I stake out a contemporary context in which democracy seems to be under attack from the populist right, and neglected by parts of the progressive left caught up with a politics of the personal. In a polarised world, persuading others to change their sense of who they are has become more difficult. I draw on Jonathan Haidt to show how most decisions are made on the basis of emotion rather than reason. Hannah Arendt and Chantal Mouffe argue for the importance of public argument and the theatricality of political life, prioritising social roles over personal authenticity. From a liberal perspective, Judith Shklar speaks to the inevitability of hypocrisy in democratic politics. Matthew Flinders, Alan Finlayson and David Runciman are contemporary theorists who identify the need for political science to take on the problem of rhetoric. From truth and hypocrisy, I turn to the question of representation. A democratic politician represents those who vote for her or him much as an actor in a play represents a character. Theatre offers a lens through which to contemplate problems of selfhood and identity, and the paradox of the sincere liar.

This chapter analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of democracies over nondemocracies when it comes to responding adequately to climate change in order to reflect on their implications for democratic education, understood as an ideal of education in which those educated come to a personal, informed awareness of the nature of political reality and a personal and informed understanding and assessment of the value of the two main components of the ideal of democracy: popular sovereignty and the recognition of human beings’ fundamental equality. The chapter offers three conclusions. First, we have reason to invest in democratic education – not just climate education. Second, radical (or agonistic) democratic education can be considered an important corrective and supplement to other approaches. Third, the primary value of democratic education, in the face of climate change, lies in responsibilizing students – fostering serious personal engagement with the issue.

Drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida, this chapter argues that we should think about democracy in a provisional key. Democracy is provisional because it puts itself into question. It does so when we take the question “what is democracy?” to be part of democracy, which means that we must ask “what is the demos?” and “what is rule?” We end up with a conception of democracy whereby the people is at once prior to and a result of the rule of the people, and so we never arrive at a final answer to the questions “who is the demos?” and “what is rule?” Treating democracy as provisional does not necessarily solve major challenges such as the environmental crisis and inequality, but it allows us to approach these challenges from a new and more fruitful angle. I discuss this with particular attention to current debates about the climate crisis.

This chapter takes the form of an interview of Chantal Mouffe by Pablo Ouziel. In the course of thirteen questions and answers, it ranges over the main substance and central features of Mouffe’s complex democratic thought. After exploring the complex theoretical grounding of Mouffe’s engagement with and contribution to democratic theory, it explores the implications of her approach for addressing that current conjuncture, which she calls a post-democracy age. She presents her arguments for a left populist response to dominant forms of right-wing populism and neoliberalism in Europe and diagnoses the role of right populism though the example of Brexit.

Chapter 2 critiques two prominent approaches to the question of difference and disagreement. Engaging with John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas’s accounts of “deliberative democracy,” the chapter first argues that discursive approaches to democracy “aim too high.” They overestimate the degree to which a basic “liberal public culture” is secure, and do not provide convincing accounts of how citizens can become (and continue to be) steadfast liberal democrats who will do what it takes to sustain liberal democracy. The chapter then probes “realist” approaches to democracy. Focusing on William Connolly and Chantal Mouffe’s accounts of “democratic agonism,” the chapter argues that realist approaches “aim too low.” They overestimate the ability of sound institutions to channel difference and disagreement, and do not adequately acknowledge the need for a sense of unity to prevent difference and disagreement from spiralling out of control. This chapter concludes that liberal democracy must be supported by a sense of unity that is oriented toward the preservation of liberal democracy and that does not unduly suppress difference and disagreement.

I introduce the dilemma of monotheistic intolerance in the context of religious violence and the concerns about the limits of liberalism and liberal violence. I then introduce Jan Assmann, René Girard, and Chantal Mouffe as figures useful in reconceptualizing our notions of intolerance, pluralism, and monotheism.

In Chapter 1, I lay out the paradox of “intolerance” as analyzed in the work of Chantal Mouffe. Her understanding of the incompatibility between liberalism and democracy illuminates the complex relationship between pluralism and intolerance. Of crucial concern is how Mouffe’s pluralism requires what I describe as apophatic intolerance, a refusal to lay hold of the Absolute and a refusal of political closure and pure tolerance.

The Conclusion ties the themes of the book together to emphasize monotheism not as an "identity forged negatively against the other," nor as an escape from this othering. Rather, through the apophatic intolerance explored in all chapters, monotheism is conceived as othering-in-reverse, as a revelation of our blindness to scapegoating the other, highlighting our need not for mere inclusivity but agonistic pluralism.