In the previous chapter, I showed how the Venezuelan opposition’s strategic choices helped Hugo Chávez erode democracy. In this chapter, I develop the other part of my argument by highlighting the role of the Colombian opposition in preventing democratic erosion. Between 2002 and 2010, Alvaro Uribe tried to erode democracy in Colombia. Like Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) in Venezuela, he introduced several reforms that sought to reduce the checks on the executive and extend his time in office beyond a second term. He was polarizing, and willing to push as far as he could to increase the powers of the presidency and stay in office beyond a second term. His government harassed opposition members, journalists, and members of the courts and worked in tandem with illegal armed actors to systemically undermine those who criticized the president. Contrary to Chávez, however, Uribe was not able to turn Colombia’s democracy into a competitive authoritarian regime. Despite his attempts to undermine the independence of the courts and the fairness of elections, Colombia’s constitutional order remained fairly strong, and Uribe had to step down after his second term.

Focusing on Colombia’s “Democratic Security Taxes,” Chapter 4 is the first of four case studies illustrating causal logic of elite taxation in the adoption of security taxes. Since 2002, the government in that country has adopted a series of taxes on the wealthy to address a deplorable public-safety situation. The revenue from the taxes has played a central role in funding efforts considered successful in reducing violent crime. With a historically difficult conflict and traditional set of elites, Colombia is a least likely case in which elites would have become invested in financing the strengthening of the state. Moreover, with the approval of elite-funded security taxes on multiple occasions across administrations, the Colombian case allows us to study the conditions under which this investment in state building becomes sustained over time.