The fourth chapter gives a succinct historical description of the secular nationalist ideologies in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel and compares the secular political movements in these countries as they have different regime types and political cultures. The chapter also provides brief biographical accounts of the three top executive leaders from each country: Bashar al-Assad, Saad al-Hariri, and Benjamin Netanyahu. The authors also present and compare the operational code results of the leaders and deliberate on what kind of generic foreign policy behavior and strategies we should expect from secular nationalist leaders. The chapter also sheds light on what these results and strategies mean for MENA politics and for the international relations discipline.

This chapter explores the foreign policy discourse of the old Anglosphere coalition during the first phase of the crisis and civil war in Syria, from early 2011 to mid 2012. First, the chapter considers the Anglosphere response to the Arab Uprisings, as protests spread to Syria. Second, it analyses the evolution of Anglosphere foreign policy discourse, as Assad’s crackdowns intensified. Third, it analyses calls for regime change and support for regional allies, amidst a policy of not intervening militarily. In all three cases, the USA is shown to lead, within a nevertheless intimately interconnected old Anglosphere coalition. This analysis sets the ground for shifting Anglosphere foreign policy from August 2012, as chemical weapons concerns rapidly overtook a policy of democracy promotion at a distance.

This chapter traces the development of the crisis and civil war in Syria through the identification of four distinct but overlapping phases, which structure and set the context for the analysis in the book’s second half. The focus here is on domestic developments within Syria, rather than Anglosphere foreign policy. First, the origins of the crisis are mapped out, beginning with the regional Arab Uprisings in the spring of 2011. During this phase of the conflict, the crisis in Syria developed as a battle for human rights and democratic reform. Second, the chapter traces the war’s next phase, which was dominated by concerns about – and the use of – chemical weapons, following Obama’s 2012 pronouncement of a red line and the subsequent attack in Ghouta in 2013. Third, the chapter charts the rise of Islamic State in 2014. In this period, Syria became the epicentre of a new War on Terror. Fourth, from late summer 2015, the chapter traces the emergence of Syria as an explicit site of Great Power proxy warfare, following the intervention of Russia on behalf of Assad.

This chapter charts Syria’s descent into conflict, from the eruption of demonstrations in March 2011 to the unrestrained brutality that would come to characterise the Syrian conflict – itself an umbrella for a number of distinct conflicts, both civil and international. The chapter focuses on the Syrian government’s leading role in Syria’s conflagration. Beginning with an analysis of the conflict’s origins and the Syrian government’s strategy, which developed from suppression and terror to a ‘total war’, the chapter describes the conduct of the Syrian government against its own people, elaborating on the chemical weapons attacks. It then discusses Russia’s and Iran’s intervention and concludes with an assessment of the implications of the conflict on the civil society in Syria in terms of deaths and casualties, demographic changes in the population of Syria, and the economic repercussions of the conflict.

A personal note, written by a Syrian human rights activist and political dissident. Dr Allabwani became an opponent of the Baathist rule in 1981 (during Hafez al-Assad’s Presidency), having witnessed the Hama massacre during his compulsory military service as a medical doctor. In 2000, when Bashar al-Assad became president, Dr. Allabwani took part in meetings of activists who called for political reforms and the strengthening of civil society and institutions, later known as the ’Damascus Spring’. Dr Allabwani was arrested for his involvement and was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, where he was held in solitary confinement. In this epilogue, Allabwani describes his perspective of the Syrian conflict and his vision for Syria – for the state he hopes one day his country will become but which, at this juncture, seems as remote as ever.