This article explores authoritarian populist mobilisation and media strategies that political elites who ran in the election advanced and their consequences on journalistic freedom in an emerging democracy. It focuses on Indonesia's democracy and examines the following questions: what types of authoritarian populist mobilisation and media strategies did Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subijanto adopt when contesting Indonesia's 2019 presidential election? To what degree did these adaptations impact the journalistic freedom of those who worked for Indonesian mainstream media, particularly Indonesian private TV news channels? In-depth interviews with four senior journalists associated with Indonesian TV news channels (Kompas TV, CNN Indonesia, TV One, and INews TV) and two senior journalists working for mainstream media owned by influential Indonesian oligarchs used qualitative and thematic content analyses to reveal the following findings. Jokowi and Prabowo adopted secular nationalist and Islamic authoritarian populist mobilisation during the election. However, Prabowo developed Islamic authoritarian populist mobilisation far more than Jokowi. Jokowi advanced an oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategy, while Prabowo established an intensive Islamic anti-oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategy. As authoritarian populist mobilisation and media strategies evolved during their campaigns, the journalistic freedom of those associated with Indonesian mainstream media declined substantially. This article introduces four faces of authoritarian populism — secular nationalist and Islamic authoritarian populist mobilisation and oligarchic and anti-oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategies — as new concepts enriching political elites’ authoritarian populism literature.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Indian government, led by Narendra Modi, imposed a stringent lockdown with only four hours notice. It paid no attention to the millions of migrants who work on a temporary basis in Indian cities. Most lost their livelihoods as a result of the lockdown, and millions sought to return to their native villages. At the same time, the rural economy confronted its own difficulties caused by the lockdown. The relief that the Modi government offered to the large numbers of poor people who had been adversely affected by its response to COVID-19 was limited and poorly delivered. The episode showed the lack of responsiveness of Indian democracy to the needs of working people and the failures of development. Yet Modi's particular brand of authoritarian populism worked so well that a government displaying very little compassion retained strong popular support.

Research on populism has gained importance in the light of the recent global populist surge. Political scientists have become concerned with the problem of authoritarian populism, examining how illiberal, anti-pluralist populist parties have degraded liberal democracies. Economic research on recent forms of populism, although also growing, lack a comprehensive conceptual approach. This paper reduces this gap by conceptualizing authoritarian populism in terms of political transaction costs, arguing that its primary function is to vertically integrate political exchange under conditions of general franchise. If successful, authoritarian populist regimes internalize a large share of political transaction costs inherent in decentralized democratic political exchange. This entails a degraded version of democracy, eliminating a significant part of substantial electoral choice. Through weakening impersonal collective political contracting, authoritarian populists bring back private political contracting as a dominant political coordination mechanism, effectively re-feudalizing democracy.

Populism is Janus-faced; simultaneously facing different directions. There is not a single form of populism, but rather a variety of different forms, each with profoundly different political consequences. Despite the current hegemony of authoritarian populism, a much different sort of populism is also possible: Democratic and anti-establishment populism, which combines elements of liberal and democratic convictions. Without understanding the political economy of the populist revolt, it is difficult to understand the true roots of populism, and consequently, to devise an appropriate democratic alternative to populism.

The paper deals with the relationship of different types of populism with authoritarianism and constitutionalism. In the first part, I try to define various approaches—Left and Right-Wing, “good” or “bad”—to populism, especially from the point of view of whether they aim at changing the liberal democratic constitutional system to an authoritarian one. The following part discusses the rhetoric of authoritarian populists, which makes this type of populism distinct from non-populist authoritarians. The paper also explores the question of whom to blame for the success of authoritarian populisms, and the final part investigates, whether the use of legal tools by an authoritarian populist to dismantle liberal constitutional democracies means that we can speak about a special populist constitutionalism. While the paper tries to find out the joint characteristics of authoritarian populism, it heavily relies on the Hungarian experiences as a kind of model approach in East-Central Europe and maybe even beyond.