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After World War One, new institutions and gadgets gave reality to a changing landscape of public culture. Therefore, in this chapter, we explore applied science in the inter-war public realm. Society’s usage interacted with officials’ language as public and bureaucratic discussions of applied science intertwined. Talk about applied science connected intimately with an intense discussion of ‘modern civilisation’ to make sense of science too. Amidst anxiety, the separation of pure and applied became important to science’s standing. To some, the process by which scientific research led to a multitude of new gadgets was frighteningly dangerous. To others, science was exploited too slowly due to the historical inadequacy of British industry. Both branch of government and a cathedral of applied science, the Science Museum displayed linkages between science and technical wonders. Debates were conducted over the new radio service and in newspapers, and were contested by bishops as well as politicians.
With the Asquithian Liberals ejected from office, Lloyd George's new government remained in denial over the severity of Britain's economic problem in the United States. Bonar Law's new responsibilities as Chancellor alerted him to the seriousness of the crisis, but he took no meaningful action. German and American moves for peace came soon after Lloyd George's ascent to power, but the new government simply sought to manoeuvre around them. British intelligence continued to serve Lloyd George poorly, sending him decrypts that again misled Lloyd George into believing that Germany and the United States were secretly collaborating. British intelligence also decrypted the infamous Zimmermann Telegram, but decided not to share it with the government. Arthur Balfour, the new Foreign Secretary, remained extremely anxious about Britain's economic position. He used a British intelligence officer in the United States, William Wiseman, to quietly keep alive the prospect of American mediation with House. House sought new negotiations between Germany and Britain via Wiseman and the German Ambassador. Germany announced a declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, ending House's negotiations.
In the aftermath of German-American diplomatic crisis over submarines, House conceived a new, more ambitious strategy of trying to use US power to end the war and prevent an Allied defeat. Although House initially struggled to find a receptive audience amongst the British leadership, anxiety within the British government was on the rise. Efforts to reconcile Britain's economic and military strategies settled on a plan to win the war with a great 1916 offensive – a strategy that provoked serious disquiet amongst a number of key British leaders. By February 1916, a number of British leaders, including Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, encouraged House towards a still more ambitious conception of American mediation: not only would the United States play a key role in setting up the negotiations, but it would also chair them. House and Grey agreed the 'House-Grey Memorandum', in which House promised that the United States would guarantee a set of limited Allied war aims at a peace conference. All the while, British intelligence was decrypting House's telegrams and attempting to undermine his negotiations.
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