To what extent are employees in the Mexican judiciary – both judges and lower level officials – connected by family ties? Are these family connections used inappropriately to hire or to favor relatives in ways that would not have been possible absent the family connection? This chapter takes advantage of a unique dataset to answer these questions. It documents a departure from the promise made in the judicial reform of 1994, that by removing the administration of the judiciary from the Supreme Court and transferring it to a judicial council, a professional and meritocratic judicial career would be established for all federal judges, making merit and not connections the main determinants of becoming a judge. The sheer magnitude and pervasiveness of family relationships within the Mexican federal judiciary conspicuously show the limitationsof this reform and highlight the challenges Mexico faces to consolidate judicial careers.

The Republic of Korea (ROK) was designed as a Cold War democracy. It started as an electoral regime with formal commitments to democratic values, but institutions designed to keep the state secure also imposed limits on domestic political struggle. From the ROK’s founding in 1948 to the political liberalization of 1987, the political system shifted between orders that might be labeled more democratic or more autocratic. A legal framework for governing party and electoral politics emerged in the country’s first fifteen years. This framework includes rights and restrictions related to formation of parties, conditions for disbanding parties, stipulations concerning party organization and activities, laws on monitoring elections, and detailed rules on election campaigns. Elections thus came with an elaborate legal structure, even as rulers – to varying degrees – deployed extra-constitutional and extralegal measures for dealing with opponents. Why were such laws developed and did they matter? What was their fate after the democratic transition? These questions point to broader themes related to authoritarian legality. Can an authoritarian regime make a commitment to rules governing electoral and party politics? Why would it make such a commitment? And why would it revoke one? What happens to that legal framework after a democratic transition?In this chapter I examine the various tools that have been used to govern the political sphere from the country’s establishment to the present. I trace the construction of the legal framework and weigh the significance of this framework versus other tools for governing parties and elections in different time periods. My main theme is a striking continuity in the legal framework guiding party and electoral politics. In particular, I point to the way legal innovations that reached their final form in 1963 under Park Chung Hee became the basis for governance of post-1987 democracy. Given the illiberal purpose of the framework, this continuity stands in sharp contrast to the liberalism that pervades many sectors of contemporary South Korean society. Through the South Korean example, this chapter points to ways that structures associated with authoritarian legality may persist beyond the political conditions in which they were created.

At the beginning of the democratic era, the state in Taiwan had at least four distinct features that set it apart from the other cases in this volume: a ‘bifurcation’ between a high capacity, high autonomy central government and deeply socially embedded local governments, a fused ‘party-state’ regime, a vibrant but fragmented and shallowly rooted civil society sector and a business community with only limited influence over the central government. These features have together shaped a distinct kind of democratic political regime in Taiwan. On the positive side, Taiwan’s civilian leaders enjoy uncircumscribed authority over all parts of the state, national elections now confer on their winners the fully effective right to rule, elections are well-managed, the party system is highly institutionalized and the full array of political rights are broadly respected. On the less positive side, Taiwan’s civil rights regime continues to suffer from weak legal foundations, and horizontal accountability has been incompletely institutionalized despite the regime’s formal separation of powers. Thus, Taiwan’s highly developed hegemonic party-state appears at best to have had no effect on and, at worst, actively undermined the establishment of a robust rule of law and protections for civil liberties.