This article highlights CSR disclosure as a strategic response of Chinese multinational enterprises (MNEs) to the social risk they face in host countries. Deviating from prior research that aims to directly measure social risk, we offer a new approach to isolate the effect of social risk by leveraging China's Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) as the research context, under which Chinese MNEs are largely protected from political risk in membership countries but are exposed to substantial social risk from local nongovernment stakeholders. Results from difference-in-differences analyses show that after the enactment of the BRI, Chinese MNEs investing in BRI countries significantly increases their likelihood of CSR disclosure than that of their counterparts investing in non-BRI countries. Further, such effects are more pronounced for state-owned MNEs and MNEs in natural resource industries. This research enriches the international business literature on the relationship between political risk and social risk, and that between corporate political actions and corporate social responsibility.

Chinese cross-border investments are often assumed to be state driven and a tool of Beijing's economic statecraft. However, corresponding evidence remains inconclusive. This article examines mainland Chinese direct investments in Taiwan and finds that they are not particularly effective tools of economic statecraft. Their excessive politicization and the sheer possibility that investments could be used for Beijing's economic statecraft resulted in a considerable pushback by Taiwan's government, bureaucrats and civil society against large and sensitive investments. The agency enjoyed by Taiwan hindered Beijing from deploying cross-Strait direct investments for political purposes, and Beijing has not openly promoted or supported such investments in Taiwan. Moreover, cross-border direct investments are by nature less exploitable for political purposes because they involve company-level commercial and entrepreneurial decisions. This sets them apart from other forms of economic statecraft, such as sanctions or trade restrictions, where the state has greater influence. Mainland Chinese companies have had limited commercial interests in Taiwan, and the investments that have been made there do not appear to have triggered significant political or security externalities. These findings suggest more generally that foreign direct investment might not be particularly effective as a tool of economic statecraft.

Working for multinational companies (MNCs) is often viewed as a privilege for host country nationals (HCNs) in emerging economies. This raises the question: Why do HCNs leave their jobs to pursue the hardship of establishing their own business? This article addresses this question by adopting a phenomenon-based approach to study 12 professional service firms in Vietnam. We explore why HCNs initially become entrepreneurs and identify how they make this transition. We reveal several idiosyncratic motivations and identify four types of migration pathways: MNC returnee, committed hybrid, transitional hybrid, and direct spin-off. Our findings address the shortcomings of the existing HCNs literature that centers on MNCs’ view and employee entrepreneurship literature that overlooks the context of emerging markets. We find evidence that institutional voids often promote, rather than suppress, entrepreneurship in emerging markets. Importantly, by taking a local perspective, our findings help MNCs increase their awareness that in the fast-growing market of Vietnam, a brain drain might occur as a result of HCNs becoming entrepreneurs.

This study provides new insights into the role of subsidiary managers in the practice of global business models of multinational enterprises in transforming economies. Drawing on the global business model literature and through semi-structured interviews with a leading Norwegian maritime multinational enterprise in China, we have developed and critically explored a theoretical framework for uncovering how subsidiary managers understand and manage the tensions between the headquarters based in a western country and the subsidiaries based in a transforming economy. More specifically, when implementing the global business model in the transforming economy, subsidiary managers need to undertake effective management of structural, behavioural, and cultural tensions along with the global integration-local responsiveness dilemma. Subsidiary managers can contribute to solving structural tensions between the headquarters and subsidiary by undertaking effective market sensing and knowledge transfer activities to integrate the transforming economies into the MNE's global production networks. Meanwhile, they need to make effective relationship management to solve behavioural and cultural tensions.

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) transfer their corporate strategies to subsidiaries globally, and in so doing, embark on a translation process. Despite the prevalence of MNEs and their investments in emerging economies, little is known about how local factors affect key actors when translating corporate talent management (CTM) strategies to these regions. This study draws from the translation and talent management literatures to explore the travel of ideas in the context of CTM. Relevant frames (narratives that emerge around actions) and actors are proposed and explored empirically in a qualitative study of 76 employees across an Australian mining MNE with subsidiaries located in Latin America. The findings support extant literature as well as uncovering new frames (categorized in external or corporate, and internal or local) and actors (including non-managerial) as part of the translation process. The findings suggest the need to balance talent management strategies between corporate and subsidiaries by being aware of internal and external frames including in both urban and rural locations. This understanding provides further clarification of the global versus local paradox faced by MNEs. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.

India began the process of market liberalization that opened it to significant interactions with the world economy in 1991. In this essay, we provide an overarching view of the country's journey toward integration with the global innovation and entrepreneurship network. Major nodes in this global network have two major components that may be metaphorically referred to as ‘pillars and ivy’. Globally connected multinational enterprises (MNEs) form the pillars. Agile startups are the ivy, and their success (metaphorically, the height to which they can climb) depends on their symbiotic connections with the pillar MNEs. Both components are essential and reinforce each other. Without MNEs, the scaling of startups is hampered. Without a vibrant population of startups, MNEs’ interest in a location remains driven by cost, rather than capability and creativity. MNEs (mainly foreign) provided the initial sparks for the formation of the Indian innovation and entrepreneurship ecosystem. We chart the subsequent growth of India's startups. They began in the information technology (IT) sector but now cover a much wider range of industries. Today, India's innovation and entrepreneurship ecosystem is one of the largest in the world, with global integration in terms of technology, financing, human capital, and administration.