This chapter is concerned with method in art history and focuses on R. G. Collingwood’s impact on Michael Baxandall’s contribution to this subject in Patterns of Intention (1985). It begins with a discussion of Baxandall’s appeal to Collingwood’s notion of “re-enactment” and Karl Popper’s “situational logic,” followed by an explanation of the Collingwoodian roots of his “triangle of re-enactment.” Taking for granted that the proper interpretation of Collingwood’s notion of “re-enactment” is in terms of Peirce’s notion of “abduction,” itself understood in terms of the “Gabbay–Woods schema,” I then offer a reading of chapter IV and Baxandall’s analysis of Piero della Francesca’s Baptism of Christ, that bring to the fore the central influence of Collingwood’s conceptions – the claim being that Baxandall’s successful application of them shows their worth.

This chapter centers on early American Pragmatist philosophers, such as Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, and the abundance of essays they produced, outlining the fundamental tenets of pragmatism. From the beginning, the Pragmatists showed a special affinity for the essay. This genre of writing proved to be the perfect vehicle not simply to fashion and explore provisional truths but to drive home the case that truth is inherently provisional. James and other pragmatists saw thinking as a mode of action in the world, quite different from the standard dualism that separates “mind” from “matter.” Just as the noun essay calls to mind the verb form – to essay, attempt, or try – so pragmatism was for James less a philosophical position or ideology than a method or practice. For James and Dewey in particular, pragmatism helped explain how we use ideas and beliefs to achieve our aims and how we modify and adapt those ideas and beliefs as we test them in the contexts of our daily living and engagement with others. The chapter dwells on the most important pragmatist essays and shows the many ways these influenced later pragmatist-oriented philosophers, even up to today.

8. From early formulations of this theory, Moscovici viewed ‘meaning’ and ‘knowledge’ as semiotic processes and expressed them as a triadic model in two formulations. The two formulations of the triadic model are complementary. First, in the figurative equation ‘representation = figure/signification’, Moscovici foregrounded the infinite meaning- and knowledge-making processes of social representations through objectification and anchoring. The figurative equation can be represented as a triad involving representation, figure, and signification. Both Peirce’s and Moscovici’s triadic models form wholes in which their elements are linked in and through indivisible relations. Signs and symbols are expressed through various means, among which name-giving is particularly notable. Changing the name implies a symbolic effort to change the identity of the bearer of that name and signifies the Self’s attempt to belong to a group or to specific Others. Divergencies between ‘meanings’ and ‘knowledge’ in professional practices have the potential to inspire intervention practices in fields such as health, education, and therapies.

The second formulation of the triadic model is expressed in the Ego–Alter–Object, which refers to the theory of social representations and communication as a theory of social knowledge.

Historians are constantly confronted with the twin problems of translating texts and interpreting their meanings. When mathematicians like Georg Cantor or Abraham Robinson demonstrate the consistency of concepts that, since the paradoxes of Zeno and Democritus, have been assumed to be paradoxical notions like infinitesimals or the actual infinite, how should the works of earlier mathematicians be regarded, who either used such concepts or believed they had proven their impossibility? Is it anachronistic to use nonstandard analysis or transfinite numbers to “rehabilitate” or explain the works of Leibniz, Euler, Cauchy, or Peirce, for example, as recent mathematicians, historians, and philosophers of mathematics have attempted? At the other extreme, chronologically, how may ideas readily accepted in the West – like incommensurable numbers, parallel lines, and similar triangles – but foreign to traditional Chinese mathematics have adversely affected the interpretations of ancient Chinese mathematical works?

This paper and the one that follows it exemplify Rorty’s use of his early metaphilosophical insights to take on then-prominent topics in linguistic philosophy. “The Paradox of Definitism” critiques modern philosophy’s pervasive privileging, in metaphysics and epistemology, of sharp-edged definiteness over fuzzy indefiniteness, where the latter is deemed a function of human “ignorance and confusion,” rather than, with Aristotle, seen as something existing in nature. Dubbing this bias “definitism,” Rorty characterizes it as “the view that there is nothing which can reasonably be called a statement which is neither true nor false.” A “resurrection’ of pragmatism, he argues, with its contextualism, creates problems for definitists. But he also invites definitists into the pragmatist camp to avoid the paradox they face by recognizing Dewey’s insight that “every transaction will involve both fuzzy and non-fuzzy elements” and Peirce’s view of logic “as a normative rather than a descriptive discipline.”