The linchpin of colonial administration under regulatory imperialism was the royal governor. The crown relied on royal governors to control the colony’s political agenda, especially on fiscal matters. Yet, in most colonies, assemblies managed to invert this plan and claim almost complete fiscal power for themselves – one of the most important developments under imperial administration in the New World. To explain this, the present chapter develops a strategic logic of bargaining between assemblies and governors and the accountability of governors to the crown. The logic shows how governors were able to make major political concessions to assemblies, yet evade accountability to the crown for them. As a result, regulatory imperialism was unable to restrain the independence of colonial legislatures.

A key component of regulatory imperialism was controlling the colonial government. While the crown accepted colonial assemblies as independent bodies, it attempted to regulate the laws they passed. In particular, imperial officials in London asserted the power to review all colonial legislation and declare acts void if they violated English law or imperial policy. This chapter examines royal legislative review from a strategic perspective as an auditing system. It shows that legislative review worked in part by inducing royal governors to exercise stricter scrutiny over colonial legislation before it ever reached London. At the same time, the analysis shows that legislative review was inherently imperfect. The cost of review to imperial officials ensured that colonial assemblies could pass laws that imperial officials opposed. As a result, legislative review was unable to eliminate the autonomy of colonial assemblies.

In the early 1920s, Hubert Llewellyn Smith took the lead in developing a new framework for multilateral trade policy in the Economic Committee of the League of Nations. He integrated the existing bilateral treaty regime into the League by imposing new forms of international oversight and standardization – most notably by codifying the most-favoured-nation norm. He also crafted a new rule-making routine to support the development of standalone multilateral agreements on key topics such as customs administration. Llewellyn Smith worked hard to preserve the status of the British Empire as an autonomous but segmented sub-unit within the League but he also understood that doing so would constrain Britain’s leadership capacity. Consequently, he aired on the side of caution, seeking consensus, working incrementally, and avoiding bold provocation. His limited ambitions allowed him to focus on crafting a new multilateral process, with important consequences for the subsequent history of international trade policy in the interwar period and beyond.

Chapter 5 examines Burke’s attempt to reform the constitutional structure of the British government, as outlined in his Speech on Economical Reform and related speeches on the same subject. The animating principles behind Speech on Economical Reform reveal broader patterns of Burke’s economic thought regarding the virtues of contracts, free commerce, and the private stewardship of land. I also explain that Burke’s qualified defense of public administration illustrated his belief that the state was necessary in civil society to perpetuate elements of permanence beneath the vagaries of everyday life. He did not seek to strip government of all offices and pensions in order to reduce its footprint to the lowest possible level, thereby distinguishing himself from many classical liberals and modern-day libertarians who endorse a minimalist state. Instead, Burke contended that the most effective form of government was one that was firm and selective in the fulfillment of specific duties, and one that rewarded industrious public employees for their service to the state. I underscore further that Burke’s economical program exemplifies his philosophy of reform: in order to preserve institutions, such as the British Constitution, they must be modified to adapt to shifting circumstances.