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Chapter 15 examines the rise of Ehud Olmert as prime minister and primary decision-maker after Ariel Sharon fell into coma. The chapter focuses on the defining event of Ehud Olmert’s first months in office, namely, the Israel-Hezbollah 2006 Lebanon War. The chapter contributes to the literature by providing a detailed examination of the decision-making process that led to the war and its conduct. The chapter demonstrates that Israel embarked on a botched war of choice and provides a comprehensive analysis of why the IDF performed poorly in the conflict against Hezbollah. Finally, it offers the first account of how the outcome of the 2006 Lebanon War significantly weakened the domestic support in Israel for its unilateralist foreign policy posture and for the leading Israeli troika during the war: Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defence Minister Amir Peretz, and IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz.
Chapter 4 examines Saudi and Syrian threat perceptions during the 2006 Lebanon War. The Saudi Kingdom, portraying itself as the primary supporter of the Arab cause against Israel, blamed and condemned Hezbollah for instigating the conflict. The chapter examines the question of why a non-state actor with limited capabilities, located far from the Saudi borders came to be perceived as a threat. Syria, a regime oppressing Islamist movements at the domestic level, supported Hezbollah, within the security calculus which perceived Israel as the ultimate threat. Whereas Hezbollah constituted a source of identity instability for the Saudi Kingdom and, hence, endangered its ontological security, Israel’s military supremacy constituted the primary source of danger to the physical security of the Syrian regime. In this situation, the alliance with Hezbollah became crucial for the Syrian regime, whose leaders capitalised on Hezbollah’s popularity by including some Islamic elements in the regime identity narratives. The chapter argues that this variation is related to the fluidity of identity of Saudi and Syrian regimes and their policy options in facing material sources of threats.
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