This study examined the sources of glare and range in luminance levels in eleven UK cattle abattoirs, and the effect of reflected glare from a footbath on balking behaviour of cows in a milking parlour. At the abattoirs, the mean luminance levels decreased from 240,000 cd m−2 outdoors to 100 cd m−2 in the stunning pen. In five of the abattoirs, the luminance of the glare from wet floor surfaces was three times higher than the luminance from the surrounding darker areas, and the luminance of the glare from shiny metal surfaces was ten times higher than the luminance from the adjacent darker areas. In the glare study, frequency of balking increased significantly from 10 to 23% when reflected glare increased from 0 (no lightbulb) to 873 cd m−2 (100 W bulb), but significantly fewer animals balked during the afternoon milking than at the morning milking times.

The ‘Price of Anarchy’ states that the performance of multi-agent service systems degrades with the agents’ selfishness (anarchy). We investigate a service model in which both customers and the firm are strategic. We find that, for a Stackelberg game in which the server invests in capacity before customers decide whether or not to join, there can be a ‘Benefit of Anarchy’, that is, customers acting selfishly can have a greater overall utility than customers who are coordinated to maximize their overall utility. We also show that customer anarchy can be socially beneficial, resulting in a ‘Social Benefit of Anarchy’. We show that such phenomena are rather general and can arise in multiple settings (e.g. in both profit-maximizing and welfare-maximizing firms, in both capacity-setting and price-setting firms, and in both observable and unobservable queues). However, the underlying mechanism leading to the Benefit of Anarchy can differ significantly from one setting to another.

We consider an M/M/1 retrial queue subject to negative customers (called as G-retrial queue). The arrival of a negative customer forces all positive customers to leave the system and causes the server to fail. At a failure instant, the server is sent to be repaired immediately. Based on a natural reward-cost structure, all arriving positive customers decide whether to join the orbit or balk when they find the server is busy. All positive customers are selfish and want to maximize their own net benefit. Therefore, this system can be modeled as a symmetric noncooperative game among positive customers and the fundamental problem is to identify the Nash equilibrium balking strategy, which is a stable strategy in the sense that if all positive customers agree to follow it no one can benefit by deviating from it, that is, it is a strategy that is the best response against itself. In this paper, by using queueing theory and game theory, the Nash equilibrium mixed strategy in unobservable case and the Nash equilibrium pure strategy in observable case are considered. We also present some numerical examples to demonstrate the effect of the information together with some parameters on the equilibrium behaviors.

In this paper we deal with an M/G/1 vacation system with the sojourn time (wait plus service) limit and two typical vacation rules, i.e. multiple and single vacation rules. Using the level crossing approach, we derive recursive equations for the steady-state distributions of the virtual waiting times in M/G/1 vacation systems with a general vacation time and two vacation rules.

In a multi server queuing system, buffer size is often larger than the number of servers.This necessitates queuing and waiting for some customers. Customers become impatient whilewaiting for service. Additionally, they may also become impatient if service is notoffered at the desired rate. This paper analyses a finite buffer multi server queuingsystem with the additional restriction that customers may balk as well as renege. Closedform expressions of a number of performance measures are presented. A design problem isdiscussed to demonstrate the results derived.

In this paper we deal with an M/G/1 vacation system with the sojourn time (wait plus service) limit and two typical vacation rules, i.e. multiple and single vacation rules. Using the level crossing approach, explicit expressions for the steady-state distributions of the virtual waiting times are obtained in vacation systems with exponential and constant service times, a general vacation time, and two vacation rules.

In this paper, a single server finite buffer Markovian queuing system is analyzed with the additional restriction that customers may balk as well as renege. Reneging considered in literature is usually of position independent type where the reneging rate is constant irrespective of the position of the customer in the system. However there are many real world situations where this assumption does not hold. This paper is an attempt to model balking with position dependent reneging. Explicit closed form expressions of a number of performance measures are presented. A typical problem is discussed to demonstrate the usefulness of results derived in the paper.

In a G/GI/c loss system with balking, reneging, or limited waiting space, deleting some of the arriving customers can either increase or decrease the fraction of the remaining arrivals who get served, depending on how customers are deleted. We present a model in which the random deletion of arrivals independently and with some fixed probability can never decrease the fraction of the remaining arrivals who get served.

In this paper we consider the general birth-and-death queueing model of Natvig (1975). Define the input and output processes by the steady-state behaviour of respectively successive input and output intervals. Ignoring balking customers, two cases are considered. In the first case we treat a lost customer neither as an input nor as an output, then secondly as both. For both cases we show the input and output processes to be reverse processes. One mistake and two erroneous comments in Natvig (1975) are also corrected.

A single-server queue with batch arrivals in a non-homogeneous Poisson process and with balking is studied with respect to the busy period, using supplementary variables. A system of integral equations is obtained on the base of which the transforms are expressed in series. For the homogeneous case, assuming finite waiting room, the solutions are obtained via Cramer's rule. This gives asymptotic expressions for the expectations for large arrival intensity. An efficiency measure giving the long run loss probability is given. For a special case contour integral representations are given as solutions.

The steady-state input and output processes are considered for a birth-and-death queueing model with N waiting positions (0 ≦ N ≦ ∞), s servers (1 ≦ s ≦ ∞) and an arbitrary queueing discipline. Let an index n indicate that the quantity in question depends on the system state but not on time t. The instantaneous arrival rate is λ, the probability of balking (i.e., not trying to obtain service) being ξn. The instantaneous departure rate, μn, of customers having joined the system is the sum of the rate of service completions and the rate of defections before service completion. Three cases are considered. We start by ignoring balking customers; in the first case treating a lost customer neither as an input nor as an output, then secondly as both. Finally, balking and lost customers are considered both as inputs and outputs.