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Upon the 2014 State of Palestine's accession to Geneva Convention III, captured Palestinians who took part in belligerent acts against the occupier should be treated as prisoners of war due to the fact that they belong to a party to an armed conflict. These individuals fall under three categories: members of security forces, affiliates of armed resistance groups, and uprisers who fight the occupant spontaneously on an individual basis. Contrary to established rules of IHL, Israel does not make any distinction regarding the status of these three types. Unilateral Israeli treatment of its captives does not hold water under international law. Such actions may trigger liability based on international criminal law, particularly as the ICC decided in 2021 that it possesses jurisdiction to investigate crimes occurring in the territory of Palestine. The mere fact of confining prisoners of war after the cessation of hostilities may constitute a ground for criminal prosecution.
The chapter’s locally emplaced focus on Menelik’s conquest “from below” fills important gaps in Ethiopian history that enable us to get a more complete picture of a crucial time period. Detailing the violent campaigns, it provides insights on how it was experienced in local contexts and discusses the deep impacts it had on the Arsi Oromo. The involuntary incorporation into the Ethiopian Kingdom meant that they had to submit to an alien and hegemonic regime focused on extracting as many resources as it could from its new territories. The chapter underscores that the Arsi Oromo saw the arrival of Menelik’s soldiers as an intrusion and that the new realities entailed subjugation and loss of autonomy. It moreover discusses the Arsi Oromo’s acts of resistance from the early days of the conquest into the twentieth century. It concludes that it is far from clear that the Arsi Oromo at the time viewed the conquest as part of a larger program of internal colonization – as it has later been interpreted – and that detailed micro-studies of the conquest serve to nuance the unproductive dichotomy of viewing it either as a process of national unification or as acts of illegitimate colonialization.
If people have a right to rebel against domestic tyranny, wrongful foreign occupation, or colonial rule, then the normative principles commonly invoked to deal with civil conflicts present a problem. While rebels in some cases might justifiably try to secure human rights by resort to violence, the three normative pillars dealing with armed force provide at best only a partial reflection of the ethics of armed revolt. This article argues that (first) the concept of “terrorism” and the ongoing attempt to define it in international law, (second) the laws of war and their application to armed conflict, and (third) the Responsibility to Protect all obscure as much as clarify the problem. Given the prevalence of political oppression and the occurrence of civil conflicts originating in attempts to confront it, there is therefore a pressing need to establish a place for the rights of rebellion in the international normative architecture.
The Second World War was clearly one of the most extravagantly violent events in human history. Pacifists in occupied countries faced particular challenges, since under occupation pacifism could function as either resistance or collaboration. In France, for instance, there was a notable strand of pacifism among French collaborationists, many of whom had been opponents of a French war against Germany in the first place. One German lexicon published during the Third Reich defined pacifism as 'fundamental opposition to war, which easily leads to treason, especially as a result of international cooperation; adherents of pacifism in Germany in particular were for the most part traitors. The wartime insignificance of pacifism was particularly striking in Britain, where pacifism and conscientious objection had been an especially brisant issue during the First World War. The most obvious legacy of wartime pacifism was the way it fed directly and influentially into the emergence of post-war reform movements, most obviously the Civil Rights movement.
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