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2 results

  • Chapter 3 - Biases: Mistaking Intuition for Irrationality

  • from Part I - The War on Intuition
  • Gerd Gigerenzer, Max Planck Institute for Human Development
  • Book:
    The Intelligence of Intuition
    Published online:
    28 September 2023
    Print publication:
    12 October 2023, pp 42-67

  • Summary

    Behavioral economics began with the promise to fill the psychological blind spot in neoclassical theory, and ended up portraying intuition as the source of irrationality. The portrait goes like this: people have systematic cognitive biases causing substantial costs, biases are persistent like visual illusions and hardly educable, therefore governments need to step in and steer people with the help of “nudges.” The biases have taken on the status of truism. In contrast, I show that this view of human nature is tainted by a “bias bias,” the tendency to spot biases even if there are none. This involves failing to notice when sample parameters differ from population parameters, mistaking people’s random error for systematic error, and confusing intelligent inferences with logical errors. I use celebrated biases to explain the general problem. Getting rid of the bias bias will be a precondition for a positive role of human intuition and psychology in general.

  • Memory reflected in our decisions: Higher working memory capacity predicts greater bias in risky choice

  • Jonathan Corbin, Todd McElroy, Cassie Black
  • Journal:
    Judgment and Decision Making / Volume 5 / Issue 2 / April 2010
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    01 January 2023, pp. 110-115
    • Article
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  • The current study looks at the role working memory plays in risky-choice framing. Eighty-six participants took the Automatic OSPAN, a measurement of working memory; this was followed by a risky-choice framing task. Participants with high working memory capacities demonstrated well pronounced framing effects, while those with low working memory capacities did not. This pattern suggests that, in a typical risky-choice decision task, elaborative encoding of task information by those with high working memory capacity may lead them to a more biased decision compared to those with low working memory.