This article examines the legal principles governing the sharing of benefits deriving from the exploration and use of outer space. It shows that, over time, three strands of State practice have developed different understandings of the content of the obligation contained in Article I, paragraph 1 of the Outer Space Treaty. While drawing parallels with other areas of international law, the article examines the role of equity in the structure of the obligation and evaluates the possibility of replacing considerations of equivalence with a proportionality test to facilitate the fulfilment of the benefit sharing obligation under the Outer Space Treaty.

Humankind’s exploration and use of outer space are first and foremost limited by the obligation of non-appropriation. This prohibition, with an aim to prevent conflicts arising from competing territorial claims, does not extend to the exploitation of abiotic resources in space. Recent state practice has shown a clear trend of regarding such exploitation as a freedom of exploration and use of outer space. The future international legal regime should prohibit property claims over natural resources in place on celestial bodies, avoid the controversial issue of ownership, co-ordinate the resource activities of different entities by a stage-specific and priority-right-based mechanism, and harden the obligations of capacity-building and co-operation. The ideas of parallel system and monetary benefit sharing should not be discarded although resistance from major space-faring countries is foreseeable.

The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its 2010 Nagoya Protocol brought about a breakthrough in global policy making. They combined a concern for the environment with a commitment to resolving longstanding human injustices regarding access to, and use of biological resources. In particular, the traditional knowledge of indigenous communities was no longer going to be exploited without fair benefit sharing. Yet, for 25 years after the adoption of the CBD, there were no major benefit sharing agreements that led to significant funding streams for indigenous communities. This changed with the signing of the Rooibos Benefit Sharing Agreement in South Africa, described in this paper. As the authors report, the Rooibos Agreement is a superlative in two respects. It is the biggest benefit sharing agreement between industry and indigenous peoples to date. It is also the first industry-wide agreement to be formed in accordance with biodiversity legislation. This article is a co-production between traditional knowledge holders, the lawyer who represented their interests, the Co-Chair of the Nagoya Protocol negotiations, and an ethicist who analyzed the major challenges of this historic agreement. With no precedent in the benefit sharing world, the agreement stands as a concrete example of the ‘art of the possible.’ Although the rooibos case is unique in a number of aspects, the experience offers many transferable insights, including: patience; incrementalism; honesty; trust; genuine dialogue; strong legal support; a shared recognition that a fair, win-win deal is possible; government leadership; and unity amongst indigenous peoples. Such ingredients of success can apply well beyond southern Africa.

Providing benefits to local people from forest conservation programmes is an important issue for policy makers. Livelihood projects are a common way to provide benefits, but there is little information about their costs. We analysed 463 livelihood projects in the Ankeniheny-Zahamena Corridor Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) pilot project in Madagascar to understand how different approaches to delivering livelihood projects affect costs. We compared costs across four approaches: conservation agreements, small grants, direct implementation and application of social safeguards. The approach impacted overall costs and the proportion of funds reaching communities. Projects implemented as safeguards were most expensive and had the lowest proportion of expenditures reaching the community. Projects provided as part of conservation agreements directed the highest proportion of expenditures to communities. Our results highlight that how livelihood projects are delivered has implications for project costs and community benefits and should be an important consideration in the design and implementation of REDD+ and forest conservation policies.

International negotiations for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) were finally concluded in 2015. However, due to the complex design and implementation processes of REDD+ policies and measures, including benefit sharing at national and subnational levels, several challenges exist for sustainably reducing emissions while simultaneously managing the provision of social and environmental side-objectives. We review the realities of REDD+ implementation in 13 REDD+ candidate countries and the risks related to REDD+ policies and benefit sharing based upon a synthesis of the findings presented in ‘country profiles’ that were developed between 2009 and 2013 as part of the Center for International Forestry Research's (CIFOR) Global Comparative Study on REDD+. We find that REDD+ policies in all countries studied are at high risk of ineffectiveness, inequity and inefficiency. By classifying these risks and understanding not only their impacts on different stakeholder groups, but also the consequences for achieving specific objectives, countries can identify solutions in order to address these shortcomings in their implementation of REDD+.

Sharing of benefits from nature conservation is widely regarded as a way to enhance local residents’ support for protected areas. While in past years, the effectiveness of such approaches has been investigated in detail, governance processes underpinning benefit sharing have received less attention. This study examines the legislation and implementation practice of a revenue sharing scheme in southern Ethiopia, an area that is currently undergoing substantial social and environmental changes that threaten livelihoods and ecosystems. Based on qualitative data from interviews, group discussions and workshops, four main areas of shortcomings in the current legislation and implementation practice were identified: information provision; imbalanced roles and responsibilities; compromised accountability; and the lack of connection between revenue and wildlife tourism in the minds of the recipients. While some of these factors fostered misunderstandings and misuse of the monies, others meant that even where revenue was disbursed it was not connected with wildlife conservation, and thus did not have the intended effect. A comparison between these factors and those in the literature on the evaluation of comanagement arrangements revealed substantial overlap. Revenue sharing may be regarded as part of the comanagement of wildlife areas, but to be successful the management of these areas needs to be shared, and not just the financial benefits.