The rise of non-Western powers has led to competing claims about how these states act among each other and how they behave vis-à-vis established powers. Existing accounts argue that the rising powers are a heterogenous group of competing states and that they are socialized into the existing Western-centered order. This article challenges these claims, arguing that the rising powers are dissatisfied with the international status quo and that they have begun to form a bloc against the established powers. The authors contend that this dissatisfaction arises from their lack of influence on the international stage, their status in the international hierarchy and the norms that sustain the current international order. They maintain that the formation of a rising powers bloc is driven by the countries’ economic growth and international dynamics, fostering their institutionalization as IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). To support this argument, the study combines spatial modeling techniques to analyze rising power voting behavior in the UN General Assembly over the period 1992–2011.

The frequent business transactions between China and South Africa in the context of BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative have resulted in many commercial disputes. The ultimate resolution of such disputes requires a feasible enforcement mechanism for commercial judgments, but some obstacles remain when enforcing commercial judgments from each side. Both countries have adopted different approaches and principles to ascertain the jurisdiction of the adjudicating court, the application of reciprocity and an understanding of public policy. This article examines these obstacles by comparing the two enforcement regimes, and explores ways to overcome these obstacles and to realize the free flow of commercial judgments between both sides.

This paper explores the structural changes in the international organization of automotive production since the early 1990s. We apply descriptive network measures to international trade data for the period 1993–2013 for three automotive component groups with different technological intensity, with the aim of understanding (1) how the automotive international trade network has changed since the beginning of the 1990s; (2) whether regionalization has increased over time; (3) how the role that rising powers play within and between regions interacts with regionalization patterns. Our findings suggest that the structure of trade has changed significantly over the last two decades in all components. The network for electric and electrical parts and engines has evolved to become more hierarchical, with a cohesive core tied to hangers-on in the periphery, while the opposite has happened for rubber and metal. Regionalization patterns also show important differences across components. Finally, we have found an apparent association between the strengthening of regionalization patterns and the role played by traditional players and rising powers.

In the early years of the twenty-first century the narrative of “emerging powers” and “rising powers” seemed to provide a clear and powerful picture of how international relations and global politics were changing. Yet dramatic changes in the global system have led many to conclude that the focus on the BRICS and the obsession with the idea of rising powers reflected a particular moment in time that has now passed. The story line is now about backlash at the core; and, with the exception of China, rising powers have returned to their role as secondary or supporting actors in the drama of global politics. Such a conclusion is profoundly mistaken for three sets of reasons: the continued reality of the post-Western global order; the need to understand nationalist backlash as a global phenomenon; and the imperative of locating and strengthening a new pluralist conception of global order.

India is gradually changing its course from decades of inward-looking economics and strong anti-Western foreign policies. It has become more pragmatic, seeing important economic benefits from globalization, and some political benefits of working with the United States to achieve New Delhi's great-power aspirations. Despite these changes, I argue that India's deep-seated anti-colonial nationalism and commitment to strategic autonomy continues to form the core of Indian identity. This makes India's commitment to Western-dominated multilateral institutions and Western norms, such as humanitarian intervention, partial and instrumental. Thus, while Indian foreign-policy discourse shows little sign of seeking to fully challenge the U.S.-led international order beyond largely reformist measures of building parallel institutions such as the New Development Bank, India will continue to strongly resist Western actions that weaken sovereignty norms.