This chapter charts the processes by which deceptive sex came to be regarded as potentially constituting rape. Through tracing these developments, the chapter shows how doctrinal features of the law, such as the way consent and deception are thought to be related and the modes of deception punished by law, were important to this process. Yet the chapter also argues that to fully appreciate how and why the changes occurred, it is necessary to pay attention to the array of interests the law has sought to protect and how these have shaped the range of topics of deception that might ground a charge of rape. This argument leads to the conclusion that, in the context of deceptive sex, deception has not been considered wrongful because it invalidates or precludes consent, as is commonly thought; rather, deception has invalidated or precluded consent because it has sometimes been considered wrongful. The chapter ends by introducing some reasons why this insight is important to ongoing debates regarding the criminalisation of deceptive sex.

This chapter explores the civil wrong of seduction to establish its nature and parameters and draw out its associations with deception. It argues that, as the earliest legal response to deceptive sex, seduction is in some senses the civil law analogue of later criminal laws. The chapter then shows how the action of seduction was rooted in the idea that deception was wrongful because it was one way of leading a woman off the ‘right’ path and that the harms it caused reflected the gendered significance of marriage and other ‘moral’ forms of intimacy. Furthermore, it highlights how these features of the action provided a framework within which the range of qualifying deceptions was limited and the temporal dimensions of the wrong were set. Finally, the chapter offers some reflections on how the distinctions between private and public introduced in Chapter 1 bore on the decision to keep seduction a civil wrong before foregrounding how these observations, and those made throughout the rest of the chapter, are pertinent to contemporary discussions about criminalising deceptive sex.

The trust can be an instrument of great power and influence in managing and maintaining wealth and creating vital rights and obligations. Settlors are given significant freedom as to when and how they create a trust, with few restrictions on the provisions they can include in the trust instrument. But with this conspicuous freedom comes responsibility to ensure that the trust is not abused. Equity will not allow such abuse, and if a trust is considered to have been abused, it may be void or unenforceable. But when will a trust be considered to be abused? Surprisingly, little attention has been paid by commentators or judges to the notion of abuse of trust, although there are particular doctrines that can be analysed as being triggered by an abuse of trust, which have received a significant amount of attention. These include the doctrine of sham trust, illusory trust, defrauding creditors, illegality and fraud on the power. All of these doctrines are examined, common principles are identified and the chapter concludes that it is possible to synthesise from these doctrines a distinct doctrine of abuse of trust which should be expressly recognised.