic study of politically connected firms in China. It was conducted by compiling a database of all the publicly traded firms in China in 1993, 2002 and 2012 that codes the biographies of hundreds of thousands of board members. I find that there has been a significant increase in the percentage of firms that are connected with the national government in the last 20 years. This casts doubt on a popular argument that businesses in China have primarily relied on “local protectionism.” I interpret this as a result of firms' need to connect with powerful and stable institutions. I test this by examining the impact of the fall of Chen Liangyu on firms in Shanghai.

China presents a mixed picture in terms of its anti-corruption efforts. On the one hand, rampant corruption remains a huge challenge for the party-state because it not only results in the loss of state assets but also damages the legitimacy of the regime. On the other hand, China's record of curbing corruption is not particularly worse than other comparable countries. This paper explains the reasons behind this mixed picture by focusing on the anti-corruption strategy employed by the central Party authorities. Effective anti-corruption measures are determined by the high probability of detecting corrupt agents and the meting out of effective and warranted punishment. In China, the central government is unable or unwilling to investigate a large number of officials, especially high-ranking officials. However, at the same time, it must impose severe punishment on convicted high-ranking officials. Although this mode of selective discipline compromises the credibility of the state in terms of anti-corruption efficacy, it also creates uncertainty for corrupt agents because corrupt officials are not guaranteed exemption.