While the basic outline of the soteriological narrative of Cyril of Alexandria is a near repeat of Athanasius, Cyril reverses the role that Athanasius had given to physicalism in this narrative. While Athanasius had said that the physicalist (i.e., universal and automatic) transformation of human nature was related to humanity’s ability to receive the Holy Spirt and not connected to the salvation of humans from death, Cyril says the opposite: the physicalist transformation of human nature does not change humanity’s ability to receive the Holy Spirit (which is salvific), but it does save every human being from eternal death (which, in itself, is not salvific). Cyril demonstrates the limitations of physicalism within a theology that also includes the creationist ensoulment model: the physicalist effects of the incarnation are limited to the body. Cyril’s physicalism is part of his nuanced use of the Adam-Christ parallel in which Cyril carefully balances the agency of Adam and Christ.

Physicalist soteriology, which proposes that Christ’s incarnation has a universal effect on the nature of every subsequent human being, rises as a logical and organic fourth-century development of the early Christian commitment to a universal fall combined with reflection on the Adam-Christ parallel. It falls because of the seemingly unrelated rise of the creationist ensoulment model that, in proposing that God directly creates and implants an unfallen soul in each fetus, removes any logical connection between individual souls and the fall of Adam. When humanity was viewed as a corporate whole in early Christianity, physicalist soteriology was a natural theological position that was never either criticized or defended. There are several signs manifesting a renewal of societal and academic openness to corporate understandings of humanity in theology, which suggests that physicalist soteriology is a part of the Christian tradition that may also prove to have contemporary theological value.

Maximus’ physicalism is the result of his combination of the creationist ensoulment model with an exacting application of the Adam-Christ parallel in which the agency of Christ must mirror that of Adam. Since the creationist ensoulment model excludes the soul from universal fallenness, Maximus reasons that Adam’s singular agency had a universal effect only on bodies. The fall of souls cannot be entirely accounted to Adam; rather, it requires individual wrong willing. Maximus insists that Christ mirrors Adam’s agency by having a universal physicalist effect only on human bodies, while the rectification of souls and wills requires individuals to follow Christ’s example in accepting suffering, thereby escaping the destructive cycle of pain and pleasure. Maximus demonstrates that the triumph of the creationist ensoulment model fatally limits the theological usefulness of physicalist soteriology.