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Taking a pause from direct focus on the Jhaveris, Chapter 4 is an interlude that outlines major shifts across the Mughal Empire between the 1680 and 1720s. I suggest that military campaigns in the Deccan region impinged the Mughal treasury and undermined administration to an extent never seen before. Officials in Gujarat started to engage in behavior that undermined Mughal sovereignty. Yet, they also had little choice as monetary resources were becoming scarce. Financial limitations impacted the quality of state machinery including the upkeep of buildings, delay in salary payments, and even the ability of officials to legitimately demand taxes. Despite this, local Gujarati poems suggest that residents preferred Mughal rule to ruthless attacks from the Maratha marauders, whose periodic raids were increasing in frequency and intensity. After Aurangzeb’s death in 1707, successive Mughal emperors were poorly equipped to revive the grandeur of their ancestors. Their short stints as emperors, sometimes as brief as a few months, led to the further breakdown of Mughal authority. This manifest most clearly in the form of rivalries between Mughal governors sent to control and profit from Gujarat. Insecure in their positions and strapped for cash, these governors turned to assaulting key members of the business fraternity in the city of Ahmedabad.
Chapter eight probes changes between 1650 and 1750, emphasizing developments that contributed to Mughal decline. The Islamic cast of Aurangzeb’s reign was not a dramatic change, but a gradual trend that had been building under his two predecessors. We then move to Aurangzeb’s vision of Islam in his multicultural, multiethnic state and his prolonged effort to subdue the Deccan Sultanates and the Marathas under Shivaji, as well as their political and economic consequences. Next the Maratha’s martial roots, Shivaji’s political ideology, and the growth of Maratha power outside the Deccan along with their cultural contributions are addressed. Finally, we examine the shifting balance of power in the subcontinent where former imperial territories emerged as successor states with flourishing political centers.
Golconda art was always less humanistic than other Deccani schools, figures are closer to the glorious dolls of Safavid illustration and possess less mass and naturalistic expression than is usual in the arts of India. The earliest miniature paintings probably date from the reign of Ibrahim Qutb Shah, all in variants of Persian styles and not one equal to the masterpieces of the following reign. Aurangzeb's conquest of Bijapur and Golconda was not as inimical to the arts as is generally assumed. He was an orthodox Muslim, but his only overtly hostile act in regard to art was to command all figural murals to be erased in the Adil Shahi palace in Bijapur. There are close links between Deccani painting and the Rajasthani school of Bikaner, but the precise nature of the relationship has never been satisfactorily explored.
In the hilly areas of the western Deccan, around Puna, the Maratha leader Shivaji Bhonsla was carving out a self-sufficient state within the enfeebled shell of the Sultanate of Bijapur. The Bhonsla regime offered a new option for ambitious and aggressive men from both the Maratha warrior caste and literate Maratha Brahmin castes. Shivaji's successes shaped a new mode of aggressive political and military action against the Indo-Muslim powers. His insurgent state gained resources and confidence as it challenged imperial might. By the early 1660s the Maratha had adopted a new style of wide-ranging predatory raiding into Mughal and Bijapur lands. With the fall of the two Deccan Sultanates, Aurangzeb then turned his attention to the Marathas. Aurangzeb sent Muqarrab Khan immediately to capture both Shambhaji and his Brahmin chief minister who were hacked to death. Four new provinces were added to Mughal empire: Bijapur and the Bijapur Karnatak, and Hyderabad and the Hyderabad Karnatak.
With the exception of the Tamil regions of the Golconda and Bijapur Karnatak, but recently conquered in the 1640s, the western Deccan of the Marathas and the eastern Deccan of the Telugus had long been accustomed to Indo-Muslim rule. Mughal annexation and administration of Golconda proceeded smoothly in the years immediately after the conquest. Before conquest the ongoing alliance between the Bhonsla rulers and Golconda had ensured that the eastern Deccan was free from Maratha raids. Throughout the Jinji siege, Maratha commanders alternated between expeditions to the south to assist Rajaram and spells of campaigning in the western Deccan. Rajaram's Jats outmaneuvered the local imperial forces and occupied Sikandra where they succeeded in looting Akbar's tomb. Aurangzeb's long absence from the North Indian heartland of the empire and his obsession with the endless Deccan war strained imperial institutions.
Throughout the first thirty years of his reign Aurangzeb, who had added Alamgir or world-seizer to his titles, dedicated himself to fostering a more properly Islamic regime and to aggressive expansion on the empire's frontiers. Aurangzeb completed the transformation of Akbar's ideology and inclusive political culture begun by Shah Jahan. Aurangzeb's revivalism forced him to confront imperial policies toward non-Muslims. His edict of 1669 ordered that all temples recently built or repaired contrary to the Sharia be torn down. His new policies increased tensions with the still-expanding Sikh community in the Punjab plain and foothills. The most sensitive test for the new militant orthodoxy lay in the emperor's relationship with his Rajput nobles. On the surface the Rajputs had no immediate grounds for complaint. Aurangzeb's new emphasis on Islam as a major strand in the political relationship strained the Rajput-Timurid bond.
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