This article analyses the endogenous choice of farmers to be organic or conventional in a groundwater evolutionary model when a tax on fertiliser on conventional farmers is implemented by a regulatory agency. The analysis of the model shows that the coexistence of both type of farmers only occurs when the decrease in productivity due to organic production is relatively low and the price premium for organic products is relatively high. However, even if conversion is welfare improving, our results show that this conversion may be done at the expense of the water resource with a lower water table. An application to the Western la Mancha aquifer (Spain) illustrates the main results.

This paper proposes a theoretical insurance model to explain well-documented loss underreporting and to study how strategic underreporting affects insurance demand. We consider a utility-maximizing insured who purchases a deductible insurance contract and follows a barrier strategy to decide whether she should report a loss. The insurer adopts a bonus-malus system with two rate classes, and the insured will move to or stay in the more expensive class if she reports a loss. First, we fix the insurance contract (deductibles) and obtain the equilibrium reporting strategy in semi-closed form. A key result is that the equilibrium barriers in both rate classes are strictly greater than the corresponding deductibles, provided that the insured economically prefers the less expensive rate class, thereby offering a theoretical explanation to underreporting. Second, we study an optimal deductible insurance problem in which the insured strategically underreports losses to maximize her utility. We find that the equilibrium deductibles are strictly positive, suggesting that full insurance, often assumed in related literature, is not optimal. Moreover, in equilibrium, the insured underreports a positive amount of her loss. Finally, we examine how underreporting affects the insurer’s expected profit.

This paper deals with the phenomenon of poverty-trap regimes in Mexico, that is, self-reinforcing mechanisms in which municipalities which start poor remain poor. We develop a coordination game of poverty traps driven by strategic interactions of economic agents: people choose to complete or not their education levels since it might be excessively costly and unprofitable. A one-shot game is constructed and then converted into a system of differential equations in which strategies that perform relatively better become more abundant in the population. Applying evolutionary games and symbolic-regimes dynamics (nonparametric and nonlinear techniques), we show that Mexican regions are in poverty-trap regimes (stable and dynamically evolving low-level equilibria) characterized by incomplete education and low income since initial conditions (education and income per capita) are such (very precarious) that poverty is the stable steady-state situation. We examine scenarios to show that to overcome the high-poverty regime by the year 2030, it is necessary to reduce incomplete education by 10% in the 5-year periods 2020–2025 and 2025–2030 and increase per-capita income by 10% in both periods.

This paper studies dynamic reinsurance contracting and competition problems under model ambiguity in a reinsurance market with one primary insurer and n reinsurers, who apply the variance premium principle and who are distinguished by their levels of ambiguity aversion. The insurer negotiates reinsurance policies with all reinsurers simultaneously, which leads to a reinsurance tree structure with full competition among the reinsurers. We model the reinsurance contracting problems between the insurer and reinsurers by Stackelberg differential games and the competition among the reinsurers by a non-cooperative Nash game. We derive equilibrium strategies in semi-closed form for all the companies, whose objective is to maximize their expected surpluses penalized by a squared-error divergence term that measures their ambiguity. We find that, in equilibrium, the insurer purchases a positive amount of proportional reinsurance from each reinsurer. We further show that the insurer always prefers the tree structure to the chain structure, in which the risk of the insurer is shared sequentially among all reinsurers.

U.S. soybean farmers are currently grappling with dicamba herbicide drift. Using a network diffusion framework that accommodates key features of soybean farmer networks, we estimate the damages incurred from dicamba drift across different regions. Under our baseline assumptions, we estimate an average yield loss of 3% and predict sizable levels of forced switching to dicamba-resistant seed in response to drift. The relative importance of drift on damage and seed choice holds across a range of economic and network assumptions. In the absence of policy, this damage may cause regional adoption rates of dicamba-resistant soybean seed to increase.

This paper introduces the concept of institutional resilience based on a population game. Agents in an economy are randomly matched to play a coordination game with two strategies, cooperate and defect. A breach of contract can be adjudicated in court. Agents can update their strategy, which is modelled using the replicator dynamic. In this context, cooperation is defined as the informal institution, whereas the legal system (contract law) constitutes the formal institution. Institutional resilience is defined by how the formal institution of a functioning legal system complements the informal institution of cooperation in a dynamic way. In the wake of an adverse exogenous shock, the formal institution can prevent a total breakdown of cooperation in the population.

Populist responses to matters of social concern are considered in a framework like that of Acemoglu and Robinson’s ‘narrow corridor’ that supports liberty and justice. We discuss the risk that such responses could result in a country being pushed out of this narrow corridor—and, if so, with what long-run consequences. We conclude that a political system of ‘checks and balances’ can play a key role in keeping the society within the narrow corridor; but it is incumbent on the existing political system to confront the issues of populist concern so as to come up with creative solutions.

We present a multiregional endogenous growth model in which forward-looking agents choose their regions to live in, in addition to consumption and capital accumulation paths. The spatial distribution of economic activity is determined by the interplay between production spillover effects and urban congestion effects. We characterize the global stability of the spatial equilibrium states in terms of economic primitives such as agents’ time preference and intra- and interregional spillovers. We also study how macroeconomic variables at the stable equilibrium state behave according to the structure of the spillover network.

We determine the optimal robust strategy of an individual who seeks to maximize the (penalized) probability of reaching a bequest goal when she is uncertain about the drift of the risky asset and her hazard rate of mortality. We assume the individual can invest in a Black–Scholes market. We solve two optimization problems with ambiguity. The first is to maximize the penalized probability of reaching a bequest goal without life insurance in the market. In the second problem, in addition to investing in the financial market, the individual is allowed to purchase term life insurance to help her reach her bequest goal. As the individual becomes more ambiguity averse concerning the drift of the risky asset, she becomes more conservative with her investment strategy. Also, as she becomes more ambiguity averse about her hazard rate of mortality, numerical work indicates she is more likely to buy life insurance when the ambiguity towards the return of the risky asset is not too large.

This paper investigates the benefits of international cooperation under uncertainty about global warming through a stochastic dynamic game. We analyze the benefits of cooperation both for the case of symmetric and asymmetric players. It is shown that the players’ combined expected payoffs decrease as climate uncertainty becomes larger, whether or not they cooperate. However, the benefits from cooperation increase with climate uncertainty. In other words, it is more important to cooperate when facing higher uncertainty. At the same time, more transfers will be needed to ensure stable cooperation among asymmetric players.

The adoption of a common central Bank has modified the strategic relationships between fiscal and monetary authorities and raised in a new context the issue of debt stabilization. To study this problem, Van Aarle et al (1997) have proposed a two-country model with a common central bank. In a sense they obtained a neutrality result: the adoption of a common central bank does not modify the evolution of debt if the authorities can commit. This note reexamines this neutrality result by departing from the previous authors on three points: i) externalities are introduced between countries to account for the elasticity of the world interest rate to macro-economic policies, ii) the model features n countries, some of them remaining outside the monetary Union, iii) analytical results are given (many results of Van Aarle et al (1997) were numeric). In this extended context the neutrality result collapses: i) the institutional change introduces an asymmetry between countries, ii) countries inside the monetary union improve their long run welfare, iii) but the outside countries can win or lose under the new institutional setting.

The aim of this paper is to evaluate to what extent more transparency can reduce the occurrence of speculative attacks. It proposes a survey of the literature about the pros and cons of transparency on the exchange rate market, which is one of the main pillars of the new international financial architecture. The effects of transparency are shown to be ambiguous both from a theoretical and empirical point of views. However, the imperfect connection resulting from the confrontation between theory and empirics suggests that some new insights are necessary in order to better catch stylised facts on the one hand and to better evaluate the theory on the other, as has been done in recent literature. This leads to new proposals for economic and informational policies.