The study of desirable structural properties that define a marketable insurance contract has been a recurring theme in insurance economic theory and practice. In this article, we develop probabilistic and structural characterizations for insurance indemnities that are universally marketable in the sense that they appeal to all policyholders whose risk preferences respect the convex order. We begin with the univariate case where a given policyholder faces a single risk, then extend our results to the case where multiple risks possessing a certain dependence structure coexist. The non-decreasing and 1-Lipschitz condition, in various forms, is shown to be intimately related to the notion of universal marketability. As the highlight of this article, we propose a multivariate mixture model which not only accommodates a host of dependence structures commonly encountered in practice but is also flexible enough to house a rich class of marketable indemnity schedules.

The formulation of optimal reinsurance policies that take various practical constraints into account is a problem commonly encountered by practitioners. In the context of a distortion-risk-measure-based optimal reinsurance model without moral hazard, this article introduces and employs a variation of the Neyman–Pearson Lemma in statistical hypothesis testing theory to solve a wide class of constrained optimal reinsurance problems analytically and expeditiously. Such a Neyman–Pearson approach identifies the unit-valued derivative of each ceded loss function as the test function of an appropriate hypothesis test and transforms the problem of designing optimal reinsurance contracts to one that resembles the search of optimal test functions achieved by the classical Neyman–Pearson Lemma. As an illustration of the versatility and superiority of the proposed Neyman–Pearson formulation, we provide complete and transparent solutions of several specific constrained optimal reinsurance problems, many of which were only partially solved in the literature by substantially more difficult means and under extraneous technical assumptions. Examples of such problems include the construction of the optimal reinsurance treaties in the presence of premium budget constraints, counterparty risk constraints and the optimal insurer–reinsurer symbiotic reinsurance treaty considered recently in Cai et al. (2016).