In essence, democracy in the workplace and the promotion of trade union representation are central to the survival of a democratic society.4 As a labor lawyer, I tend to think that law has a special role to play in this process. Yet my experience derived from Washington and Sacramento, both as a scholar and a practicing lawyer, convinces me of the limits of law. Law is subordinate to other factors, including union devotion to resources, the necessary expenditures involved, and the creation of strategic tactics and vision in organizing the unorganized – as well as foreign competition, American investment abroad, and technological innovation. Law is subordinate and can only play a symbiotic role in the proper promotion of collective bargaining by a reorganized movement. Law, however worthy of reform, has never been the solution in the past and is unlikely to be so now.

We conclude by situating the theory and practice of monetary policy within liberal political economy more generally. As we have seen, there are significant tensions between existing monetary institutions (discretionary central banking) and liberal ideals. This has been made even clearer by the Federal Reserve’s response to COVID-19. In brief, the Fed is now engaging in not only monetary policy but fiscal policy as well. This represents an immense expansion in its mandate, one that poses serious challenges for general and predictable monetary policy. The way out of this mess is embracing a comparative institutions approach to monetary policy. We cannot be satisfied with technical refinements to existing models and data. We need to explore alternative monetary policy rules, ones that are effective at providing macroeconomic stability while also respecting the requirements of democracy.