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1 results

  • 8 - How to Make Friends and Alienate People

  • Edited by David P. Fields, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Mitchell B. Lerner, Ohio State University
  • Book:
    Divided America, Divided Korea
    Published online:
    15 March 2024
    Print publication:
    28 March 2024, pp 198-223

  • Summary

    Donald J. Trump’s election portended fundamental changes in America’s relations with its major trading partners and allies. However, Japan’s prime minister, Abe Shinzō, in developing a relationship with Trump as well as an understanding of how to deal with him, positioned Japan as a reliable partner of the US in its assertive stance against China and North Korea. Abe also understood the importance to Trump of image and perception and used this to Japan’s advantage throughout Trump’s term, particularly in his careful use of flattery and in Japan’s agreement to accept largely symbolic trade concessions. The Trump administration’s “America First” approach and its consequent abandonment of America’s leadership role in the region left a vacuum that Japan filled, notably in the resurrection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Japan’s concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” found support in Washington. However, Tokyo’s calibrated approach to China, which blended competition and cooperation, was not adopted by the US, which prioritized competition.