Do fiscal stabilization policies affect the long-term growth of the economy? If so, are the long-term effects growth enhancing or growth reducing? When addressing these questions from a theoretical perspective, the literature has typically emphasized the importance of structural aspects such as the modeling approach of endogenous technological change while paying less attention to an elaborate design of the considered fiscal stabilization policies. This paper uses an agent-based macroeconomic model that generates endogenous business cycles to emphasize the role of the policy design for long-term growth effects of stabilization policies. By comparing a demand-oriented consumption policy and two different investment subsidizing policies, it can be shown that these policies are successful in smoothing the business cycle but differ in terms of their effects on economic long-term growth. This highlights the importance of policy design for the analysis of long-term effects of stabilization policies.

This paper aims at investigating the interplay between inequality, innovation dynamics, and investment behaviors in shaping the long-run patterns of growth of a closed economy. By extending the analysis proposed in Caiani et al. [(2018) Journal of Evolutionary Economics], we explore the effects of alternative wage regimes under different investment and technological change scenarios. Experimental results seem to de-emphasize the role of technological progress as a possible source of greater inequality. Overall, simulation results are consistent with the predominance of a wage-led growth regime in most of the scenarios analyzed: A faster growth of low- and middle-level workers’ wages, relative to managers’, generally exert beneficial effects on the economy and allows to counteract the labor-saving effects of technological progress. Furthermore, a distribution more favorable to workers does not compromise firms’ profitability, but rather strengthen it by creating a more favorable macroeconomic environment, which encourages further innovations, stimulates investment, and sustains economic growth.

This paper explores how different credit market and banking regulations affect business fluctuations. Capital adequacy- and reserve requirements are analyzed for their effect on the risk of severe downturns. We develop an agent-based macroeconomic model in which financial contagion is transmitted through balance sheets in an endogenous firm-bank network, which incorporates firm bankruptcy and heterogeneity among banks to capture the fact that contagion effects are bank specific. Using concepts from the empirical literature to identify amplitude and duration of recessions and expansions, we show that more stringent liquidity regulations are best to dampen output fluctuations and prevent severe downturns. Under such regulations, both leverage along expansions and amplitude of recessions become smaller. More stringent capital requirements induce larger output fluctuations and lead to deeper, more fragile recessions. This indicates that the capital adequacy requirement is procyclical and therefore not advisable as a measure to prevent financial contagion.