Joe Biden’s first two years became a turning point. The country had reached a point where it was obvious that the mix of government and markets had titled too much in the direction of markets. Besides the COVID pandemic, Biden confronted growing inflation, an economic recession, and Trump’s refusal to do anything to address climate change, together with a deeply divided partisan Congress. Biden galvanized the Democrats to unite around significant and bold responses and even obtained bipartisan support for some of his legislative agenda. He passed legislation to address COVID and increase government investment in infrastructure and technological developments. Regarding these successes and the inability to do more, Biden focused on how the balance between government and markets depends on the role of government right-sizing that balance by trying to restore confidence in American government and American democracy.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) seeks to end impunity for the world’s worst crimes to contribute to their prevention. But what is its impact to date? This book takes an in-depth look at four countries under scrutiny of the ICC: Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya, and Uganda. It puts forward an analytical framework to assess the impact of the ICC on four levels: on domestic legal systems (systemic effect); on peace negotiations and agreements (transformative effect); on victims (reparative effect); and on the perceptions of affected populations (demonstration effect). It concludes that the ICC is having a normative impact on domestic legal systems and peace agreements, but it has brought little reparative justice for victims, and it does not necessarily correspond with how affected populations view justice priorities. The book concludes that justice for the world’s worst crimes has no “universal formula” that can easily be captured in the law of the ICC.

Prisons in this country did not fill simply because crime went up, police arrested more people, and judges sent them to prison. The crime surge’s primary contribution was that it fostered an environment where politicians and the public became attracted to harsh criminal laws. The steady ratcheting up of the severity of American criminal law played a larger role in Mass Incarceration than the transitory crime rise. This chapter introduces the critical punitive pattern: crime leads to public outrage, and outrage leads to harsher laws.

Chapter 7 concludes this book with an analysis of two key speeches delivered by President Biden on the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Biden’s speeches served, yet again, to co-constitute nation/empire, the familial and the political, deploying these co-constitutions to authorize and legitimize American imperial violence. In the process, Biden re-articulated to necropolitical law, relying on political myth to ground his narratives of authority, legitimacy, and community. With myth doing the work of law, imperial violence directed at distant, racialized Others reconstituted America as a community of power

This chapter addresses the Federal Trade Commission’s Nixing the Fix report, assessing both its promises and its limitations.

Solicitation of foreign interference in an election represents a betrayal of public trust because it threatens to undermine the people’s right of self-determination – a foundational norm of our constitutional order. Section 1 of the chapter focuses on candidate Trump’s solicitation of Russian email hacking during his speech in Florida in July of 2016 – a speech that set the tone for much of what was to come during the Trump presidency. Likewise, Section 2 focuses on an even more daring solicitation: President Trump’s solicitation of interference from Ukraine during a call with its President, Volodymyr Zelensky. Section 3 looks at the legal status of the domestic norm against soliciting foreign interference. This chapter argues that, for the removal of all doubt, Congress should pass a new statute criminalizing the solicitation of foreign involvement in elections. Section 4 responds to the argument that such a statute could not be applied against the President because doing so would conflict with the President’s constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations. Finally, Section 5 examines the ultimate remedy of impeachment as a tool for sanctioning a President who solicits foreign involvement in an election.