In its Taylor decision the Special Court for Sierra Leone denied immunity ratione personae to the, at the time of the indictment, President of Liberia. This article first analyzes the legal reasoning of that decision. The Court's finding that it is an international court is approved; the consequence it attaches to that finding is criticized. The decision is then presented as an illustration of the negative consequences of relying upon controversial elements of the ICJ's Arrest Warrant case. It is suggested that instead of the distinction between national and international courts, the difference between criminal responsibility and procedural immunity could have been the basis for the reasoning of the ICJ and Special Court.

The author critically analyzes the judgement rendered by the ICJ on 14 February 2002, in the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 case. The Court's reasoning is criticized for both its poor motivation in acknowledging the existence of a rule of customary international law, providing for absolute inviolability and immunity for incumbent ministers for foreign affairs before the national courts of other states, and for the rather theoretical manner in which the Court asserts that immunity does not amount to impunity. It is also regretted that the Court did not pronounce on the issue of universal jurisdiction, thereby missing a great opportunity to clarify a controversial but increasingly important issue of international (criminal) law.