An unresolved question in sacramental theology is whether the Mass is to be considered as limited or unlimited in its efficacy, and in what sense. In modern times, this question has been less discussed, in part from a concern that it is incorrect to attempt to speak of spiritual realities in quantitative terms. I defend the use of such quantitative language, and its application to the so-called special fruit of the Mass, understood both ‘intensively’ and ‘extensively’. I then summarise the two principal positions taken on the question of the efficacy of the Mass, referring to an important representative of each, Cajetan and Bellarmine. I argue that neither position is fully satisfying. I note that authors have generally failed to find a coherent position in Aquinas's two treatments of the question. I argue that these two positions are in fact coherent, and when combined allow for a new proposal about the fruits of the Mass, integrating the insights of all parties. This proposal may be summed up as intensive infinitude and extensive finitude. I finish by an analogy between the Mass thus understood and one aspect of Aquinas's Christology.

Recently, historians of the international system have called into question the significance of the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648 as the moment when the international system formed. One of their primary arguments is that the non-intervention norm typically associated with Westphalian notions of sovereignty developed much later. This paper will examine the early 17th-century debates over the right of the Pope to depose monarchs in the defense of spiritual matters. I read Part III and Part IV of Hobbes’ Leviathan in its intellectual context to see how his theory of sovereignty was partially developed to support a theory of non-intervention. This reading leads to two important contributions to current political science debates. First, it refutes the growing consensus that non-intervention developed as an aspect of sovereignty only in the late 18th and early 19th century. Second, the paper addresses current attempts to assert a right of humanitarian intervention. By exploring similarities between these recent debates and those between Bellarmine and Hobbes in the 17th century, I offer a fresh perspective on what is at stake in current claims to international community.