In light of inconclusive findings on the effect of political connections, this study explores conditions that affect the effectiveness of political connections on firm performance in democratic systems. First, using a resource dependence rationale, this study stresses the importance of variation in political connections and classifies direct and indirect political connections based on sources of power and the mechanisms for developing connections. Second, this study recognizes that influencing political outcomes is an entire political process in which political power matters. Furthermore, as power is central to the resource dependence rationale unlike exchange in transaction cost economics, this study explores how the effectiveness of political connections is contingent on the dynamics of de jure political power. We find that the effect of direct political connections is susceptible to changes in de jure political power due to its dyadic relationship with de jure power, while indirect political connections are more robust to such changes due to their connections with informal networks holding de facto political power. Further, the positive effects of political connections on firm performance are mediated by operational capability.

Managerial networking with political actors has long been recognized as a crucial co-option strategy to navigate the challenging institutional environment in emerging economies. However, we know much less about what drives the variation of political networking investment by private ventures. Drawing on resource dependence theory, we unpack the dyadic business-government relations and identify the key organizational and environmental factors that shape the power dependence relationships between private ventures and the government. By examining power imbalance and mutual dependence in this dyadic relationship and considering both the necessity and the capability of political networking, we develop hypotheses regarding the ways in which size-, connection-, and location-based dependencies affect firms’ political networking intensity. These hypotheses are tested through a unique survey of Chinese private ventures. Our study finds that political networking intensity (1) has an inverted U-shaped relationship with firm size, (2) is negatively associated with the presence of embedded political ties while positively associated with that of achieved political connections, and (3) is smaller when the focal firm is located in business development zones. This research bears rich implications for our understanding of corporate political activity in emerging economies from a resource dependence lens.

Publicly traded Chinese firms recently reformed their ownership structuresby converting non-tradable shares, which constituted two-thirds of sharesoutstanding and were held largely by the state, into shares that could tradeon domestic exchanges. To facilitate this reform, tradable shareholders werecompensated with stock grants from non-tradable shareholders. Our analysisfocuses on the level of compensation, the compensation ratio, the ratio of new tradable shares granted to tradableshares outstanding before the reform. Contrary to the predictions ofasset-pricing models, most firms set the compensation ratio around 0.3. Weexplain this surprising convergence using institutional theory. In doing so,we analyze the power and interests of all relevant actors – not just owners,but also state regulators, executives, and other agents — and draw oninsights from resource-dependence and agency theories. We find strongevidence of coercive and mimetic isomorphism, but no evidence of normativeisomorphism. Because our dependent variable is continuous (a ratio), we areable to show that the mimetic effects we observe cannot be attributed tocoercion or norms. Thus, we not only explain an empirical puzzle, we alsoadvance institutional analysis of isomorphism by clearly distinguishingthree isomorphic forces that have been conflated in much previousresearch.

This study proposes an initial and a revised model of government-oriented public relation (PR) strategies based on the results of two content analyses of website news regarding the PR activities of 76 firms in general and six well-known firms in China in more depth. With the perspective of resource dependence theory, this model reveals that firms in China employ six types of formal PR strategies, including visitation, philanthropy, participation, publicity, party involvement and political propaganda, to manage their dependence on government for resources. Further, the implementation of such strategies involves a four-step process: organizing PR activities with economic, social and political significance; obtaining the involvement and recognition of the government; building firms' resource, moral and cultural legitimacy in the government's eyes; and interacting with the government on the issues of firms' dependence to influence government policies relative to firms. We also explore the differences that exist among firms with different ownership structures in the use of these PR strategies, the level of government involved and the issues pursued.