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By 1977–78, the Horn of Africa became a key area of Soviet–American rivalry, with both superpowers supporting rival regimes. Both the Soviets and the Americans wanted their clients to embrace specific legitimating discourses, such as human rights or Marxism-Leninism, establishing patterns of deference, recognition, and legitimation. By the late 1970s, China concluded that involvement in Africa was not worth the cost and retreated, while the Soviets continued despite the costs. Driven by inertia of proletarian internationalism, Moscow sought involvement in faraway struggles, seeking recognition as the leader of revolutionary forces. As before, the Soviets failed to see the contradiction between detente with the United States and supporting third world revolutions. Meanwhile, in the late 1970s, the Cold War was reshaped by China's transformation under Deng Xiaoping, who shifted focus from revolution to development. This strategic pivot led China to lean toward America, which the United States welcomed to contain the Soviet threat. Despite being based on tactical choices rather than shared values, this alignment deeply worried Soviet leaders.
The Deal New regulated banks, transportation, and energy among other industries, in the 1930s. In the 1970s, there was a mostly bipartisan effort to reduce regulation in those industries. Although Ronald Reagan is known as the deregulation president, it was Jimmy Carter that started deregulation in each of those industries. Alfred Kahn, whom Carter appointed to lead the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), together with recently retired Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, advised Senator Ted Kennedy on how to deregulate airlines. The deregulation of truck, railroad, bus, and transportation, along with natural gas deregulation, followed. Deregulation was based on policy evidence that changes in those industries made it possible to lessen regulation and depend on markets to achieve greater efficiencies. By comparison, Congress decision to reduce regulation of savings and loan banks, based on industry lobbying, ended in disaster as S&Ls failed because of risky behavior and Congress had to bail them out. On balance, the regulation that occurred rebalanced the mix of government and markets in order to achieve a more robust economy.
The proposal to create a transitional regime of autonomy for the Arab population of the West Bank was initiated by Israel Prime Minister Begin. Through US mediation, the idea of autonomy was adopted by Egypt and Israel at Camp David as a program of full autonomy to the Arab inhabitants. The Camp David Accords proposed withdrawing the Israel military administration from the West Bank and Gaza and replacing it, for a transitional period of five years, with an elected council. The issue of the final status, after the termination of the five-year period, was left open to negotiation. The Accords referred to “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.” This phrase could be understood as referring to a right of self-determination but it was not stated explicitly. Egypt and Israel failed to agree on the implementation of the autonomy plan. The issues that prevented agreement were participation of East Jerusalem Arabs in the elections for the Council and the powers and responsibilities that were to be transferred to the elected council. The main elements of the Camp David Accords were, later, adopted by the Israel-PLO “Oslo” agreements.
In 1993, Sue Rodriguez was unsuccessful in her efforts to persuade the Supreme Court of Canada that the Canadian Criminal Code prohibitions on voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide violated her rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Some twenty years later, in February 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously struck down the very same prohibitions in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General). The next year, the Canadian Parliament passed Bill C-14 – An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical assistance in dying). Medical assistance in dying is now legal in Canada and it has become an illuminating case study for other jurisdictions contemplating assisted dying. This chapter describes the journey from Rodriguez to Carter to Bill C-14 and reflects on the lessons to be learned from the two interconnected yet distinct pathways to law reform taken in Canada (a court challenge and federal legislation). While there are obviously critical differences between jurisdictions such that the Canadian path cannot simply be replicated, this chapter draws out transferable lessons about law reform in this area.
The introductory chapter is a brief recap of the history and origins of wind power, from windmills in ancient times to today’s multi-megawatt turbines. Energy security has arguably been the historic driver for wind power, and it was a primary source of mechanical power until the advent of the Industrial Revolution, when it was superceded by coal and oil. The first electricity-generating wind turbines were built in the late nineteenth centry, and the technology was pursued most vigorously in Denmark, a country with limited energy reserves: the role of this country in creating the modern wind turbine is described. The worldwide energy crisis of the 1970s brought wind power into the frame internationally, and the pivotal role of legislation under President Carter in expanding the market for wind energy in the US and elsewhere is outlined. Since then, the rationale for wind power has expanded to include climate change, and the technology has grown exponentially in terms of global installation of wind power and the physical size of wind turbines. The chapter concludes by introducing some of the technological steps that have enabled this process, which are detailed in subsequent chapters.
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