This paper addresses the relationship between the development of the concepts of autarky and «economy of the extended space» in the German-speaking world and the framing of economic relations between Germany and Brazil in the 1930s. According to this «autarkic» way of conceiving economics, in order to thrive, an economy has to be autonomous regarding its supply of necessary inputs. Proposals presented in the Annual Reports transmitted to the German Foreign Office by German diplomatic representatives in Brazil encouraged, for example, the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements and the expansion of the Brazilian production of strategic inputs for Germany. The choice of Karl Ritter, an expert in economic matters, as ambassador to Brazil is also representative of this strategy.

The impact of Francoist autarkic economic policy on Spain's economy is assessed using Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) as an indicator. This indicator compares the real opportunity cost of the primary factors used in the production of a certain good with its added value at international prices. Our results indicate that the inefficient allocation of productive factors induced by the interventionist economic policy resulted in a significant loss of efficiency for the economy. Only 50 out of 125 industries or, in other words, 39 per cent of Spanish industrial production, could be considered efficient. However, the paper also shows that the Spanish economy was in a good position to take advantage of the opportunities created by the 1959 reform, as most industrial production was on the verge of relative efficiency.

The system of multiple exchange rates for the peseta, in force between 1948 and 1959, has posed many problems for Spanish historiography, in that it implies that the price at which foreign transactions were carried out is unknown, being hidden in the dense foliage of special exchange rates. In this paper we estimate the various average exchange rates series for all the Balance of Payments of these years, thus filling the vacuum that the post-Civil War period represents in the history of the peseta. We also calculate the real effective exchange rate, concluding that the important devaluations of 1949–1951 and 1957–1959 were insufficient in order to achieve equilibrium between Spanish relative prices and those of its main trading partners, so that the peseta remained continuously over-valued throughout the 1940's and 1950's.